Afghan Pullout Halt Tests New U.S.-Soviet Ties : Analysis

In suspending the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union put the United States on notice over the weekend that their new relationship is facing a serious test.

Moscow sees the Afghan agreement, signed in April after prolonged and difficult negotiations, as virtually in ruins--and fears the collapse with it of the two superpowers’ ability to cooperate in resolving other regional conflicts before they become international crises.

And this collapse, in Moscow’s view, would in turn jeopardize the overall improvement in Soviet-American relations in which a keyelement has been the management--the stabilization, in fact--of their global rivalry.

Moscow now sees Washington maneuvering to take maximum advantage of recent Soviet setbacks in Afghanistan, hoping not only to oust the Soviet-backed government in Kabul but also to install one formed by the moujahedeen, the Muslim guerrillas who have fought Marxist rule for nearly a decade with extensive U.S. support.

Such a development would be so resounding a success for the United States, particularly for the Reagan Administration’s policy of supporting rightist guerrillas around the world, and such a defeat for the Soviet Union that it could affect the political balance of power in the world.

If the agreement signed in April by Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States fails to bring peace to Afghanistan with its “balance of interests” formula, Soviet officials ask, how could the pattern be applied to other, perhaps even more complicated regional conflicts--such as those in southern Africa, Indochina, Central America and the Middle East?

And if Moscow and Washington cannot accommodate their conflicting interests on regional issues, how will they reach an accord on major international questions, such as the proposed 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons?

American ‘Cheap Shots’

“We thought those days of quick advantage, what Americans call the ‘cheap shots,’ were past,” a senior Soviet foreign affairs analyst commented last week, explaining the Kremlin’s evaluation of the Afghan situation and its decision to suspend its troop withdrawal.

“Perhaps we were naive, but we hoped that we understood each other’s strategic interests, political needs and policy priorities and that we would try to accommodate them. Certainly, we try to understand those of the United States . . . but in Afghanistan they are deliberately rubbing our noses in the dirt.”

Moscow’s bitterness is increasingly evident in both the remarks of senior foreign policy specialists and in official Kremlin commentaries and statements. It is particularly intense over Washington’s apparent insensitivity to real Soviet problems of pulling troops out amid a heightened moujahedeen offensive, which has inflicted heavy casualties on the civilian population in Afghan towns and some casualties on Soviet military units, construction crews and advisers.

Soviet officials have accused the United States and Pakistan of delivering “massive amounts” of arms to the moujahedeen since the April agreement in Geneva providing, among other things, for the Soviet troop withdrawal, and they attribute the rebels’ recent successes directly to that support.

Even more acute for Moscow than those battlefield setbacks, however, is the probable loss of political “face” for the Soviet Union as it tries to extricate itself from the Afghan war and yet ensure the viability of the Kabul government.

Impact on World

If those Soviet measures fail in Afghanistan, countries around the world will note that Moscow could not sustain a Marxist government in a neighboring country where it should have had unchallengeable military power and political influence.

All this becomes a quick test of the new Soviet-American detente, according to well-informed Soviet officials and foreign policy analysts, because the United States must decide whether to go for the immediate advantage of a dramatic victory in Afghanistan, if in fact it could be achieved against renewed Soviet determination to support the Kabul government, or to pursue a less antagonistic, long-term relationship.

“Moscow has laid down a marker for Washington on Afghanistan, but the Reagan Administration appears only to see an opportunity to move in at Soviet expense,” a senior West European diplomat commented after meeting with top Soviet officials over the weekend. “As Moscow sees it, Washington is saying, ‘We are going to make sure this hurts you, and, boy, are we going to enjoy it.’ ”

While American officials might deny such motives, they have repeatedly declared, in Washington, in Moscow and in Kabul, their belief that the Marxist government in Kabul lacks all popular support and would fall within weeks, if not days, of a Soviet withdrawal from the Afghan capital.

“Why should we worry about how they look after they withdraw their troops?” another senior Western diplomat remarked late last week, reflecting U.S. thinking. “They did not ask us what we thought before they intervened with their troops nine years ago.

‘We Intend to Compete’

“More seriously, we are not in the business of carving up the world into spheres--this for you, this for me, this for you and this for me. We intend to compete, if that’s the word, everywhere democracy and freedom can get a hearing. We say, ‘Match that!’ ”

At the center of the current dispute are Soviet arms shipments to the Kabul government and U.S. arms deliveries to the moujahedeen.

When the Geneva agreement was signed, Moscow and Washington could not agree on ways to reduce arms shipments; the resulting “non-agreement” was what the Reagan Administration called “positive symmetry,” in which Washington said it would match Moscow’s arms shipments to Kabul with its own deliveries, via Pakistan, to the moujahedeen.

Despite its own deployment recently of advanced warplanes in Afghanistan and in neighboring regions of the Soviet Union, Moscow remains convinced, top officials here say, that only a political settlement can end the long civil war and bring peace to the country.

Moscow’s top diplomatic trouble-shooter, Yuli M. Vorontsov, a first deputy foreign minister, was sent to Kabul as ambassador last month, signaling the Kremlin’s determination to pursue a negotiated settlement, based on a broad government of “national reconciliation” in Kabul.

Soviet Gift Package

Vorontsov’s month in Kabul has coincided with a massive Soviet gift package of $600 million along with economic assistance provided through the United Nations, the deployment of advanced Soviet warplanes, including the Backfire bomber, inside and outside the country, and the provision of more weapons to the Kabul government.

When the Soviet withdrawal began nearly six months ago, American officials confidently predicted that town after town in Afghanistan would fall to the moujahedeen after Soviet forces pulled out. Those officials now say that it might take six months or a year or perhaps even longer for the moujahedeen to win.

“The United States wants us to say that we have lost, but we have not,” another Soviet foreign policy commentator commented. “We have not won, and they have not won. This is a different thing.

“We would like an honorable peace that benefits the people of Afghanistan, but there seem to be some in the United States who want blood, literally the blood of our soldiers. That we will not stand for.”

The broader issue of Soviet-American trust has also been raised here as foreign policy analysts and commentators, as well as government officials, assess the impact of Afghanistan on the whole relationship.

Intensely Patriotic Nation

While the Afghan war has become increasingly unpopular here, with many people questioning its goals as well as its conduct, few in this intensely patriotic nation favor a withdrawal at any price, under any conditions.

“We are talking about trust and confidence, and that is what is missing in Afghanistan,” a Soviet Foreign Ministry official remarked. “We know all about ‘hard ball,’ American style, and that may be what we are playing. But that is not what we want, that is not our choice, (it is) Cold War, confrontation, and that is old thinking that makes our future very dangerous.

“We want a ‘new political thinking’ that seeks to nurture trust and confidence, that tries to take into consideration the viewpoints of other parties and to seek an agreement on the basis of a balance of interests. . . . In other words, we would like a foreign policy based on consensus, on accommodation, on cooperation.”

As Soviet foreign policy specialists assess prospects for a resolution of the civil war in Afghanistan, that country assumes a far greater importance than its remoteness, sparse population and poverty would suggest.

“We must not be seen as quitters,” a young, bearded tool-and-die maker declared at a local political discussion here this weekend on the situation in Afghanistan. “We do not need to debate how we got into Afghanistan or why we should leave. . . . The question now is what comes after, and that is very important.”