Democracy Can Flourish in Haiti

After the Haitian military brutally defeated democracy by disrupting elections last November, I suspected that Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy was a keen student of history. I predicted that the Haitian military would do as it did 30 years earlier when it arranged the election of Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier. This time the selected candidate was Leslie Manigat, whom Namphy removed from power this past week.

Namphy has proved to be an even better student of Haitian history than I had thought. He remembered that when Duvalier assumed the presidency he quickly and successfully gained control of the army by transferring key officers and continually juggling the high command. Papa Doc’s authority over the army was not relinquished until 15 years after his death, when his son, Jean-Claude (Baby Doc), fled the country, turning control of the army and the country over to a Namphy-led junta.

When Manigat attempted to transfer Namphy and some of his closest associates from their positions of power, Namphy responded decisively. Manigat was exiled, and the military reassumed command of the Haitian government in an unopposed, bloodless coup d’etat.

In the wake of Duvalier’s departure in 1986, the Namphy junta promised democracy, and for two years the U.S. government believed and supported him. This time the United States has condemned the coup, but has done little else. It continues to recognize the military government, and it seems all but certain that aid will be re-extended to this poorest country in the Western Hemisphere.

Many in Washington express frustration with Haiti. They proclaim that the United States did all that it could for democracy in Haiti, that the army has almost always ruled Haitian politics, that Haiti has no tradition of democracy and that there is nothing more that we can do to advance democracy there.

These beliefs are all seriously and profoundly mistaken.

Haiti has just experienced two years of democratic hope. After the departure of Duvalier and until the crushed elections of last November, the fundamental bases of democracy in Haiti sprouted, grew and were ready to mature. A free press suddenly appeared. After 30 years of oppression, Haitians rich and poor, in the cities and in the countryside, actively debated political issues. Grass-roots organizations, many of which had pressured Duvalier to leave, became visibly active in every community. Political parties of every possible persuasion materialized. A democratic constitution was written and enthusiastically supported by the vast majority.

One impediment to democracy, however, remained. The old elite who had benefited economically and politically under Duvalier retained control and, through the Namphy junta, led the government. Democracy threatened their livelihood because corruption would assuredly be attacked and Haiti might lose its justified reputation as a “kleptocracy”--government by thieves. Thousands had lined up to vote last November, intending to replace kleptocracy with democracy.

The Namphy junta tried to quash their hopes. Military and civilian thugs brutally attacked and killed many waiting in line to cast their ballots. Now the Namphy government has overthrown the president whom it had installed, and U.S. officials appear poised to do nothing.

The United States could have done much more to foster democracy in Haiti. When Washington arranged for Duvalier’s departure aboard a U.S. military transport, it did not demand that the interim government be entirely civilian and include the Haitian opposition groups. It did not actively support or seek the prosecution of officials responsible for terror and corruption in the previous Duvalier government. It did not publicly and loudly declaim the junta’s attacks on democracy that occurred nearly continuously from early 1987 through the disrupted elections and until today.

Instead, the Administration asked Congress for military aid for the Haitian government so that it could restore order. Congress refused the request, but Namphy knew where the Administration stood. He knew that disrupting real elections, imposing Manigat and then deposing Manigat wouldn’t occasion a Grenada-like invasion.

The Haitian army is the only force in Haiti that has the power of violence. Many were killed in November for simply trying to vote. The Haitian people well recognize that to oppose the army now would be suicidal.

The suppression of democracy in Haiti, however, does not mean that democracy is dead there. The lesson of the past two years in Haiti is that democracy is possible, that a populace with no tradition of democratic participation wants to and will participate if given the opportunity.

But they will be opposed by the most powerful forces in the country, and they need all the external support that they can get. They need far more than U.S. expressions of regret.

U.S. assistance in the future should go only and directly to the grass-roots peasant and youth groups that are the roots of Haitian democracy. The United States should give no support to the Haitian military or to the Haitian government. But it must support the Haitian people if it truly desires a government of, by and for the Haitian people.