A Chance Now to Link U.S. Aid to Democracy : To Hold Off Sandinista Consolidation, Congress Needs Plan for Entire Region

The unexpected cease-fire agreement between the Sandinistas and the Contras could produce both peace and democracy in Nicaragua. It could also lead to the destruction of the Contras and the consolidation of Sandinista control. Given the balance of power between the two sides, an undemocratic outcome is more probable unless the United States explicitly links future economic assistance for Nicaragua and its neighbors to the implementation of democratic reforms.

The Contras entered into the cease-fire negotiations in a severely weakened position. Several weeks earlier, the U.S. Congress had decided not to renew humanitarian aid to the rebels. U.S. military aid, including aerial resupply flights, had ended on Feb. 29. As a result, the Contras had been forced to retreat to their bases inside Honduras. They had planned to continue battling the Sandinistas from there, drawing upon the weapons and supplies they had stockpiled in the area. Their prospects for success were limited, however, by the fact that the Sandinistas continued to receive substantial military and economic aid from the Soviet Union.

The Sandinistas decided to take advantage of the U.S. abandonment of the Contras by launching a massive military attack against them. Ultimately, the Sandinistas would have succeeded in destroying the Contras had the United States not sent more than 3,000 troops into southern Honduras. Faced with the choice between doing battle with the United States and its Honduran ally or retreating, the Sandinistas chose withdrawal.

Both sides then decided to proceed with plans for direct negotiations over a cease-fire agreement, but for different reasons and with different expectations. The Contras had little choice, since they could not survive as a viable fighting force without U.S. aerial resupply flights. They were thus negotiating the terms of their surrender.

The Sandinistas, in contrast, made no important concessions. They agreed to allow freedom of the press, to release some political prisoners and to let the Contras, once they lay down their arms, to return to Nicaragua and participate in the Sandinista-dominated political system. But the Sandinistas had already promised to do all this last August when they signed the peace plan advanced by Costa Rica’s President Oscar Arias Sanchez. The new cease-fire agreement, by postponing the implementation of full democratic reforms to a later date, actually reversed the earlier Sandinista agreement to implement the provisions of the peace plan simultaneously.

What is really different about the current cease-fire agreement, however, is the diminished ability of Nicaragua’s neighbors to pressure the Sandinistas to comply with the Democratic provisions of the Arias plan, of which the cease-fire accord is only one part. This is particularly true of Honduras and El Salvador.

Honduras has been placed in a difficult position by the congressional cutoff of Contra aid. Faced with the possibility that thousands of Contras might remain on its territory, Honduras must now come to terms with the Sandinistas in order to get the rebels repatriated. Keeping the Sandinistas’ feet to the fire on the democratization issue would now be counter-productive for Honduras, given its new vulnerability.

In El Salvador, President Jose Napolean Duarte was the leading force favoring both democratization in Nicaragua and the simultaneous and complete implementation of all provisions of the peace plan. The resounding defeat of his Christian Democratic Party in last Sunday’s congressional and municipal elections, however, as well as the defeat of his son Alejandro, who ran for mayor of San Salvador, have severely reduced the president’s influence. The fact that a right-wing party linked to the death squads, the Nationalist Republican Alliance, or Arena, won the Salvadoran elections further undermines Duarte’s ability to press for democratic reform in Nicaragua.

On a more positive note, the Arena victory could contribute to the forging of a bipartisan consensus within the U.S. Congress on the importance of democracy as a means of protecting U.S. security interests in Central America. Until now, the need to democratize Nicaragua was accepted mainly by congressional Republicans. Many Democrats regarded it as a ploy to single out, undermine or overthrow the Sandinista government. They argued instead that Washington should only aim to cut a deal with the Sandinistas that would guarantee U.S. security interests, in return for a pledge of U.S. non-interference in the internal politics of Nicaragua.

These Democrats will now find it difficult to resist pressing the Sandinistas to democratize if they also wish to prevent the resurgence of death squad activity in El Salvador. At the same time, Republicans who have argued that democracy in Nicaragua is vital to U.S. security will find it difficult to resist tough U.S. policies toward anti-democratic behavior in El Salvador.

El Salvador will continue to require substantial U.S. aid in the foreseeable future. The Sandinistas have already indicated that they would like Washington to help with the reconstruction of Nicaragua’s devastated economy. Congress should take advantage of the new situation in Central America to fashion a bipartisan development program for the region that explicitly links U.S. aid to the implementation of the provisions for democracy in the Arias peace plan.