Israel Must Draw Lines for a Future

Israel and its friends now face a dilemma. On one hand is an urgent need to deal effectively with the Palestinian riots; on the other is a need not to lose sight of the big picture and thereby abandon the search for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli solution. The very sense of urgency blinds many to basic underlying factors.

One should not forget: The main responsibility for the current state of affairs lies with the hostility of the Arabs against the Jewish national liberation movement--Zionism--and with their commitment to the destruction of the Jewish state. To achieve their objective, the Arabs have used all means: war, boycott, terror and political pressure.

Though it sounds ironic, the Israelis were the only party in the region to accept the idea of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in 1947. The Arabs rejected that solution. When Egypt and Jordan conquered the territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and held them from 1948 to 1967, they could have created an independent Palestinian state. But they did not. In a paradoxical way, if not for the existence of Israel, the Palestinians would probably have no chance of being granted independence by their Arab “brothers.”

It seems to be human nature to press for solutions where there is a chance to affect change--and not necessarily where the problem lies. And so no one really brings pressure on the Arabs to change their consistent hostility toward Israel while Israel is pressured, insistently, to deliver real assets for promises. Israel was always ready for negotiation and peace, complying again and again with this one-sided demand: in 1949, in 1956, in 1973 and in the Camp David accords. It never stopped pleading for negotiation, but this did not bring peace.

The big mistake Israel made was in 1967; after the victory over Arab armies it neglected to impose a political solution and work out a comprehensive plan.

In January, 1976, I submitted the “Double-Column Plan” to then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Its territorial elements were basically similar to those in a plan submitted by Yigal Allon in 1967 and, regrettably, never adopted by the Israeli government. Double Column is based on three important principles:

Israel has the right to and should annex those unpopulated areas that came under her control in a defensive war and which are vital to her future and security.

Israel must acknowledge the right of Palestinian Arabs to self-determination and independence in the populated areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza strip.

Israel must insist on conditions necessary to ensure her future development and security.

The Double-Column Plan was supported by large numbers of Labor Alignment leaders, including Golda Meir, by almost all of the communal Kibbutz movement and the Moshav cooperative movement. The plan stalled after Labor lost the 1977 elections.

Double Column was aimed at three objectives: First, to enhance development of the “Eastern Column” stretching from Upper Galilee down to Eilat. This requires annexation of the Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert, conquered in 1967, which are almost unpopulated and form the central link in the Eastern Column. Massive development and settlement of the Eastern Column is vital if Israel wants to avoid shrinking to a “coastal strip” state.

Second, it is essential for Israel not to incorporate the Arab populations of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip; Palestinians want independence and Israel doesn’t want to rule them. Whether they will be part of a Palestinian state with its main base in Jordan or whether they will form an independent entity are open questions. Accordingly, establishment of new Jewish settlements in those populated areas should be avoided.

The third element is an urgent need for Israel to clarify goals and declare objectives regarding its future map. Only when these three elements are followed can lines be drawn for any negotiation over a territorial solution.

The slogan “land for peace” is misleading, aimed in one direction: Israel is to give land and receive promises for peace. It is assumed axiomatically that for the Arabs--21 countries over millions of square miles--territory is an uncompromisable asset but for Israel it is not. Why shouldn’t tiny Israel get land from the Arabs and give them peace in return?

Here exactly lies the danger from Camp David: Israel lost areas in eastern Sinai which it had vowed to keep for future security. Israel returned all of Sinai to Egypt. The loss is clear. The real reward is yet to be proved.

But there is also an important matter of principle: Camp David is based implicitly on the assumption that Israel is not entitled to keep conquered territory--even after defending itself repeatedly against attacks launched from that territory. Whatever it gains should be returned--to the last inch. This principle, if followed, would push Israel first to the 1967 borders, then back to 1947 and then. . . . The erosion should have been stopped in Sinai. It must be stopped now.

The principle can be reversed: Arabs must know that any aggression against Israel might cost them land. If they can attack Israel without any territorial loss, why shouldn’t they try again and again?

Israel is still a state in the making, an enterprise “under construction.” Self-image and firm conviction are absolutely crucial factors. Moral strength proved to be Israel’s most crucial weapon in the years until now. It is even more important now. But this weapon will no longer work without definite territorial clarity. Israelis, especially the young generation, must have a “body image” of their land. They should know what territory to fight for, what territory to give up--and why. Erosion in these matters may be more fatal to Israel than military threats. Thus the biggest sin of Israeli governments for the last 20 years has been “deciding not to decide” and not drawing maps--instead waiting for negotiations. If you don’t clarify your own goals and needs, you cannot attend properly to your rival’s needs and aspirations. Thus a solution for the Palestinian problem was also pushed aside.

Supporters of Israel have to remember that our main goal is to ensure the future, not just seek immediate relief of the current situation at any cost. This unnoticed shift of emphasis, from the basic issues and global context to the painful current events, today plays into the hands of Israel’s enemies. It encourages the inciters to go on with the riots: Every day of violence and every victim fuels the venomous propaganda inflicted upon Israel and helps to obscure the fundamentals. It is assisted by one-sided coverage of events among a large part of the media, which amounts to a character assassination of the Jewish state and serves perfectly the long-sought objective of the Arabs: to achieve delegitimacy of Israel in the international community.

Jews in the Diaspora are both obliged and have the right to express their views regarding basic national issues. But Israel should not be pushed to start negotiations in a panic. Israel should be urged to make up its mind and draw up its future map. No one can or should do it for her. It should have been done 20 years ago. It can and must be done now. Unless “red lines” are drawn before the negotiations, a lasting peace cannot be guaranteed.

Those boundary lines cannot be negotiated. All the rest can: the framework of Palestinian independence, security measures and solution to the Palestinian refugee problem--efforts which, by the way, have been obstructed by the Arabs and the United Nations for the last 40 years.

The relevance of the Double-Column Plan to the present political situation in Israel can be described in a nutshell: The biparty “national unity” government is in a stalemate. Outside the government are two wings--on the right, “Greater Israel,” and on the left, “Peace Now.” Though opposed, each wing is similarly trapped in mystical paradigms. The right urges immediate settlement in every possible site and disregards future repercussions: God is almighty. The left presses for immediate negotiations, without a plan; this is a kind of secular mysticism--”give peace a chance.”

While both the left and the right wait for the Palestinians to tire, for demography to change its course, for big powers to impose “peace” or for Arabs to abandon hostility, Double Column waits only for Jews.

The two large political parties--however divided--should be able to unite over the Double-Column Plan because it serves basic premises of both parties’ platforms. In the present situation, when Israel is attacked from within and from without, real national unity would not be an empty phrase--it would be a vital achievement.