Bush Can Make Way for a 1% Step Toward Peace : Divert Symbolic Amount From Arms and Challenge Gorbachev to Follow

Already confronted by a number of serious domestic problems, President-elect George Bush now has a new one on the international front. Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s bravura performance at the United Nations on Dec. 7 is truly a hard act to follow.

In seizing center stage, Gorbachev created a challenge that Bush must answer very early in his Administration. Failing to respond positively will place the Soviet Union in the forefront of the movement to relax the 40-year-old Cold War confrontation, leaving the United States inthe churlish position of discounting what seems, to our closest allies, to be a significant initiative by the Soviet leader. Nowhere will resentment be higher than in Western Europe, where popular opinion strongly favors troop reductions and reduced military spending.

But consider the plight of President Bush. Before he can respond to Gorbachev in more than vaguely encouraging terms, he must first hammer out a consensus in the State Department and the Pentagon on the exact force reductions that the United States will offer in the forthcoming NATO-Warsaw Pact talks on conventional-force stability. Then he must sell the U.S. position to the American arms lobby, to Congress and to our allies in the Atlantic alliance. Success in this complex task will be difficult at best, and will require strong political leadership extending over months of head-banging at home and delicate negotiations with allies abroad. And all this time the Soviets will command the high ground as leaders in the cause of peace. “We have already started the disarmament process,” they will trumpet. “When will you follow?”

Is there any way out of this bureaucratic trap for Bush? Fortunately, yes. The power to take positive action will be in his hands on Jan. 21. On that day he should propose a plan to divert 1% of U.S. military spending to peaceful purposes. The commitment should be unconditional, just as Gorbachev’s commitment to reduce troops is, but he should challenge the Soviets to divert an equal amount of military funds into a cooperative venture with the United States. The nature of the joint project should be left open for early discussion and agreement between high-level U.S. and Soviet representatives.

Here there is no end of constructive possibilities. The only problem will be to identify the best, most suitable undertakings that will permit a high degree of practical side-by-side effort and achieve measurable results within a reasonable period.

Some possibilities might be too expansive for a first step. Examples would be a joint project to control depletion of the ozone layer, to attack the pollution of the world’s oceans or to develop renewable energy systems in anticipation of the day when worldwide petroleum supplies approach exhaustion. All of these have great long-term potential to benefit the world community, even to prevent a global environmental disaster, but the tasks are essentially open-ended in terms of cost and time.

Coming down to earth firmly, there are an infinite number of possibilities for joint development projects in the Third World that could achieve measurable success within the approximate $6 billion made available by only a one-time cut of 1% in American and Soviet military spending. Recall that the World Health Organization brought about an end to smallpox globally for something on the order of $320 million. Perhaps some or all of the scourges of malaria, glaucoma, polio, diphtheria and pertussis could be ameliorated or eradicated with 18 times the sum that eliminated smallpox. U.S. and Soviet scientists and health-care professionals working together could not only save thousands of lives today, but would also add to medical knowledge and skills that would save millions in future generations.

Another option could be to select specific areas or nations in the Third World for economic development. American and Soviet teams could work together in strife-ridden, impoverished areas like Angola, Sudan, Nicaragua and the Philippines to improve water and energy supplies, modernize agricultural practices, improve sanitation and public health, and build roadsand schools. Certainly these cooperative ventures would do more to build the economic and social structures needed to provide well-being for the inhabitants than we are now doing separately through the generous provision of American and Soviet arms to perpetuate violence in the developing nations.

A clear plus for the focused effort in one country is that the United States can begin a project alone if the Soviets are unresponsive. As positive results are achieved, the case for cooperative efforts will be strengthened and confidence will be created to expand joint projects. A one-time Bush initiative could well become the basis for a continuing program to divert even more military expenditures into peaceful pursuits.

Regardless of the very real practical difficulties of forging a cooperative program with the Soviet Union and following through in an efficient and productive joint effort, the concept is sound and the potential benefits are immense. If Bush is to restore the United States to a leadership role on the world stage, he must be bold, imaginative and prompt in his actions.

For but 1% of a huge military budget, the cost of only six stealth bombers, he could send the message that the United States is not merely willing to cut arms; we are also willing to work with others to build for peace. It should be an offer that Gorbachev can’t refuse.