Arms and the Middle East

Pro-Israel members of Congress have succeeded in blocking a number of proposed arms sales to friendly Persian Gulf states on the ground that they could threaten Israel’s security, but now even some thoughtful Israeli voices are asking whether these legislative vetoes might not prove counter-productive. Underscoring that question is word that Saudi Arabia, which has never made a secret of its preference for U.S. weapons, has signedan arms deal with Britain worth anywhere up to $36 billion. That’s a lot of money, and it represents a lot of defense industry jobs. What it also represents is an inevitable decline in American influence with Saudi Arabia, and that, as the Jerusalem Post suggests in an editorial, is not a gain for Israel.

The point is well taken. When the United States sells weapons overseas it usually attaches conditions about where they can be deployed and how they may be used--the aim being to try to see that they will be committed to defense and not aggression. Sometimes that doesn’t work. Israel, for example, violated certain of its arms-transfer agreements with the United States during its invasion of Lebanon in 1982. But usually the United States wields enough influence--through contracts for training, spare parts and maintenance--to help ensure that the rules are followed.

Other countries that engage in arms-peddling in a big way--like Britain, France, Brazil, China and Israel--seldom try to influence their customers’ actions once a deal is done. It’s a good bet that Britain won’t try to tell Saudi Arabia where to station or how to employ the new fighter-bombers and other weapons that it will be buying.

Israel’s long-time position, echoed by its friends in Congress, is that no U.S. weapons should be sold to any state that hasn’t joined the peace process. Strictly applied, that rules out arms transfers to every Arab state except Egypt, on a claim that every Arab state from Morocco on the Atlanticto Qatar on the Persian Gulf is a potential threat to Israel’s security. But can anyone really believe that Kuwait, say, equipped with the U.S. F-18 jets and air-to-ground missiles that it wants to buy, would represent a plausible threat to Israel, 1,500 miles away? Threats deserve to be assessed seriously--not on the basis of how they appeal to the most farfetched of fears.

Important as Israel’s security is to the United States, it is not the only concern of American policy in the Near East. One of those concerns has to do with the ability of friendly oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to protect themselves against coercion or aggression from Iran. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are determined to buy the weapons that they require for self-defense. Increasingly, though, it appears that those arms won’t be American. As the Persian Gulf states turn more and more to non-U.S.arms suppliers, American political influence in the region seems sure to decline.

As a general rule, arms sales are not one of the moral pillars of a country’s foreign policy. The enormous economic resources consumed by unproductive arms purchases are in fact one of the great shames and scandals of the modern world. But, shame or not, arms purchases on a huge scale are a reality, and, like it or not, arms sales are something that give major providers like the United States the chance to wield useful influence. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will buy the weapons that they need to defend themselves. Where they spend their money is politically important. Both have shown a clear preference for U.S. arms. Both have had their preferences rejected by Congress. That rejectionism has had little to do with the merits of the proposed sales. It has had even less to do with the bigger issue of U.S. foreign-policy interests. It has had a lot to do with domestic politics. Here is another case where Congress’ skewed priorities are doing the country no good at all.