Europe’s Safe Adolescence Is Over : With NATO of ‘60s a Thing of Past, Allies Grope for New Phase

By forcefully outlining his opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s modernization on the eve of the alliance’s summit meeting in Brussels, President Francois Mitterrand was performing a delicate balancing act between East and West. He attended the meeting, but as a dissonant voice within the alliance and within France.

As the French presidential election nears, Mitterrand is increasingly espousing arms control and disarmament in Europe, as if returning to his pre-1981 Socialist stance.

His recent statements illustrate the confusion of a Europe caught between Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s subtle maneuverings and America’s leaderless equivocations. The perceived weakening of NATO’s American pillar leaves a gap to be filled. Each European country seems to be rushing to fill it in the way that it finds historically comfortable: Britain by renewing its old Atlanticist ways, West Germany by turning again toward some sort of united Germany, and France, under Mitterrand, by renewing its old Gaullist rhetoric.

All this may have a familiar and reassuring sound to those accustomed to France’s discordant role within the alliance or to Britain’s loyalty to the United States. But, for better or for worse, there is no returning to the NATO of the 1960s. The prevailing cacophony reflects Europe’s difficulties in adjusting to an international system as it enters a new phase.

It is time for Europeans to behave as responsible adults. Their postwar adolescence, under American protection, is over. Less America in Europe should spell more Europe. So should the evolving Western approach to nuclear deterrence.

But there is a striking disparity between the sense of urgency that many Europeans feel today and the modesty of the measures that they are taking. In part this reflects a legitimate reluctance to advocate defense measures that would mean not only budgetary sacrifices but also the loss of a clear national identity. The weight of national bureaucracies also bears some blame. But at a deeper level the causes of Europe’s paralysis are structural.

The European approach to security has been based too exclusively on bilateral cooperation between France and West Germany. The joint effort of these two countries stands as a major postwar achievement--living proof that Europeans can transcend their divisive past. But such bilateralism is no longer enough. France is a nuclear power outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; West Germany is a non-nuclear power in NATO. West Germany is not about to become nuclear, nor is France about to return to the integrated military body of NATO. A multilateral approach is needed to transcend the French-German structural deadlock and to accommodate British sensitivity to what London tends to see as an excessive flirtation between Bonn and Paris.

There are two prerequisites for a new European multilateral policy: the good will of the United States and a redefinition of the alliance that would give the European pillar more weight.

The United States must be convinced of its duty to encourage European security efforts by deeds, not just by words. America should, for example, persuade Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that there is no contradiction between Britain’s duties to the alliance and its responsibilities to Europe. Equally crucial, Washington should make sure that the flow in NATO arms procurement goes both ways across the Atlantic.

Europeans and Americans alike must understand that the best way to have more Europe tomorrow is to have more alliance today--and an alliance that is more balanced toward Europe. France must show greater pragmatism and flexibility if this is to work. Once its presidential election is over, France could, for example, return to the NATO planning group--a symbolic gesture that would prove a new French concern for the sensitivities of other Europeans, who have never fully accepted France’s self-proclaimed “specificity.”

If Europeans want to be taken seriously, they should do less lamenting and less ruminating, and move toward more concrete and positive actions. The worst thing that Europe could do would be to combine an overly optimistic assessment of Gorbachev’s Soviet Union with an overly pessimistic reading of America’s future role in Europe and the world. This could produce a state of semi-paralysis on defense matters.

The United States, despite its claims to the contrary, is paying relatively less attention to Europe compared with other areas of the world. Europeans, no longer the sole object of East-West competition, must again become a subject of history. In years to come, as American ascendancy in the world wanes, there must be more Europe in NATO.