Advertisement

U.S. Now Urging Soviets to Help Mideast Peace Effort

Share
Times Staff Writer

The Reagan Administration, in a sharp break with a longstanding American policy of trying to minimize Soviet influence in the Middle East, is urging Moscow to help mediate the Arab-Israeli conflict, a step that could require the Soviets to make the same sort of controversial choices that the United States frequently has had to make in recent years.

Frustrated Administration officials maintain that Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev has been able to pose as a potential peacemaker without having to advance specific proposals that might alienate pro-Soviet regimes in the Arab world.

These officials contrast the Soviet performance, which they say consists largely of slogans and generalities, with Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s Mideast peace plan, which was designed to set out specific compromises that Israel and its Arab adversaries could accept. The plan turned out to be so evenly balanced that both sides objected to it on grounds that it was too favorable to the other.

Advertisement

“We should get the Soviets to be more specific about what kind of peace process they want,” one official said. “If they refuse to give answers, the people in the region should know that.”

The new emphasis on bringing Moscow into the process is part of the Administration’s fallback position after Shultz’s failure to bring Israel, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians into a new round of peace talks. In four high-profile trips to the region this year, Shultz has not been able to persuade any of the key leaders to compromise. Although Shultz has said that he might schedule a fifth trip later this year, Administration officials say this now seems unlikely.

“Secretaries shouldn’t shuttle to the region without concrete results,” one official said. “Frequency without results devalues visits. We may be at that point.”

Nevertheless, Shultz is determined to keep the process alive, if only just barely. Despite their mutual animosity on most substantive issues, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel, President Hafez Assad of Syria, King Hussein of Jordan and all other leaders in the region have urged Shultz to continue his efforts, despite their steadfast refusal to agree to the sort of concessions that would make progress possible.

“Better the process than the lack of a process,” one U.S. official said. “As contemptuous as people are of a process without concrete results, the alternative is far worse.”

Murphy Being Sent Back

To keep the pot boiling, the official said, the Administration intends to send the State Department’s top Middle East expert, Assistant Secretary Richard W. Murphy, to the region as a substitute for additional Shultz trips. But the official said it would be a mistake for Washington to advance any major new initiatives with only six months to go in President Reagan’s term.

Advertisement

The new overture to the Soviets is also designed to keep up the appearance of movement. For most of the last 15 years, U.S. policy has been designed to exclude Moscow from Mideast diplomacy. But under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union has sought to repair its relations with moderate pro-West Arab states and has softened its hostility toward Israel.

As a result, Jordan’s Hussein and Syria’s Assad want the Soviets to join the Americans as mediators. Hussein has said he would engage in face-to-face negotiations with Israel--something Israel has long demanded--but only in conjunction with a regional peace conference. The conference would be attended by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council--the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China--and the parties to the conflict.

Shamir Strongly Opposed

Israel’s Shamir is adamantly opposed to any sort of international conference, but Shamir’s political rival, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, supports a conference, provided it would have no power to impose a settlement or to veto an agreement reached by the parties.

The Soviet Union has said that it is prepared to attend a conference if it would be effective. That formulation seems to rule out the sort of conference Israel might accept, but U.S. officials say the Soviet position is not clear. If Moscow really wants to participate in peace talks, it will have to adopt specific positions that could appeal to Israel as well as the Arabs. U.S. officials believe that if the Soviets adopt a conciliatory stance, Shamir will be under heavy pressure to go along.

The way the Administration sees it, the Soviets will either have to take specific action that would help to bring the parties together or tacitly admit that their Mideast policy is a hollow one.

Worth the Effort

“I’m skeptical that talks with the Soviets will get anywhere, but the attempt is worthwhile,” an Administration official said. “It is a ticket that has to be punched to keep the king (Hussein) engaged.”

Advertisement

Non-government experts on the Middle East doubt that the Soviets can be backed into a corner. William B. Quandt, a former National Security Council official who is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said the Soviets “won’t make any tough decisions until they think things are getting serious, and that won’t happen until a new Administration is in power.”

However, he said, U.S.-Soviet talks on the Middle East are useful because “we get a feel for their real sensitivities and they get the same sort of feel for ours.”

Galia Golan, director of the Soviet and East European Research Center of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, said Gorbachev has shown far more flexibility than his predecessors in dealing with Israel and the peace process. She said Moscow has sent a subtle message to Jerusalem that it eventually might soften its reflexive support for the Arab position.

Speaking at a seminar in Washington, Golan agreed with U.S. officials that the Soviets have avoided boxing themselves in on the details of a settlement.

“I don’t think the Soviet Union really cares about the substantive issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict,” Golan said. “I don’t think the Soviets really care where the border is or what happens to the refugees. But they have reached the conclusion that a continuation of the conflict is no longer productive for the Soviet Union.”

Advertisement