Contra Aid Counter to Prospects for Peace

In his July 30 radio address, President Reagan assured the nation that U.S. failure to continue aid to the Contras had caused the peace talks in Nicaragua to break down. Saying that only its resumption would get the Sandinistas back to the negotiating table, he urged Congress to pass an aid package now being put forward by Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.), that includes military as well as logistical support.

As usual, the President has turned the situation in Nicaragua on its head. The peace talks broke down not because of the suspension of U.S. aid to the Contras, but because the Reagan Administration and the Contra faction led by Col. Enrique Bermudez wanted them to break down.

On June 9, Contra negotiators tabled a series of demands they knew the Sandinistas could not accept--indeed, no self-respecting government would accept. They demanded, for example, that all captured Contras be freed immediately, even though the Contra army remains in the field; that all soldiers drafted into the Sandinista army be allowed to go home immediately and that all Supreme Court Justices be forced to resign--with the Contras given the right to name the majority of new justices. These demands, moreover, were put forward as an ultimatum--the Sandinistas had just two hours to accept.

When the Sandinistas said they were prepared to discuss the demands but not to accept them on a non-negotiable basis, the Contras walked out of the talks. Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams and his men, with their inimitable style, rushed to announce that the peace process had broken down because of Sandinista intransigence.

But if the Reagan Administration engineered the suspension of peace talks, responsibility for the internal crackdown that followed rests squarely on the Sandinistas. True, reaching the full opening to democracy is contingent on ending the war. With the peace talks halted, Sandinista incentives to press ahead with the democratization process were reduced.

But it is also true that the United States has been funding the opposition newspaper, La Prensa, and one can imagine how frantically the CIA station chief in Managua has been trying to convert political rallies into civil disturbances--to do anything, in fact, that would provoke the Sandinistas to overreact and move against internal dissent. But at the same time, the Sandinistas seemed ready to move against the political opposition, close La Prensa and several radio stations irrespective of anything the CIA did. Opponents have become increasingly vocal and the Sandinistas don’t like it.

Whether provoked by the United States or simply reflecting an aversion to democratic processes, the crackdown was a serious mistake on the part of the Sandinistas. If the former, the Sandinistas foolishly fell into the trap planted by the Reagan Administration. If the latter, their aversion is inconsistent with the spirit of the peace plan put forward by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica and must be overcome. Perhaps negative reaction abroad is bringing that point home, for La Prensa has been reopened and a number of the radio stations soon will be.

Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration hopes reaction in the U.S. Congress to recent events in Nicaragua will open the way to more Contra aid. What they refuse to accept is that that Contra aid didn’t work before and would work no better now. No matter what mistakes the Sandinistas make, aid to the Contras will not solve U.S. problems in Nicaragua. On the contrary, it would violate the Arias Plan and give the Sandinistas the pretext for a more comprehensive crackdown.

One reason the Contra ploy won’t work was pointed up in a June poll by the Jesuit-run Central American University in Managua--the first independent poll taken in Nicaragua since 1979. Some will question its accuracy and objectivity, but the poll can hardly be seen as biased in favor of the Sandinistas. Only 28% of those polled identified with the Sandinistas. Only 27% thought the government’s overall performance good, while 26% disapproved. Only 40% believed the Sandinista government to be democratic, while a solid 48% said it was not--and the number of skeptics doubtless increased in the wake of July’s internal crackdown.

But if the poll reflected divisions and doubts about the Sandinistas and their policies, it showed no such ambiguity concerning U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. An overwhelming 85% opposed further U.S. aid to the Contras. In other words, even Nicaraguans who dislike the Sandinistas reject aid to the Contras as a means of dealing with them.

This is of crucial significance, for without widespread support among the Nicaraguan people, the Contras cannot win. They are the inferior military force; they could only overcome that imbalance by winning wide popular support inside Nicaragua, something they have failed utterly to do. Naming Bermudez, a former officer in Anastasio Somoza’s hated National Guard, as the principal Contra leader further undercuts their appeal.

Another reason the U.S. Contra policy won’t work is that it isn’t supported by other Latin American countries; they see it as interventionist. And it is not supported by a majority of U.S. citizens.

By the end of last week, Senate Democrats had worked out an alternative to the Dole aid package. Their proposal virtually ruled out military assistance and is thus palatable to both liberal and conservative Democrats. Not even this alternative is likely to get through the House, however, because that chamber is more strongly opposed to any resumption of aid.

That is just as well. Rather than sticking with something that hasn’t worked, the United States should do the following: Encourage rather than impede peace talks. Encourage other Latin American governments to exert pressure on the Sandinistas to adhere to the democratization process (something they will not do as long as we are trying to overthrow the government in Managua). Begin direct talks with the Sandinistas to work out a verifiable security agreement (ruling out Soviet and Cuban bases, sending all foreign military personnel home, etc.), emphasizing that U.S. power and honor would stand behind that agreement. Such an approach would have a high chance of success; aid to the Contras has none.