What If Europe’s House Wasn’t Divided?

The North Atlantic Treaty, cornerstone of Western security, celebrates its 40th birthday Tuesday. Such anniversaries usually mean little except as a chance for statesmen to congratulate one another. But something is in the air: It’s no less than a debate about whether, at long last, it will become possible to end the division of Europe.

This surge of interest has been caused primarily by Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. For the past two years, he has been looking like a man who wants to reduce the Soviet military threat on which so much of the Western alliance’s common purpose has been based. He agreed with President Reagan to scrap two classes of European-based nuclear weapons. Then he announced plans to withdraw 50,000 Soviet troops and 5,000 tanks from Eastern Europe. After that, he says he will reconfigure remaining forces so that they will be more useful for defense than for offense. And he has accepted the principles of on-site inspection and intrusive verification in arms-control agreements.

Equally remarkable, when the foreign ministers of 23 nations met in Vienna on March 6 to open talks on conventional forces in Europe, the Soviets offered a proposal that would require the Warsaw Pact to make much larger cuts than NATO in ground forces. And the proposal’s general outlines were surprisingly close to the Western position.

Skeptics rightly point out that large numbers of Soviet Euromissiles remain to be dismantled, the Soviet nuclear arsenal has many other weapons that could destroy Western Europe, troop reductions haven’t happened yet and even unilateral Soviet cuts will keep the Warsaw Pact stronger than NATO. Gorbachev, they argue, could be indulging in a clever propaganda game to burnish his image as a man of peace at U.S. expense. He also may be trying to lull the West, especially to gain access to needed trade, credits and high technology.

All this may be so. Nevertheless something dramatic is happening. Barring Gorbachev’s unexpected replacement by a leader willing and able to turn the Cold War back on full force, the debate on European security will never again be the same. In the final analysis, confrontation is about politics. Words do count, even if deeds are lagging behind. And Gorbachev has begun to talk about military security in Western terms and to acknowledge the legitimacy of the NATO point of view. He has even endorsed national “freedom of choice,” which some observers take as modifying if not repealing the infamous Brezhnev Doctrine that justified Soviet military intervention in Eastern Europe.

Against this background, it is difficult for NATO to proceed with business as usual. The West German government has put the United States on notice that it cannot now commit itself to modernize short-range nuclear missiles that will remain on European soil. No European government will increase spending on defense and, in the face of forthcoming cuts in the U.S. defense budget, decreases are likely.

It is also doubtful that there could again be U.S. nuclear deployments on the Continent without parallel East-West arms negotiations. Pursuing the conventional-force talks vigorously--not as a place-holding action like the negotiations they have replaced--will be required in order to retain political support in Western Europe for any force modernizations. It will not be possible to gain agreed limits on East-West trade in high technology that could benefit the Soviet military unless there is sanction for other economic relations.

These developments pose a hefty challenge to NATO. Already, there is evidence that allies will be out of phase with one another in analyzing developments and the possibility of resolving conflict. West Germany, in particular, is out in front of the United States in looking for alternatives to the status quo. While deeply enmeshed in Western institutions, the Federal Republic is looking eastward for new diplomatic opportunities. Its economic links with East European states have burgeoned--ironically, with the approval of a Soviet Union that understands the need for Western capital to reduce economic and social pressures in these countries.

It is surely too early to begin counting on a reunified Europe. Ending military confrontation will take years of effort. East European states must experience a political and economic revolution before their stability can be assured without occupation forces. The Soviet Union will have to allow them latitude in adapting political systems that would be a final, public acknowledgment of its ideological bankruptcy. The United States and the Soviet Union will each have to recognize explicitly that the other has legitimate European security interests. Some means will need to be found to continue tying U.S. power and purpose to the fate of a Europe that is no longer separated by two military blocs. And a secure role will have to be devised for the German nation, whether two states (as now) or a new unity.

These are key items on a new agenda that will increasingly dominate the future. It carries a special message for the Bush Administration. In the political climate that has developed from the Gorbachev initiatives, the United States can’t just press the allies for conventional-force increases, chivy them on burden-sharing and demand a decision now on modernizing short-range missiles. To regain the diplomatic initiative, it must create its own blueprint for Europe’s future, and then challenge the Soviets to join in resolving the sources of conflict.