U.S. Aides Confident SDI Won’t Block Treaty

U.S. officials, assessing the prospects for curbing strategic arms agreements, expressed increasing confidence Wednesday that President Reagan’s controversial Strategic Defense Initiative will not be an obstacle to a major agreement aimed at cutting long-range offensive weapons in half.

As the latest high-level U.S.-Soviet talks ended, Secretary of State George P. Shultz told a press conference that the Kremlin has not separated or “de-linked” the SDI space defense issue from the strategic arms reduction, or START, issue.

But the Soviets have now agreed for the first time to seek separate treaties on space defenses and on START, in contrast to the previous Kremlin position calling for one treaty covering both.

“While the Soviets have not said SDI is de-linked from START, they are certainly moving in that direction,” a senior Administration official said immediately after the Shultz press conference.

This official is one of several on the American side who believes the Strategic Defense Initiative--commonly called “Star Wars”--ultimately will not prevent a START agreement.

Soviet negotiators have apparently given no such assurances in their meetings with the Administration, however. Other officials caution that although Moscow may be playing down SDI’s importance now--Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze failed to mention SDI in dealing at length with strategic arms issues during a luncheon Wednesday with President Reagan, for example--the Kremlin might still try to hold a strategic agreement hostage to a last-minute compromise on the anti-missile defense program.

Not Only Obstacle

Further, SDI is by no means the only potential obstacle to having a new START arms pact ready in time for signing when Reagan travels to Moscow in May for his next summit session with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. There may not be enough time to work out other key elements in such an agreement, including the critical provisions providing for verification of such a radical cutback in superpower arsenals.

And the Reagan Administration itself appears to have shifted its position on a sensitive point: it now wants the negotiations on START and space defense to move forward together. At one time, it refused even to discuss a separate treaty on space defenses with the Soviets. Now, the Administration wants an agreement that describes what activities are permitted in the space defense program.

Without such an agreement, the Administration fears the Soviets could interpret the existing Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in a very strict manner, then accuse the United States of violating it, and threaten to stop reductions under the START treaty in retaliation. A sympathetic U.S. Congress might then curtail Pentagon funds to force Administration compliance with Moscow’s views, according to the scenario spelled out by a senior U.S. official.

Nonetheless, beyond all the maneuvering, much of which may be for tactical purposes, it is clear that the Soviets have significantly eased their once-vociferous objections to the “Star Wars” program.

The consensus of expert U.S. officials is that the Soviets have effectively concluded, as one official said, that “they can sign START even under the specter of SDI. They’ve come to realize that SDI will not be a threat in the short term of five to seven years, if ever--for political, technical and financial reasons.”

Also, he said, “a START agreement alone may in fact help reduce prospects further that SDI will ever become a reality” if observance of the agreement is seen to require continued adherence to the 1972 ABM treaty.

The ABM treaty forbids deployment of more than a token missile defense force. It also limits research, development and testing on such weapons to a few ground bases. Reagan, in his call five years ago for a “Star Wars” shield in space, envisaged a comprehensive network of weapons using lasers or other directed-energy beams to shoot down enemy warheads.

At that time, the Kremlin unleashed an enormous propaganda effort to portray the program as an attempt to transfer the arms race on Earth to space. Moscow contended that, behind such a shield, the United States planned to launch a surprise attack and insisted that it could not sign a START agreement without “direct linkage” to stringent curbs on SDI.

Position Softened

Initially, the Soviets demanded a ban on all SDI research, but have gradually moved away from that position. And now, they have conceded that some testing of SDI devices is permitted in space under the ABM treaty.

Since 1986, the two sides have tried to resolve their differences on space defenses by agreeing to the concept of a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty. But they differ on how long such a period would last; on what work--research, development and/or testing--would be permitted during the period; and on what would happen afterward.

At their Washington summit in December, Reagan and Gorbachev papered over the differences on space defense. While it appeared the Soviets accepted more of the U.S. position, the wording was broad enough for each side to read it as they wished.

It called for an agreement that would commit the two nations “to observe the ABM treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM treaty. . . . “

Since then, the view that Moscow is inclined to put SDI aside has been buttressed by a other developments, including the Soviets’ agreement Wednesday to negotiate separate treaties on space defenses and START.