U.S. Must Make Up Its Mind on Gulf Goal

In May, 1987, when the Reagan Administration decided to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and offer them naval protection, it offered several reasons. The United States needed to reassure its Arab allies of its continued support after the shock of U.S. arms dealings with Iran. U.S. action was needed to prevent Soviet inroads. And it was needed to bolster Iraqi morale and force Iran to the negotiating table.

Whether the reflagging and the U.S. naval buildup represented the best strategy to achieve these goals, some of them have been achieved--albeit at a cost measured in lives and in terms of future relations with any Iranian government. The Persian Gulf Arabs are as reassured of U.S. support and steadfastness as they will ever be--that is, until the next Middle East crisis. With U.S. support, Iraq has turned the military tables on Iran. And the United States has gained emotional satisfaction from bombing Iran’s oil installations, destroying a third of its navy and in general showing its military superiority.

However, an end to the Iran-Iraq War still eludes the United States. Battered and exhausted, Iran refuses to accept a humiliating peace. Iraq, emboldened by its successes, is pushing for a military victory. Under the circumstances, it is important to ask what the ultimate U.S. objective is toward Iran and the Persian Gulf.

The contention that the United States is neutral in the war and seeks only a negotiated solution is becoming most difficult to sustain. It has been helping Iraq’s war effort through the furnishing of intelligence and through the activities of the U.S. Navy, which has given Iraq a free-fire zone in the Persian Gulf. There is no doubt that U.S. assistance, plus Iraq’s massive use of chemical weapons, has been largely responsible for its recent military victories.

The United States has also been giving total support to Iraq’s position that Iran should accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 without change. Given that the resolution has built-in biases toward Iraq, it has become the major stumbling block to winding down the war through a U.N.-sponsored informal cease-fire. Similarly, U.S. opposition has been a principal factor in the United Nations’ inability to give Iran any satisfaction on the issue of determining who started the war--even though this could be the key to peace.

Understandably, the United States finds it difficult to pursue any policy that could be characterized as fair toward Iran. But neither understandable nor justifiable is the U.S. unwillingness or inability to see where its policies are leading and to accept responsibility for the consequences. Indeed, it is not at all clear what the United States is trying to achieve.

Meanwhile, with U.S. assistance Iraq is pursuing its plans toward Iran. From the beginning of the war, Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, has wanted to dismember Iran and annex not only the province of Khuzistan but also parts of Iranian Kurdistan and Iran’s southern shores from Bandar Abbas to Bandar Lengeh. The Iraqi Ba’ath Party’s charter and Iraqi maps attest to these ambitions, and both Hussein and his lieutenants have been vocal on the subject.

Iraq’s current strategy is to use the Iranian opposition group, Moujahedeen-e-Khalgh, and its so-called Liberation Army of Iran as a Trojan horse for its ambitions in Iran. For a brief period Iraq might use a successful Moujahedeen to set up a puppet government in Khuzistan. But this would only be a prelude to Iran’s dismemberment or at the very least the rise of an Iranian irredentist movement that would dwarf the Palestinian problem, not just in Iran but also in neighboring states like Pakistan that are also vulnerable to ethnic and religious stresses. Iran would also be “up for grabs,” and the Soviet Union would find it difficult to stand aloof from such turmoil and opportunity on its southern border.

Whether or not the United States shares Iraqi goals toward Iran, it must realize that its Persian Gulf policy is advancing them. Washington must recognize these facts and accept responsibility for its actions. After these events take place, post-mortem lamenting, hand-wringing or exculpatory reasoning--as has so often been the case with U.S. policies toward other parts of the Third World--would do no good and serve no purpose.

The United States must finally make up its mind what it really wants in Iran and the Persian Gulf. If its purpose has been to contain Iran, shore up Iraq and reassure the Arabs, then this has already been achieved. But if the United States seeks something else--like seeing Iran carved up or reduced to total, long-term impotence in the region--it must be careful to define its own goals, pursue them and live with the results. It must beware of being manipulated by Iraq and, because of American hatred for Iran, of endangering its interests in Southwest Asia from the Persian Gulf to Pakistan. One thing is certain: U.S. interests and Iraqi goals in the region are not identical. To continue making that mistake could prove disastrous for the United States, and no amount of posthumous regretting would set matters right.