Power, Not Religion, Is the Ulster Problem

Life and death were supposed to be more peaceful in Northern Ireland by now. Two and a half years ago the Anglo-Irish Accords were announced, with the promise that they were a historic breakthrough in Northern Irish politics.

Recent events tell a different story.

To appreciate why the accords have proved disappointing, it is necessary to shed the common image of conflict in Northern Ireland. The fight might be between Protestants and Catholics, but it is about the distribution of political power, not about religion.

The essential fact of politics in Northern Ireland is that Catholics lack political power. This is no accident. It is the central demand of the Protestant parties. They insist that Catholics--whether radicals or moderates--are disloyal, subversive and unacceptable as partners in government.

Britain has made clear that it will not restore self-government to Northern Ireland until and unless Protestants agree to share political power with Catholics. But Britain also promises to prevent the unification of Ireland, which allows Protestants to have their cake and to eat it, too. They can veto political reform without risking unification.

Rather than including Catholics in political institutions that Protestants would control, Protestants refuse to participate in institutions designed by Britain to extend meaningful political power to Catholics. The effect of Protestant protest is to prevent the formation of political institutions in Northern Ireland that would provide Catholics with constitutional alternatives to violence. Thus Protestant intransigence generates support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

The British government is aware that the IRA benefits from the refusal of Protestants to share power with moderate Catholics. That, in fact, is precisely why the Thatcher government entered into the Anglo-Irish Accords.

The idea was that consultations between the British and the Irish governments over the affairs of Northern Ireland would give Catholics a sense of belonging and participation. Treated with respect by the political authorities, they would show respect for political authority.

But British hopes have been frustrated. Having antagonized Protestants with the accords in the first place, Britain is wary of using them to develop policies objectionable to Protestants. While Britain listens to the Irish government, it fears the Protestant majority in the north.

Britain’s fear of a Protestant backlash has reduced the importance of the accords. They were said to be the inaugural step in a continuing process, but the major steps that were to follow have not been taken. Thus what was advertised as the first of many important changes has produced some minor ones, but nothing big enough to resolve Catholic grievances.

The accords do not empower Northern Irish Catholics. They encourage them to speak to the Irish government, which now relays their concerns to the British government. But that merely makes formal a process that already existed informally.

Britain has the worst of both worlds. Protestants are furious that the Irish government is being consulted about the internal affairs of Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, Catholics are disturbed that Britain can reject whatever advice it pleases. Thus Britain has antagonized Protestants without placating Catholics. It is an unhappy and combustible situation.

The point is not that the violence of the IRA is good, progressive and emancipating. Quite the opposite. It is grim and destructive. But the violence of the IRA is the symptom of the political problem in Northern Ireland as much as the cause of it.

Protestants have been privileged over Catholics since Northern Ireland was established in 1921. They still enjoy more jobs, higher income and better housing. These advantages are valuable for both substantive and symbolic reasons. Substantively, privileges make life easier for Protestants. Symbolically, the privileges provide “proof” that Protestants are “better” than Catholics.

But privilege is an invidious thing. Protestants can enjoy privileges only as long as Catholics suffer deprivations. If Catholics were to achieve equality with Protestants, then Protestants would lose the superiority over Catholics that shapes their cultural traditions and protects their material interests.

Thus Protestants hold desperately to the remnants of their privileges as to their very identities. And since their privileges are rooted in the discrepancy between Protestant power and Catholic powerlessness, Protestants must deny equality.

Protestants, by dooming the moderation of the majority of Catholics to futility, prevent peaceful change and recruit for the IRA. And Britain, by protecting the forces that doom moderate reform, makes inevitable the ensuing violence between some Catholics and the forces of law and order.