An Old Question, Opened Up Again : Hussein’s Move Makes All Parties Rethink the Palestine Issue

Just as the Persian Gulf war begins to wind down, there comes a new injection of tension and uncertainty into another of the Middle East’s current hot spots: the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

This process got under way with King Hussein’s dramatic declaration of May 10 that the Palestine Liberation Organization, not Jordan, must take over full responsibility for the return of the territories. Significantly, he repeated the same formula at the Arab summit held in Algiers in mid-June.

But it has only been in the last week that the full implications of this new policy have become clear.

In rapid succession came the announcement of the cancellation of the Jordanian-inspired development plan for the West Bank, the dissolution of the lower house of the Jordanian parliament with its 30 Palestinian representatives, and then the enforced retirement or resignation of the great majority of the 18,000 Palestinian officials (municipal administrators, teachers, etc.) who had remained on Jordan’s payroll after its loss of the West Bank in 1967. All this gives practical reality to Hussein’s assertion last week that his kingdom was set to sever all “administrative ties” with the Palestinian lands it first annexed in 1950.

Even if the extent of these measures took most observers by surprise, the reason for them is now well understood. Not only did the Palestinian uprising demonstrate a clear wish to be rid of Jordanian as well as Israeli control, but its continued intensity also finished off the February peace plan of Secretary of State George P. Shultz, by which most of the West Bank and Gaza were supposed to be reunited with Jordan after direct negotiations between the king and the Israelis. In addition, the uprising created increasing tension in Jordan itself, placing great strain on the loyalties of its many resident Palestinians and causing a severe anti-Palestinian backlash.

Now, at one go, the king has been able to strengthen his own position against his Palestinian, Syrian and other Arab opponents who were accusing him of doing so little to regain the territories from Israeli control. By distancing himself from the lands to the west of the River Jordan, he also hoped to protect himself against the argument of right-wing Israelis like Ariel Sharon, who believe that since both the East Bank and the West Bank were part of historical Palestine, it would be perfectly possible to settle the whole problem by giving most of the Palestinians a home, and perhaps even a state, in Jordan at the king’s expense.

But is there also an element of bluff? Might the king simply be saying to the PLO and the West Bank Palestinians, “See what you can do,” sure in the knowledge that they will get nowhere against the intransigent Israelis and will, sooner or later, have to come crawling back to him for help? This is certainly what Labor Party leader Shimon Peres has to believe if his own peace plan is to have any chance of majority acceptance in November’s Israeli elections. It is also what the U.S. Administration will continue to assert during Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy’s visit to Amman.

Recent history would support the view that Hussein is bluffing. Whatever the bulk of his East Bank subjects might think, up to now the king has always acted in the belief that Jordan could not afford to turn its back on Palestine, given its own large Palestinian population. And also that much of the tiny, resource-poor, kingdom’s importance in the world has depended on the fact that it is a moderating force in its day-to-day contact with both Palestinians and Israelis.

However, such is the pressure of events that all this may now have to change. Clearly there is a very strong anti-Palestinian lobby among members of the Jordanian cabinet and security services. Then, too, by challenging the PLO to accept full responsibility, not only for the Palestinian diplomatic effort but also for the financial and administrative support of the uprising, Hussein may have created a space in which the “inside” Palestinians under occupation and the “outside” Palestinians can begin to work together with new-found effectiveness. This will not be easy. Jordanian cooperation for such vital activities as the channeling of funds to the West Bank, or even movement of people across the River Jordan, is not assured. But the possibility exists. Meanwhile, the Israelis will certainly do everything in their power to prevent such a link-up of Palestinians. And as long as Israel makes it difficult for any local national leadership to emerge publicly under occupation, this will strengthen those on the West Bank who urge reliance on the PLO for leadership, rather than those who believe that the only hope for the future lies in an accommodation with the Israelis.

King Hussein’s gamble makes for hard decisions for all. It will strengthen those forces in Israel calling for annexation of the West Bank just as much as those calling for a negotiated Israeli withdrawal. It will reopen the whole debate within the PLO about the practical advantages of forming a government-in-exile in order to obtain international support for the uprising. It will allow West European governments a new opportunity to persuade the U.S. government to base its policies on the promotion of a Palestinian rather than a Jordanian option. And in Jordan it has already sparked off an intense, and potentially explosive, debate as to the identity and the ultimate loyalty of Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

Perhaps most important of all, it has reopened the whole question of an autonomous Palestinian entity that most had thought closed by the events of 40 years ago--the creation of the state of Israel and the occupation of the West Bank by King Hussein’s grandfather, King Abdullah.