Jordanian Option Obituary Was Premature, as Signals From Hussein, PLO Prove

For all the hype surrounding the 11th-hour conversion of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Jordan’s King Hussein in their attempt to influence today’s Israeli elections, the fact remains that this does not bring the relevant parties any closerto true peace.

It has been only two months since Hussein abruptly announced Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank, leaving the responsibility for the occupied territory to the PLO. Most analysts agreed then that the king’s surprise move was all but a death kiss to the “Jordanian option” so obsessively pursued by Israel’s Labor Party and its leader, Shimon Peres. Hussein wasno longer viewed as a key participant in negotiations for a resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Despite such assessments, Hussein’s critical role in the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remained essentially intact. Just two weeks ago Hani Hassan, a close aide to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, stated the unquestionable need for the creation of a future Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. This position was echoed in the following meeting between Hussein, Arafat and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Throughout the years, Jordan and the PLO have developed a symbiotic relationship. As much as Jordan rejects the PLO, it still needs it in the West Bank. Behind Hussein’s actions has been the need to balance his own control of the West Bank against the PLO’s status as the legitimate authority in the eyes of the inhabitants. This latter, symbolic compensation has let Hussein retain wide latitude in running his own country, where the Palestinians constitute an overwhelming 80% of all Jordanians under 35. Similarly, as much as it rejects him, the PLO needs Hussein, at the very least because of geographic proximity.

As an experienced chess player, Hussein understands the inability of the PLO and the Palestinians in the West Bank to break off with Jordan. The only access that a future Palestinian entity in the West Bank would have to Arab countries lies through the East Bank of the Jordan River. There is a massive longstanding economic connection between the people of both areas. Finally, the fear that a Palestinian entity would have of Israel is likely to be a dominant factor for the near future.

Both Hussein and the PLO acknowledge that after the first ecstasy inspired by the intifada , or Palestinian uprising, has subsided, the immediate gains will have to be translated into a political move by the Palestinians. When this happens, the two will have to establish a new kind of relationship. The West Bank will no longer be subordinated to Jordan, as it was before 1967. Rather, the West Bank and Jordan will cooperate, at least formally, as two equal entities.

Thus, in his recent move to dissociate Jordan from the West Bank, Hussein did not risk the extreme consequences--that the PLO and the Palestinian population in the West Bank would do as they wanted without taking into consideration Hussein’s own interests. Rather, for the last two months Hussein was improving his bargaining position in the talks that are likely to follow the elections in both Israel and the United States. Hussein now expects to maximize his negotiating position vis-a-vis the PLO and the Palestinians with regard to their likely confederation. He wants to create the conditions under which the future Palestinian entity will not pose a threat to his own kingdom.

For decades the United States and Israel have entertained the idea that King Hussein is the ideal partner for negotiations on any future resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although Hussein will remain a chief and indispensable participant in any negotiations, this exclusive orientation to him is no longer wise.

Israel and Washington should not have ignored the PLO when they were trying to strengthen Hussein and preserve his relative position--a point that the two allies continue to miss. Hussein and the PLO are like Siamese twins. They should always have been considered as such. Hussein recognized this. Only now does Peres come to grips with this reality.

An understanding between Hussein and the PLO on the need for a confederation between them is, of course, only a first step toward peace. Israel, holding the power cards in the West Bank, must first give its consent to any such political program.

Appearing on ABC-TV’s “Nightline,” Hussein called a possible Likud victory in the Israeli elections “a disaster.” The revival of the “Jordanian option” aimed at giving Peres new ammunition in his election campaign. However, even if Israelis respond to the last-minute signals from the Palestinians and Jordan by casting their ballots in favor of the peace-seeking platform proposed by Labor, there is still the possibility that Peres and Labor will have a very difficult time implementing their political program.