In Hungary, a New Era Will Need West’s Help

A “popular uprising” rather than a “counter-revolution” took place in Hungary in October, 1956. This official pronouncement by the top reform politician, Imre Pozsgay, on Jan. 27 in Budapest was an event of momentous importance. It signaled a decisive break with the Kadar era, and marked the first step toward national reconciliation between the people and the regime in Hungary. In fact, if the present trends of political liberalization continue, within one year free elections will be held and a multiparty government will be established in Hungary.

The disintegration of Janos Kadar’s 32-year rule was made possible by Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s bold reform experiments in the Soviet Union and by the impending collapse of the inefficient and debt-ridden Hungarian economy. Kadar had neither the ability nor the courage to seek the people’s help to overcome the country’s grave problems. What divided the old regime and the nation was the memory of 2,000 tanks and 200,000 Red Army soldiers crushing the revolution, the judicial murder of its leader, Imre Nagy, and the misrule of the party apparat in the next 30 years.

In May, 1988, an informal coalition of disgruntled party officials, provincial party bosses, reform intellectuals and groups of the democratic opposition overthrew the Kadar regime. The coup was spearheaded by Politburo member Karoly Grosz--a tough, pragmatic politician committed to the survival of the regime at any cost.

The political crisis that caused Kadar’s fall, however, has been further exacerbated. Since May, Grosz has been waging a struggle to shore up confidence in his regime at home and abroad. These efforts have yielded modest results. From his travels in 1988 in Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Iran, Grosz went home empty-handed.

On the domestic front, things have gone from bad to worse in the last nine months. The birth, rebirth and rapid proliferation of democratic groups, lobbies and political parties have put an end to the Communist Party’s monopoly of influence in Hungary. The Hungarian Democratic Forum--with a national network of 450 local groups, a score of independent trade unions and the Smallholders’ and Social Democratic parties--represents a direct challenge to the regime’s legitimacy and political power. The enactment in mid-1989 of a new “party law” will give legal standing to these insurgent forces and a reasonable chance to seek popular support at the ballot box in the next national elections in 1990.

These internal changes in Hungary are vulnerable to conservative pressures from all sides. The “rehabilitation” of the 1956 revolution will be resisted by Hungary’s anti-reform neighbors--particularly East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Pozsgay’s announcement will also be a test of Gorbachev’s resolve to promote perestroika and glasnost at home and in Eastern Europe. Moreover, forces of the old order are still well entrenched in Hungary. They can be expected to put up stiff resistance to what they see as a “betrayal” of Kadar’s political legacy.

Therefore, now is the time to lend a hand to a process that promises to lead to a “historic first” in the communist world--that of a peaceful transformation from communist dictatorship to a democratic multiparty system. Although American interests are well looked after in Budapest, a coordinated Western stance toward reforms in the communist world is not on the horizon. The courageous advocates of political democratization in Eastern Europe, particularly in Hungary and Poland, deserve more and better from Washington, London and Bonn than kind words of encouragement. The latest attempts at self-emancipation in Eastern Europe must not be allowed to fail. If they do, it will be the West rather than the Soviet Union that must bear the responsibility for thwarting yet again the hopes for freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe.