Changing the Guard

Senate hearings on a treaty to dismantle all Soviet and American medium-range nuclear missiles are about at midpoint, and so far the treaty doesn’t have a hair out of place.

The roster of character witnesses to appear on its behalf before the Foreign Relations Committee of Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) has been impressive. The secretaries of defense and state, Frank C. Carlucci and George P. Shultz, led the parade, followed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former heads of both departments and others, all but one urging ratification.

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), blundering around in very nearly total ignorance of the subject, did less damage to the treaty than to himself, saying among other things that it was the trigger for a nuclear holocaust.

So far the hearings have pretty much confirmed what was claimed for the treaty when it was signed. It is a small step but a significant one, if for no other reason than that it is the first new arms-control agreement in nearly a decade. Removing the deterrence of nuclear warheads that are pointed at command posts and marshaling areas inside the Soviet Union does not make war more likely in Europe. If only because Soviet missiles were on hair triggers to retaliate against American Pershing 2s, it eliminates a possibility that Western Europe could be torn apart by an unintended nuclear shower. The treaty is stacked in favor of compliance by both sides, but no treaty carries a 100% guarantee against cheating.

During the coming congressional recess, Pell and other senators--including Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee--will confer with civilian and military leaders in Western Europe to satisfy themselves on the most serious question that has been raised about the treaty: Some of our Atlantic allies hate the whole idea of taking the missiles out of Europe, but will say so only in private.

The intermediate-nuclear-forces treaty could go before the full Senate as early as a month from now. During floor debate its real meaning for the next decade or two may become clear.

It does represent the end of an era of about 40 years in which, at least for part of the time, nuclear weapons were an important part of the force that the Soviet Union had to calculate on if it wanted to try to roll into Europe. In recent years the nuclear weapons lost some of their credibility because Soviet and American nuclear forces were at a standoff.

The withdrawal also represents the beginning of a recognition that the United States no longer can afford everything that it contributes to the defense of the allies. Washington has talked that way privately for years. Now the huge U.S. deficit, much of it incurred in the name of Europe’s defense, and its trade deficit have reached the point at which it is no longer talk.

Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev has even worse problems with his own economy--a condition that certainly helped spur the super powers to start cutting military power that both had declared could never be used. It is a direction in which the Senate should encourage both countries to keep moving.