Don’t Cry for Argentina Over Its Lawless Military but Over Its External Debt

The process of transition to a consolidated democratic system in Argentina has again been challenged by threats that are sequels of a dark past. Last week, small but tough groups of the army defied the authority of its chief of staff, disappointed by his lack of success in obtaining from the government satisfaction of old claims. Basically, they sought an amnesty law to reverse convictions for human-rights abuses committed during the previous regime and to stop new trials for abuses, as well as an increase in the much-reduced military budget for salaries and for equipment.

The rebellion was overcome by the firm attitude of President Raul Alfonsin, who refused to accept any condition or to negotiate changes in government policies, notwithstanding the difficulty of asking troops to repress colleagues with whom they share objectives though not methodology. This steadfastness of the government made the loyal forces--the great majority of the military--realize that they must act and this, in turn, made the rebels surrender.

Unfortunately, this was not the first menace to the normal working of democratic institutions that Alfonsin’s government has had to face. There probably will be other agitations before democracy is completely secured. The reaction of civil society--represented by all the parties, social and economic organizations and the people at large--was of such deep adherence to the constitution that it fosters hope that democracy, like scientific laws, fortifies itself with unsuccessful counter proofs.

It will take a long time to eliminate disruptive factors within the armed forces that go back at least half a century. From 1930 on, the armed forces were accustomed to seeing themselves and being seen by some sectors of society as the custodians of the fatherland, ready to intervene when the order and traditions of the nation are endangered. In this role many officers considered themselves to be above the law and due privileges and immunities needed for their transcendental mission. This image and self-image was broken for the first time when Alfonsin came to power, despite the fact that the same people as before were in control of the nation’s defense. Those most responsible for the abhorrent violations of human rights and for the reckless management of the Malvinas (Falklands) war were severely punished; the jurisdiction of military courts for common crimes committed by the military in connection to service was abolished for the first time; the laws enacted by the military regime were subject to review; the military-industrial complex was put under civilian control; a law was passed proscribing the armed forces from intervening in civil conflicts, and more.

But ideologies and world views are not as easily changed. During all these decades large numbers of men-in-arms absorbed through military academies the outlook that the nation’s identity is intertwined with the armed forces and the Church. This created a mode of discourse quite different from that of the rest of society, from which the armed forces are highly isolated (because of separate educational facilities and neighborhoods, and intragroup marriages).

A basic idea in this discourse is that the “national being” is an essence that is not defined by any empirical evidence: for instance, the majority consensus does not express its will, only select portions and not the complete history of the country reflect the national being’s true course, and the constitution is not an expression of the structure of the national being. This unseizeable character of the national being allows for allegations that some groups have a privileged access to it, while some other sectors are its sempiternal enemies whatever their deeds and attitudes.

This outlook and mode of discourse are in operation when abhorrent human-rights violations are justified as a necessary means of preserving the national being against the threat posed by individuals who, because of their enmity with it, have lost their humanity.

When such a deep discontinuity between the prevailing moral discourse and that of a very small (but powerful) minority is produced, a cleavage in the larger community of dialogue emerges.

The definitive surmounting of this situation will come with time, as the process of social and educational integration between the most hardened members of the armed forces and the rest of society progresses. This will lead to shared basic assumptions of discourse despite differences of substantive views, which are natural in a pluralistic society.

The time for this long process is granted as long as the constitutional system is guarded by popular consensus. There has never been in Argentina a coup d’etat without the sympathy or at least the tolerance of vast segments of the population.

Social adherence to democracy is being fed by awful recollections, but it also needs to be stimulated by hopes that its peaceful means of resolving conflicts will bring relief to the most pressing needs.

Insofar as that relief partly depends on some external causes, friends of democracy abroad should be more concerned with factors like the external debt and protectionism against exports of countries like Argentina than with the exoticism of some military adventures. As President Alfonsin says, to pay attention to those factors is the way of going beyond a mere post-mortem solidarity with democracy.