Unless U.S. Can Talk Israel Into Playing, There’s No Game

Is Secretary of State George P. Shultz’s announcement that the United States will open discussions with the PLO a “historic decision,” the “real turning point in Middle East history” that Arafat’s speech writer Bassam abu Sharif says it is?

It certainly is not a new “Balfour Declaration,” guaranteeing American support for a Palestinian state in the Holy Land. Indeed, Shultz reemphasized the Administration’s position that the United States rejects the PLO’s declaration of independence. The future of the West Bank and Gaza, he asserted, can be determined only through a negotiated peace settlement, not by any unilateral Palestinian decision; neither will we recognize Israeli annexation of the territories. The “historic decision” merely states that the United States recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization as the “designated hitter” for the Palestinians in a diplomatic game that has not even begun--the putative Middle East international peace conference.

Shultz’s statement does shift the burden of diplomacy for the Bush Administration from persuading the Arabs to take an initiative, to persuading Israel. Israel’s prime minister-designate, Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir, insists that he won’t join the international peace conference that seems to be a next step toward settlement of the conflict. Even if Shamir can be persuaded to play, at this point he refuses to even enter the diplomatic arena if the PLO is a recognized player.

The new American policy could revive discussion within Israel of a peace proposal by two Labor Cabinet members back in the days of Golda Meir--the Shemtov-Yariv formula. In 1974 Victor Shemtov, Israel’s minister of health, and retired Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv, minister of transport, recommended that Israel declare willingness to enter peace negotiations “with any Palestinian factor, which will recognize its right to exist, will be willing to make peace with it and will not engage in terrorism.” Although this proposal was not acted on, PLO acceptance of these terms in the ‘70s was not even a remote possibility. Have the recent Arafat and Shultz statements really changed the situation?

Even before the recent events, polls in Israel indicated that public opinion was in flux--one poll last summer showed that an absolute majority of the public supported the Shemtov-Yariv formula. Since the intifada began last December, leading to the Palestinian declaration of independence, a significant number of mainline Israelis seem to have been anticipating Arafat’s peace offer, most prominently former Foreign Minister Abba Eban.

Shultz’s lead in accepting the PLO as a legitimate partner in peace negotiations will probably intensify polarization in Israel between supporters of Shamir’s rejectionist policies and supporters of the Shemtov-Yariv formula. Polarization is not conducive to progress; rather, it may lead to a more adamant rejection than ever of any negotiations involving the PLO by the prime minister and his backers.

Despite general euphoria in the West Bank and Gaza over the November independence declaration, the Arafat peace proposal and Shultz’s comments on Wednesday, these events are likely to disrupt the remarkable unity among Palestinians evident in the occupied territories since the intifada began. Cracks in the united front of intifada leaders have already appeared as a result of clashes between those representing the PLO and Hamas, an underground Islamic fundamentalist organization that opposes any settlement other than Palestinian control of all the Holy Land. In recent months Hamas struck out at those in the intifada who urged recognition of a two-state solution based on territorial compromise. The very thought of peace with the Jewish state is anathema to these fundamentalists. While Hamas’ strength is concentrated in Gaza, it has been gathering support in the West Bank, where up to now backing for the PLO moderates’ approach has been dominant.

What, then, can be expected from the recent outpouring of good will? Can the U.S. government really be an “honest broker” when it proceeds from a position rejecting an independent Palestinian state? This goal is a sine qua non of every conceivable Palestinian diplomat, a non-negotiable demand, which is supported by an international consensus including the Arab states, the whole Third World and most of our European allies. Ironically, both Palestinians and Israelis still say that the United States is the only intermediary to which both sides can turn.

Perhaps the greatest contribution in the sudden about-face in American policy is that it legitimizes the PLO as a player in a fresh round of Middle East diplomacy awaiting the Bush Administration. If, because of the deep divisions over the Palestinian question in Israeli society, its new government becomes stalemated or more hawkish about negotiations, little progress will have been made. Only if the United States can devise some new tactic to persuade Shamir to change his mind will the U.S. turnaround be of more than fleeting significance.