Best Shot for U.S. Is Always Kadafi

To the Pentagon it was a fair fight, U.S. Navy jets responding to an obvious provocation. Not surprisingly, Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi did not see things this way. He cried foul, accusing the United States of acting the bully--shooting down unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. To others, notably European and Arab leaders who have watched repeated rounds of U.S.-Libyan sparring with growing distaste and apprehension, when U.S. warplanes shot down two Libyan fighters on Wednesday it was yet another example of the American obsession with the Libyan strongman.

In fact, during the eight-year Reagan presidency, Kadafi did become, in one Administration official’s words, “The man we love to hate--and hit.”

But Kadafi did not become Ronald Reagan’s bete noire for unfounded reasons. On the contrary, the mercurial Libyan leader has an uncanny knack for embracing just those causes certain to inflame and ultimately provoke the United States. This time, he may even have sought an aerial dogfight to stave off what he thought was going to be a major air strike. “It’s better to lose a couple of MiGs than to lose a chemical weapons plant,” a senior Pentagon official speculated.

Libya also provides a safe target--unlike other radical Middle Eastern states. Syria, for example, while equally involved in supporting international terrorism and amassing chemical weapons, has nonetheless proved to be much less inviting. It has the Soviet Union as its secure patron, a well-equipped military and a central geographic location.

Reagan’s preoccupation with Libya was evident from the earliest days of his Administration. In 1981, his first secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., declared that combating terrorism would be the Reagan Administration’s crusade as much as human-rights activism had been Jimmy Carter’s. And within nine months the first shooting incident between the United States and Libya occurred--two Libyan planes were shot down.

Five years passed before the Administration’s war on terrorism would turn hot--and against Libya--but economic and political pressure were constantly increasing. The April, 1986, attack on Libya’s capital of Tripoli, which almost took Kadafi’s life, was therefore meant to be the final act.

Kadafi survived the raid and, more important, the domestic political turmoil that followed. Reagan Administration planners were disappointed. Still they took solace in knowing that Kadafi had at least been chastened. His support for international terrorism dramatically decreased. Even today Libyan involvement is recorded at far below 1986 levels.

But now it turns out that as far as the United States is concerned, Kadafi merely shifted from one unacceptable form of behavior to another. The scourge of international terrorism--as the Pan American bombing so tragically illustrates--is still present. But it has been superseded--at least in the view of U.S. officials--by the specter of widespread chemical warfare. Kadafi, with his new chemical plant, again provides the unmistakable--and tangible--target.

According to Administration sources, the Libyans are building the largest chemical weapons facility outside the United States and the Soviet Union. Actually, Germans and Japanese are building the complex for the Libyans. “The Japanese may have been duped,” said one U.S. official. They are constructing a metalworks factory able to supply munitions for the chemicals.

But the Germans are displaying an expertise revealed when they enabled Syria to develop a sophisticated chemical-weapons capability more than a year ago. “The Germans are the technicians. Their role is crucial,” said a State Department expert. Anger with the Germans among some State Department officials is palpable, “If we do take out the Libyan plant,” said one man, “there should be no apologies for German nationals killed.”

It is the proliferation of chemical weapons--first to Iraq, then to Syria and now to Libya--that gives the issue its urgency. Introducing chemical weapons to the volatile Middle East is to almost guarantee their use, say State Department analysts. In fact, the weapons have already been used on a major scale during the recent Iran-Iraq War. Chemical weapons gave Iraq a crucial edge in the final stages of the war; after a truce was declared, the Iraqis used chemical weapons on their own rebellious Kurdish minority. “Chemical weapons are like anything else, each time you do it, it gets easier,” commented a State Department Middle East expert.

Because of its battlefield experience, the Iraqi army has the dubious distinction of being the most adept practitioner of chemical warfare in the world today, say U.S. experts. Israeli officials fear that their Syrian enemies are catching up.

Iraq and Syria also have rudimentary missile systems capable of delivering chemical weapons far distances. Kadafi’s Libya, by contrast, has no delivery system other than by, as one U.S. expert said, “rolling some drums out of the back of an airplane.” Moreover, with its small standing army, there is little chance Libya will ever incorporate chemical warfare into a strategic doctrine as Iraq has done, and as Syria is suspected of doing now.

So then, why all the fuss about Libya? Could it be--as many Arabs and Europeans are saying--that bashing Kadafi is safer than going after more formidable but no less culpable Iraq and Syria? Is there truth to the charge made last week by one State Department analyst?--”If Kadafi didn’t exist we would have to invent him.”

Some U.S. officials admit they have a problem with consistency. “Kadafi is by no means the leader in chemical warfare,” said a State Department analyst. “He is just once again the most blatant.”

But a range of U.S. experts see special risks in the possibility of a major chemical-weapons capability coming under the control of an unstable figure like Kadafi. “We are talking here about a fearless, feckless flake,” said Douglas J. Feith, the Pentagon official in charge of chemical-weapons policy from 1984-1986. Feith advocates using force against Kadafi.

Those now in the Reagan Administration are more circumspect. But they, too, say Kadafi must be singled out for diplomatic if not military pressure. “The Iraqis have a full-blown program. It can’t be affected,” said a State Department official. “But we can do something about the Libyans. They are still dependent on foreign expertise.” Another key U.S. official is equally adamant. “There is a distinction between Kadafi and other Arab leaders. He is simply not responsible. So someone must become responsible for him.”

Among the concerns about Kadafi are what he would do with an enormous stockpile of chemical weapons that this new facility is capable of producing. “He thinks it’s the weapon of the future,” said a State Department expert. This analyst see Kadafi as a triple threat--he might use it himself, give it to terrorists or to another state. A possible recipient, according to one well-connected intelligence official, is the East African country of Somalia, now being wooed by Kadafi.

However, each day these matters become more speculative to senior Administration officials. With less than two weeks left in Reagan’s term, these officials are letting it be known that despite the latest fire fight they are not planning any aggressive action against Libya. That would be left for the next Administration.

But if George Bush’s campaign pronouncements are to be believed, dealing with chemical weapons, will, if anything, soon become of even greater import. Judging by prior performance, Kadafi probably knows that already.