U.S.-Israel Relations Put on Hold by Elections

The last time Israel’s right-wing Likud Party won a clear-cut victory, in 1981, there was consternation in Washington. And for good reason. Led by Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Israel was soon pursuing Palestinians all the way to Beirut, and involving the United States and itself in the morass of Lebanon.

The Israeli election on Nov. 1, which marked a right-wing resurgence and enables Likud to form a government, comes on the heels of an internal Palestinian uprising, the intifada. Now the tough-talking Likud has promised to use whatever force is necessary to stamp out this Palestinian challenge.

Some U.S. State Department officials take these threats seriously--particularly if Sharon returns as defense minister. The charismatic and controversial Sharon was forced to resign in 1983 after a special Israeli commission found him personally responsible for allowing the massacre of Palestinians at the Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps in Lebanon. Since then, however, he has made something of a political comeback and now ranks as one of the most popular party leaders.

Equally important, Sharon is presenting himself as the man who can contain the intifada, a claim even his most severe critics do not dismiss. In 1971, Sharon, then an army commander, was successful in putting down a Palestinian uprising in the Gaza Strip. Though the intifada is on a much larger scale and is far more complicated, Sharon insists the tough-minded approach he used in Gaza is applicable today.

Some U.S. officials agree. “Under Sharon, Israelis would treat the intifada seriously,” said a State Department analyst. This analyst said that unlike the current defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, or Moshe Arens, the other leading contender for the defense portfolio, Sharon would do “whatever it takes to end the uprising.”

Such actions would, however, entail serious risks. Many army officers would resist Sharon’s orders--as they resisted his Lebanon invasion. They would have to be replaced. Even more important, world opinion is focused on the intifada, far more so than during the relatively unpublicized Gaza operations of 17 years ago. Any new Israeli action is certain to generate worldwide protest. Specifically, Sharon and company would provoke the wrath of the incoming Bush Administration.

George Bush is going to be a different kind of ally than the man he replaces. As Donald P. Gregg, the vice president’s national security adviser, candidly admitted before the campaign, “George Bush does not have the same gut feelings towards Israel as Ronald Reagan.”

Moreover, James A. Baker III, who expresses views similar to Bush, is set to replace Israel’s best friend in the Reagan Cabinet, Secretary of State George P. Shultz. Shultz, after all, is credited with rescuing Israel from hyper-inflation. Thomas A. Dine, head of the leading pro-Israel lobby, American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, described Shultz as “project manager of Israel’s economy.”

That is not to say Bush or Baker is looking to battle with Israel and its supporters in Congress. Left alone, the Bush Administration, by most accounts, would be content to put Israel low on its list of priorities. For example, in preparing transition papers for the new Administration, officials consistently rank outstanding problems with Israel below at least two other Middle East matters, hostages in Lebanon and relations with Iran.

Moreover, the legacy of the Reagan years is unprecedented Israeli strength in Washington. U.S.-Israeli ties--tacit and explicit--now range from Israel receiving direct cash budgetary assistance to the tune of $3 billion a year to Israel wielding much influence in efforts to obstruct U.S. arms sales to most Arab countries. As a senior pro-Israeli lobbyist described the past eight years: “It’s been a banquet.”

Yet any significant change in the U.S.-Israeli relationship actually depends on the regional parties themselves. The Palestinians, whose representatives are meeting in Algiers, could make an effective appeal to the new Administration by addressing longtime U.S. concerns. These include the use of terrorism and unwillingness to accept Israel’s right to exist. “Should the Palestinians do the unexpected and grasp the tough issues,” said one veteran State Department official, “the Israelis would be put seriously on the defensive with the new Administration.”

Barring that unlikely scenario, the Palestinians are left with the option of whipping up more enthusiasm for the intifada. State Department officials look to the uprising’s one-year anniversary on Dec. 8 for the next bold statement. “Don’t underestimate (the Palestinians),” said a State Department Middle East expert. “After all, they are the ones who got Israel’s friend, George Shultz, involved on their behalf when it was the last thing he wanted to do. Shultz’s successor would almost certainly be more receptive.”

But it is a shift in Israeli behavior that concerns Washington. This means the man on the spot is Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. As one State Department official said, “We need to see which face Shamir shows--the one which takes the U.S. for granted or Shamir, the enlightened.”

Most analysts regard the latter as more likely. They cite Shamir’s highly developed political antennae, which allowed him to best Labor Party leader Shimon Peres in daily skirmishes and, ultimately, in the election. They also note that the dour prime minister will have his hands full dealing with Israel’s growing religious right and its effect on secular Israelis--as well as the American-Jewish community. And finally, as one State Department official said, “Shamir is aware there is no reason for the U.S. to cause Israel pain unless forced to do so by Israel.”

The first litmus test will probably be the fate of Sharon. Shamir, because of the Lebanon debacle, dislikes and distrusts Sharon. He prefers Arens, his protege, as defense minister. But most important, if he blocks Sharon, Shamir must know that he will be signaling that the current Likud government--unlike its predecessor--recognizes and respects limits in its relationship with the United States.