A Revitalized Taiwan Still Has Reason to Worry After Leader’s Passing

History will be kind to Chiang Ching-kuo, who died last week at age 77. During his presidency, Taiwan completed its economic development and became a newly industrialized country with an average 1987 per-capita gross national product of more than $5,000 and a foreign-exchange reserve of more than $70 billion--behind only Japan and West Germany.

Under his leadership, Taiwan also began the arduous process of democratization. Martial law was lifted, opposition parties and public demonstrations were legalized, the ban on travel to mainland China was ended. All this was accomplished with minimal political turmoil.

But Chiang also left his country with a number of unresolved problems and challenges, including:

--The completion of Taiwan’s transition to full democracy through the establishment of representative institutions and constitutional government.

--A lingering ethnic problem in Taiwan between the native Taiwanese and the mainlanders (those who came to the islands in 1948-49 and their offspring).

--A persistent trade surplus with the United States, totaling $16 billion in 1987, which fuels protectionist sentiments in Congress.

--The challenge posed by China, in particular its unabated threat of military force if necessary to “reunify” Taiwan.

These problems await solution by the ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT). It is perhaps here that Chiang was the most remiss, for he died without having instituted needed and urgent reforms of his party.

To begin with, Chiang had not adequately provided for his succession. In spite of the recent progress toward democratization, Taiwan’s political system remains dominated by a party that is revolutionary and authoritarian in character. Succession to the presidency depends less on formal rules than on the currency of political power. (Chiang became president in 1978 after the death of his father, Chiang Kai-shek.) The astute Chiang had carefully maintained a balance of power among the factions within the KMT so that no one was powerful enough to pose a threat to him. But this power equilibrium can also be dysfunctional--Chiang’s death has left the KMT without a leader.

Former Vice President Lee Teng-hui, the constitutionally designated successor, has been sworn into office, but reportedly lacks the political currency to be anything other than a nominal leader. In particular, Lee lacks the support of the conservatives and the military. Barring unforeseen circumstances, however, Lee will remain president--the figurehead of a collective leadership--until the 1990 election.

Perhaps an even greater problem is the rejuvenation of the KMT’s top echelon to provide for generational succession. In this area the KMT should take a lesson from its mainland rival, the Chinese Communist Party. Last October five elder statesmen in their 80s and 70s, including Deng Xiaoping, resigned from leading positions in the party and government.

In contrast, the membership of the KMT’s highest body, the standing committee, is bloated with elderly men. Some are arch-conservatives who reportedly opposed recent democratic reforms. These men should retire from active management of the party-government, particularly those in their 80s. Their retirement would enable a younger generation of officials, men in their 40s and 50s who have long stagnated in middle-level positions, to finally assume leadership. Many of them are able, progressive and committed to democratization.

How Taiwan’s ruling party deals with these problems will become clearer when the KMT convenes its scheduled 13th Party Congress later this year. This will be a critical congress, for the party must make the difficult transition from a paternalistic party to a more democratic institution.

In the past the composition of the party’s central committee and standing committee was determined by Chiang Ching-kuo. He would submit a list of names, and the party simply acceded to his wishes. The ranking of standing committee members was similarly determined--a reflection more of the individual’s standing with Chiang than of real power or ability.

Now the party’s decision-making process will necessarily be more democratic: Elections will determine committee memberships while rankings within the standing committee will be more indicative of relative power and influence. At the same time, there will also be compromise and trade-offs as well as competition for power and votes. The potential for ruinous factional strife cannot be dismissed.

Much depends on how the Kuomintang weathers this difficult transition. Nothing less than the future of Taiwan is at stake.