U.S. <i> Machismo</i> Is No Answer in Panama : Allowing Noriega a Face-Saving Exit May Be Called For

Six weeks ago, the State Department engaged in a plot to depose Panama’s strongman, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega. To the intense frustration of the State Department, Noriega is still there, despite various escalations of pressure from Washington.

What is going on, and where is Panama headed? Has the United States overplayed its hand by getting so involved? Have U.S. actions backfired, with the beleaguered general being the beneficiary? There are no easy answers to any of these questions.

One thing is certain--the mere departure of Noriega will not change the expectations of Panama’s military that they will continue to dominate the country’s politics as they have for two decades. Their attitude toward the United States and toward the largely well-educated, affluent middle-class opposition cannot be taken for granted as favorable. There is certainly no evidence that they would accept deposed President Eric Arturo Delvalle’s restoration to head a “government of national reconciliation” as desired by the State Department and Panamanian exiles in Washington.

Noriega is portrayed both by the Administration and the Senate as a sort of demon incarnate, a tyrant indicted by two Florida federal grand juries on major drug-running charges and a scourge to his people. Yet until less than a year ago, many U.S. federal agencies, while aware that he was no Boy Scout, found Noriega a convenient contact with whom they could conduct business.

Given the importance of U.S. military bases in Panama, planners in the Pentagon now worry about the fallout from the Administration’s heavy-handedness. It may not be easy for them to recover the good will of the Panamanian military.

Signs of serious trouble surfaced in September, 1985, when Noriega and civilians of the ruling political party forced President Nicolas Ardito Barletta out of office. The vice president, Delvalle, assumed the presidency but was clearly subservient to Noriega and the military. By 1986 a growing opposition movement, the Civic Crusade, arose within Panama’s large middle class.

At the behest of influential middle-class Panamanian opponents of Noriega in Washington, a prestigious Washington law firm acted for the Delvalle “government” to freeze Panama’s assets in U.S. banks, nearly $50 million. That action, plus a strike called by the Civic Crusade, was sufficient to shut down Panama’s economy. A run on the banks for lack of cash (Panama uses the U.S. dollar) has kept the banks closed. The country’s once profitable international banking sector, a major employer, virtually disappeared almost overnight. The United States later withheld a $6.6-million monthly payment due under the Panama Canal Treaty and has since called on U.S. companies in Panama not to pay their taxes to the de facto government.

Subsequently word has leaked out of more Administration plans to rid Panama of Noriega--these include a kidnaping plot, other covert activities and serious thoughts of military intervention. Astoundingly for a Latin American, the deposed Delvalle from his hiding place has called publicly on the United States to invade Panama and remove Noriega. This sentiment has been expressed openly by other Panamanian opponents of the regime. Colonial mind-sets die hard on both sides.

By this week, however, the strike called by the Civic Crusade seemed over. Shops opened again and there was at least a superficial air of normalcy. The essential problem remained for the Noriega-backed government; how to survive the erosion of its last civilian support base, public-sector employees.

Until now, Noriega’s lack of popularity in Panama and in Latin America has muted what would normally be cries of outrage against Yankee interventionism. Although countries of the Latin American Economic System condemned the U.S. economic sanctions, there is a visible lack of sympathy among them for the regime in power.

New actors came onto the scene in late March, trying to help achieve a settlement involving Noriega’s departure. The Roman Catholic bishops of Panama issued their first statement asking Noriega to leave, and they may be able to mediate. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez, former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez and other regional leaders have conferred to devise a strategy along similar lines.

Rather than continue to defy Noriega’s pride with a machismo of its own, Washington should now shift its strategy to pursuing all serious negotiating options, even if these allow Noriega a face-saving departure. Reports indicate that very little negotiating flexibility has been exhibited by the United States.

Perhaps Noriega’s removal from Panama could be temporary, leading to his return later as an ordinary citizen. In any case, it would obviously be best for the action to shift from Washington into the hands of Latin Americans.

The best role for the Administration and the Senate would be to prepare to put their money where their mouth has been--to ready a large aid package to include debt relief and civic-action projects for the military that would be handed over after Noriega’s departure.

The only conditions for such aid should be the Panamanian government’s promises to hold fair elections on schedule in May, 1989, under the supervision of the Organization of American States, and to grant the immediate restoration of freedom of expression and association. The United States should not try to dictate what kind of interim government Panama has.

In the long run, important U.S. interests in Panama can be protected only by the emergence of a democratic society with a successful economy based on a strong private sector. Its politics must be broadly representative of the whole population, however, and not just the narrower interests of middle-class opponents who seem to be guiding much of the Administration’s strategy today.