Kremlin Firm on Jews, Afghan War : Soviet Concessions Few, Aside From Arms Accord

Achieving what Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev called a “breakthrough” on the long-divisive issue of anti-missile defenses, the third summit meeting between the Soviet leader and President Reagan ended Thursday by living up to its high expectations in arms control--greatly advancing prospects that a treaty slashing strategic weapons will be completed in time for a Reagan visit to Moscow next spring.

But the Soviets held fast on other areas of dispute between the superpowers, denying President Reagan any visible success on such issues as Afghanistan and the plight of Soviet Jews. Gorbachev refused to set a final date for withdrawing 115,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan and told Reagan he cannot preach to the Kremlin on human rights.

Thus, while making most of the concessions on arms issues, the Kremlin chief persevered in refusing to allow arms control to appear to be linked to Soviet behavior in the Third World or to what he considers internal matters such as Jewish emigration--areas in which he may have been most vulnerable to criticism from his detractors at home.

The Carter Administration, for example, had followed a strict linkage policy, withdrawing the second strategic arms limitation treaty from the Senate in 1979 after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. And the Reagan Administration had sought to exert similar pressure.

Gorbachev may pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan next year, as the Kremlin has hinted, and perhaps even begin the withdrawal before Reagan travels to Moscow. He may also continue to let the rate of Jewish emigration rise--it is now almost 10 times higher than last year, but still far below the high levels of earlier years. But Gorbachev has made it clear he will not do so under direct U.S. pressure.

Despite these differences, the close of the summit signaled that “a new situation is emerging in the world,” as Secretary of State George P. Shultz said. The new agreements on arms control, now the cornerstone of U.S.-Soviet relations, permit an improved political climate between the superpowers.

“We need a realistic understanding of each other’s intentions and objectives, a process for dealing with differences in a practical and straightforward manner,” Reagan said in his statement bidding Gorbachev goodby. “As a result of this summit, the framework for building such a relationship has been strengthened.”

Gorbachev said in reply that, thanks to the summit, “we have been able to formulate a kind of agenda for joint efforts in the future. This puts the dialogue between our two countries on a more predictable footing and is undoubtedly constructive.” U.S.-Soviet relations are entering “a new phase,” he added, and “we can talk about a deepening political dialogue.”

Thursday began overcast and rainy, with gloomy comments by officials suggesting the summit would end in an anticlimax. Diplomatically cold words such as businesslike , straightforward , and frank were used to describe the two leaders’ final meeting.

Statement Indicates Progress

But the joint statement ending the summit, coupled with interviews with senior Administration officials afterward, made it clear that in fact great progress had been made.

The language in the final statement, which caused the final Reagan-Gorbachev session to be delayed 90 minutes, showed a startling degree of convergence on key arms issues.

Most important was missile defenses and their relation to cuts in strategic offensive weapons, the most powerful and dangerous elements in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Earlier, the two sides had agreed to slash their offensive arsenals of long-range missiles and bombers by about 50%--to 1,600 “delivery vehicles” carrying a total of 6,000 warheads.

The Soviets had insisted, however, that they could not cut their offensive forces without some curb on the the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the anti-missile program popularly known as “Star Wars.”

After failing to win concessions through direct assaults, in recent months, the Soviets had sought such constraints indirectly--through the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which forbids deployment of missile defenses except around one site in each country.

Before the summit, U.S. and Soviet negotiators had agreed to consider extending the non-withdrawal clause of the ABM treaty for a given period of time. But three major differences remained: how long the period would be; what kind of research, development and testing, if any, would be permitted during that period under terms of the treaty; and what would happen at the end of the period.

The length of the period was viewed as a relatively minor issue. The Soviets wanted 10 years, while the United States offered until the end of 1994. At the summit, Reagan and Gorbachev discussed the matter, and while they came to no firm agreement on it, neither side believes it will be difficult to arrive at a compromise, a senior U.S. official said.

Points of Accord Listed

On the other, more crucial issues, however, one was finessed and the Soviets largely conceded to the U.S. position on the other. Specifically:

--The Soviets agreed that during the non-withdrawal period, each side could pursue work under terms of the treaty “as signed in 1972.” In the past, the Soviets insisted on the phrase “as signed and ratified in 1972.”

The Administration is at odds with both the Soviets and most congressional Democrats on the limits of work that can be done under the treaty as the Senate understood it when it was ratified. The Administration holds to a broad interpretation under which everything up to deployment is legal, while the others hold to the narrow interpretation that only limited testing--and none in space--is permitted.

Now the Soviets have agreed to leave the matter unresolved, at least for the time being, perhaps because Congress has already limited the Administration to experiments within the narrow interpretation for the rest of Reagan’s 13 months in office. But at the same time, Moscow has not accepted the broad interpretation.

“I don’t feel that we’ve given up, or that they’ve given up,” said a key senior Administration official on the point.

--The Soviets did make a “substantial concession,” however, he said, on what would happen after the non-withdrawal period ended.

They had insisted that the ABM treaty revert to its old status, under which each side had to give six months’ notice before it could withdraw if its “supreme national interest” were threatened. The Administration, in contrast, wanted the right to deploy space-based missile defenses immediately after the period ended, effectively ending the ABM treaty at that time.

The two sides have now agreed that at the expiration of the non-withdrawal period, missile defenses can be deployed if negotiations, held during the final three years of the period, fail to produce an agreement to continue the ABM treaty.

The Soviets, however, have stated that if the agreement cutting offensive weapons in half is reached, they would feel free to abrogate it if the United States “grossly violated” the ABM treaty during the non-withdrawal period.

According to the senior official who took part in the negotiations, the Soviets indicated they would abrogate the pact only after considerable provocation. Just a few space tests would not do it, he said. The official described “a gross violation” as follows: “If we tested and then demonstrated that we are preparing to deploy (space defenses)--that is consistent with what they said.”

Concessions, often by the Soviets, were also recorded in the negotiations on cutting the strategic weapons arsenals. In particular, the two sides agreed that:

--Within the 6,000-warhead ceiling on strategic weapons, there would be a sublimit of 4,900 warheads on ballistic missiles, including both submarine-launched and land-launched weapons. Earlier, the Soviets wanted a sublimit of 5,100, the United States 4,800. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this sublimit to be crucial because it gives the United States more freedom to strive for an ideal mix of weapons.

--A separate ceiling on sea-launched cruise missiles will be established if ways can be found to distinguish those with nuclear warheads from missiles with conventional warheads. This appeared to be a small U.S. concession, since the Administration previously avoided accepting the concept of limits on these weapons, but it was conditioned on a “mutually” accepted verification regime.

The Soviets came forward with a verification system in which a neutron beam aimed at a ship would cause any fissionable material in it to emit radiation that could be detected. But American officials said nuclear warheads on other weapons inside the naval vessel, such as depth bombs, would give off the same radioactive “signature” as a missile warhead.

--”Counting rules” were set for the number of warheads atop ballistic missiles and for the number of air-launched cruise missiles inside a bomber. The number of warheads permitted on six types of U.S. ballistic missiles and 13 types of Soviet ballistic missiles was established, including eight for the Trident II (or D-5) missile now being developed by the United States.