With Contra Sword Gone, Congress Allows Ortega to Wait Out Reagan Era

Daniel Ortega must be laughing about Congress’ response to what one diplomat has called the Sandinistas’ “hardening of positions.”

Despite evidence of growing repression in Nicaragua, Ortega has received what amounts to his biggest political victory yet. A combined bloc of conservative Republicans and Democrats, along with some liberal Democrats, voted in Congress to kill any form of non-lethal humanitarian aid to the Contras.

That outcome was not supposed to have taken place. The Democrats had arranged in advance to first vote against a Republican bill for non-lethal aid to the Contras. But, not wanting it to appear that they were to be held responsible for the defeat of the Contras if the peace process broke down, the Democrats had agreed to then vote for their own package of humanitarian aid. Speaker Jim Wright (D-Tex.) had promised to bring forth the votes to pass such legislation. The Speaker ended up with egg on his face.

To date, the Democrats seem more concerned with scoring points against the Reagan Administration’s foreign policy than with advancing democracy in Nicaragua. That puts them squarely against the intent of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, who formulated his plan with the intent of moving Nicaragua away from the path of Leninism. Since accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, Arias has repeatedly insisted that the Sandinistas must turn toward democracy, abide by their pledges of August and negotiate with the Contras--not only for a cease-fire but also for the terms by which a free political process can be opened up within Nicaragua. If they do not comply, he argues, the world must move to isolate them.

In effect, the defeat of any form of Contra aid means--as the former southern-front Contra commander, Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli, put it--that “the true struggle now is the one that political parties are waging inside Nicaragua.” But even though Chamorro accepted the Sandinistas’ amnesty offer and returned to his country to engage in politics, he frankly acknowledges that any new political opening “and whatever other concessions we are seeing are the result of military pressure.” Thus he has concluded that “the Contras should be maintained as a sword of Damocles hanging over the Sandinistas.”

Without that sword, the Sandinistas are hanging tough. In his Feb. 25 letter to Ortega, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo noted his hope that the negotiating agenda would include the setting of a date at which the government would grant “total and unconditional amnesty to all political prisoners,” as required by the Arias plan, as well as “full freedom of expression” and a date at which the government would hear requests of opposition parties to reopen a canceled dialogue as well as a review of the compulsory draft.

It was in response to this letter that the Sandinistas removed Obando as a mediator, claiming that he was siding with the Contras and that he was no longer objective. The removal of Obando indicates that the Sandinistas think that they can move further away from the intentions of the Arias plan.

It is likely that Wright will not seek to get another package of non-lethal aid together. As of this writing, a bipartisan group of senators--including Nancy Kassebaum, Richard Lugar, David Boren, John McCain and Bob Graham--are trying to write a new version for consideration. A blend of the defeated House Democratic package and the Republican one, it would allow for an expedited mechanism in which Congress could take up a request from the President for renewed military aid, when and if he felt that it had become necessary.

That provision, however, is totally unacceptable to the liberal Democrats. Any chance of this new package passing is therefore slim. The only chance that it has would be if Wright announced his support. And at present the Speaker seems chagrined and burnt out.

Since all sides say that any new package could take months to prepare, it puts the Nicaragua issue off until the elections. It leaves the Contras in limbo and the Sandinistas free to continue on their path of consolidation of power until a new Administration comes into office. By that time the Sandinistas will be further entrenched in power and will have tightened their control of the state machinery. If Michael Dukakis or Jesse Jackson ends up with the Democratic nomination, the presidency or even a strong influence on foreign policy, any chance of the Arias plan’s succeeding can be forgotten. Dukakis has already said that the United States can “tolerate” a pro-Soviet regime in the hemisphere, and Jackson has in the past proclaimed his support of the Sandinistas.

Both positions are a virtual green light for Ortega to move even closer to the Soviets. If the Republicans win the nomination, a hard-line policy by a George Bush or a Bob Dole administration might merely repeat the impasse that now exists and worsen the situation throughout Central America.

At any rate, little hope exists that democratization will proceed in Nicaragua unless some Contra force manages to hang on. Once again, whether that prerequisite for progress takes place is up to the Democrats in Congress. Their record up until now gives little ground for any hope.