In Europe, Time to Give Peace a Chance, Combining NATO and the Warsaw Pact

The major countries of Europe have now been at peace with one another for the longest continuous stretch since the days of the Roman Empire. A truly substantial crisis has not been witnessed for more than a quarter-century. Therefore it may now be time to take this remarkable phenomenon--peace--seriously.

While major war in Europe is not impossible in the foreseeable future, it seems far from heroic to assume it to be wildly improbable. Since the consequences of even a non-nuclear major war would be horrendous, it is sensible to be concerned about it even if its likelihood is slight.

Nevertheless, when the probabilities get low enough, a relaxation of concern even about calamity begins to become justified. A nuclear war between Britain and France, or between either (or both) and the United States would be catastrophic but, because of its low probability, none of these once-hostile countries spends much time, effort, money or psychic energy guarding against the danger.

The chances of a war between East and West may not be that low, but they are getting there.

Although unprecedented peace has prevailed in Europe since 1945, there remain serious unresolved problems on that once-warlike Continent. Chief among them are an unnatural division into two camps and the anachronistic empire the Soviet Union has forced upon unwilling peoples in Eastern Europe. These problems might best be resolved by confederating the alliances; the conditions may now be favorable for probing such an unorthodox solution.

The division of Europe is built around two alliances arrayed in military opposition. If war is no longer a realistic possibility, the two alliances are essentially unnecessary. Equally unnecessary is the Soviet Union’s empire. Today, Eastern Europe is probably an economic burden on the Soviet Union and its military usefulness in the days of long-range missiles and diminished threat of war is highly questionable. Ideological justifications for the empire can still be spun out, of course, but ideology is in pronounced decline in the Soviet Union, particularly when it runs up against unpleasant economic realities.

The logical outcome of all this would be a gradual evisceration of the costly and useless alliances and empire--a sort of continentwide Finlandization or Austrianization as each country wanders off to pursue its independent destiny.

There are two major problems with such a development, however. One concerns Germany. Without the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union, Germany would be the most formidable country in Central Europe. Given the history of the last century or two, it is too easy to visualize, on the one hand, eventual conflict or war between two independent Germanys, or, on the other, a reunification of the two entities leading eventually to hegemonic domination, militarization and war.

Neither of these dire possibilities may be very likely. With the experience of two world wars behind them, however, it is understandable that the Soviets (and many others) would want an arrangement keeping Germany permanently under wraps. The current arrangement in Europe may be absurd, inefficient and unjust, but at least seems to guarantee that Germany can be forever prevented from again perpetrating a major war on its own. Any resolution of the European situation should need to include a similar perpetual--or at least seemingly perpetual--guarantee.

Another problem with an abandonment of the alliances is that it would leave the Soviet Union, even if there were significant arms reductions, as the dominant military entity in the area. Clearly, an attractive plan for a lasting resolution of the European situation should guard against the possibility of Soviet domination.

Since it would allow for the potential rise of German revanchism, the withdrawal of the United States and the Soviet Union from effective participation in the affairs of Central Europe should be an element within any effective resolution of the divisions and discontinuities of the Continent. Since it would allow for the potential Soviet domination of Europe, the withdrawal of the United States from the affairs of the area is additionally undesirable; a solution should keep the American counterweight in place.

An economic blending of West and East could be part of a solution. But mutual economic dependency has been no guarantee against war in the past. Political and military dependency is also necessary; this could be accomplished with most direct dispatch by combining the two alliances. If Britain and France can be linked in an alliance, so perhaps can the United States and the Soviet Union.

Initially, of course, any confederation of the alliances would feel awkward and peculiar. It could begin with political consultations and lead to a rough coordination of military planning. (The Voice of America is far more likely to bring about a collapse of the Soviet regime than is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. VOA will soon have an office in Moscow; why can’t NATO?) The role of France within NATO might form something of a model--French forces are not integrated under joint command but they are coordinated with those of NATO.

Bases or training camps might even be exchanged eventually, something that perhaps can now be contemplated after the sanctity of bases has been violated by inspectors from the enemy alliance under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. The bases would be at once guarantors of cooperation and hostages to it. This might lead in time to joint command in places and then to judicious, balanced and overdue arms reduction in Europe.

Historically, alliances have often been formed as much to control allies as to confront potential enemies. In a modern confederation, the goal would be to create a situation in which every country in the area feels it has some control over the military destiny of every other country and, specifically, one allowing both the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain control over the military potential of the two Germanys. Under that circumstance a relaxation of the Soviet Union’s grip on its useless and costly empire in East Europe would be entirely feasible, as would an eventual German confederation. Without such a resolution to the German problem, Soviet colonies will be able to pry themselves free only by causing dangerous unease in Moscow.

A plan that promises at once to solve the German problem and to remove their East European albatross is likely to have substantial appeal to the Soviets. And a plan that promises gradually to decolonize East Europe is likely to reduce Soviet problems in that area by relieving the frustration of Eastern Europeans and giving them a future to work for. To accept the plan, however, the Soviets would have to abandon any hegemonic notions they might still cherish about Europe. If they are still Stalinists at heart, they won’t be able to buy the idea. If they’ve genuinely changed, they will. It would be a useful test.