Imprudent Exposure in Lebanon

A month has passed since the abduction of Marine Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, commander of the Lebanon detachment of the U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization. The search for him so far has been fruitless, and there has been no recent word from his abductors, who in the first week of his captivity released his identification papers and a videotape of him, and said that he would be tried as a spy.

Before Higgins melts off the screen of public attention into the limbo of long-term American hostages in Lebanon--the 12th in four years, No. 9 of those currently held --it is time to raise a question about why he was there. He is the second U.S. government official to be kidnaped, and it appears that a tragic mistake was mindlessly repeated--sending into that terrorist-infested area a known bearer of nationalsecurity secrets that would make him a tempting target.

Higgins arrived in Lebanon last July, fresh from two years of service as a military assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. Congress was gearing up for its televised investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, and the death under torture of William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut, was being cited by the Reagan Administration as one of the concerns that had led to the arms-for-hostages deal.

Buckley had gone to Lebanon in mid-1983 to help the Lebanese develop anti-terrorism techniques and to rebuild the American intelligence operation destroyed in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy a few months earlier. Buckley had served as the Beirut station chief before, and his role as a CIA anti-terrorism specialist was well known around the Middle East. His proposed return to Beirut, to operate out of an ill-guarded hotel penthouse, caused some qualms among agency professionals. But these were brushed aside by Director William J. Casey, a friend and admirer of Buckley, intent on finding an answer to the terrorist menace.

Buckley was snatched from his car as he left his hotel in March, 1984. Casey ordered unprecedented exertions to recover him, all to no avail. Buckley appeared twice on videotape--once with fellow hostages Jeremy Levin and the Rev. Benjamin Weir and once alone.

In October, 1985, the CIA learned of Buckley’s death under torture the previous June--probably at the hands of the Iranians, to whom he had been delivered. It was believed that he had been forced to compromise intelligence secrets, including information about anti-terrorist activities. A year later the Reagan Administration was negotiating with the Iranians to obtain, in return for arms sales, not only hostages but also Buckley’s remains and a reported 80-page transcript of his interrogation.

The Pentagon end of acquisition of TOW missiles to be sold to Iran was handled, starting in January, 1986, by Weinberger’s chief military adviser, Army Maj. Gen. Colin Powell, for whom Higgins worked. (Powell is now the White House national-security adviser.) But, apparently, no connection with the Buckley case was made when Higgins, due for field assignment after five years in the Pentagon, started vigorously lobbying with Weinberger and others for command of the U.N. force in Lebanon, considered a long step up the career ladder.

This command had been an “Army slot” since the creation of the force in 1948. So Marine personnel officers were surprised when the Army requested that Higgins be released for the assignment, for which he had volunteered. It seemed plain to the Marines that the request packed a lot of high-level support. (Marine officers who monitored the assignment say that they are now under orders not to discuss it.)

There are government-wide policies and specific military regulations restricting, for at least three years, travel by personnel with recent access to highly classified material to countries where they may be at risk. For assignment to such countries a written waiver is required. None was requested for Higgins. A Pentagon spokesman says that this was because “Lebanon is not on the restricted list.”

In southern Lebanon, Higgins talked freely to members of his 75-man multinational force about his personal relationship with Weinberger, whose daily staff conferences he had attended. If there was any doubt about what a catch he represented to terrorists, it was dispelled by President Reagan when he said in a Feb. 24 news conference that “someone would have a hard time getting secrets that could harm the country from a person of this kind.”

Within a week of his abduction, Higgins, like Buckley before him, appeared on videotape. He urged concessions to his captors and blamed Reagan for “crimes against the oppressed people in the region.”

A painful deja vu. Once again an officer, with the indulgence of his top boss, had overcome security concerns and taken himself--and his nation’s secrets--into danger. No one seems to have been responsible.

Fred C. Ikle, who was two days away from retirement as undersecretary of defense when the abduction occurred, told me that he was “astonished and outraged.” He had not been aware of the assignment.

Robert C. McFarlane, former national-security adviser and himself a retired Marine lieutenant colonel, said that the Higgins assignment was “a case of gross mismanagement--and not necessarily by the Marines.”