The Uproar in Beijing

The death a week ago of Hu Yaobang, who was forced to step down as the reform-minded leader of China’s Communist Party in 1987 in the wake of nationwide demonstrations for greater democracy, has provided the occasion for Beijing’s biggest public protests since 1976. The precipitating event 13 years ago was almost identical, as tens of thousands of Chinese took to the streets to mourn the death of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and condemn the radicals who had been responsible for the destructive Cultural Revolution. Then as now, to mourn was to make a political statement. This week’s student-led protests, which have continued despite occasional police stong-arm tactics and repeated orders to disperse, have been marked by demands for greater democracy, denunciations of ruling officials and questioning of the regime’s political legitimacy.

It has been a remarkable demonstration of defiance and courage, very much in a Chinese tradition that dates back to the last century, and surprising not just for its intensity but also for the relative tolerance the authorities have shown by letting things run on. The regime, of course, retains the power to quash the protests and arrest those participating in them. It has not hesitated to do so before, most recently in 1987. But even if steps are taken to punish the protesters, their message must still be taken seriously. The resentment that has been manifested against authoritarianism, lack of intellectual freedoms, and--increasingly explicit--alleged corruption among the party’s leaders won’t disappear when the protests are suppressed or abate.

The students and intellectuals expressing these views represent only a tiny fraction of China’s 1.1 billion people. But it is this fraction, the educated elite, on whom China’s hopes for future modernization and increased prosperity largely depend. The demonstrators demand more democracy. They aren’t likely to get it, at least now, but neither are they likely to abandon their claims and retreat into political passivity. They know that, and so does the regime.