Japan and U.S. See Themselves as Victims of Same Relationship

If the Cold War is over, the victor is Japan. The exertions of the United States in the 45-year struggle to contain Soviet communism created the indispensable conditions for Japan’s emergence as an economic superpower. The American use of Japan as a base for its Korean War operations boosted Japanese recovery; the protracted Vietnam War brought prosperity to Japan even as it overheated the American economy and tore its social fabric. All during these years, Japan and the United States have pursued radically different national-security strategies.

The United States has consistently given priority to the military dimensions of national security, even at the sacrifice of economic advantage. True, the Korean War rearmament and subsequent military expenditures have at times provided crucial stimulus to the U.S. economy. But the concentration on fighting the Cold War to the neglect of the U.S. economy and its changing position in the world have seriously damaged national security. Japanese competition now inflicts greater damage and creates greater uncertainty about the future of the United States than anything the Soviet Union is doing or is likely to do.

In contrast, the Japanese concept of “comprehensive security” has emphasized the race for markets, technological preeminence and a wide variety of sophisticated economic relationships with a wide range of partners. The United States has been the keystone of that strategy, both the military protector and the prime market. The strategy has been wildly successful. Japan has overtaken the United States as a supplier of investment capital and foreign aid and as the world’s most successful producer and merchandiser of automobiles, machine tools, semi-conductors, robotics and other technologies that will shape the early decades of the new century.

The combined U.S. trade and budget deficits have created the conditions under which Washington is increasingly dependent on Japanese capital to pay its bills; and, because of the weakened dollar, the Japanese are picking up choice American assets--real estate, farm land, corporations--at bargain prices.

U.S.-Japanese relations are likely to deteriorate because both Japanese and Americans see themselves as victims. The Japanese attribute the astonishing turnabout in U.S.-Japanese relations to their success in following the rules laid down by the United States at the end of World War II. They became a peaceful trading nation. Why should they be blamed if they beat the United States at its own game?

Americans see themselves as victims of predatory Japanese trade practices and of Japan’s monumental ingratitude for having had a “free ride” under the “nuclear umbrella” all these years. In both countries, nationalist sentiments fueled by radically different perceptions of the same reality are on the rise.

Unaccountably, despite growing tensions, U.S. policy continues to encourage Japanese rearmament. Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev has made proposals to reverse the naval arms race in the Pacific and, according to the U.S. Navy’s chief intelligence officer, the Soviets are pulling a significant number of surface ships out of service. (Decommissioning vessels makes the Soviet navy more efficient, the U.S. officer said, but this is not an argument he would extend to the U.S. Navy.)

Soviet sources say they have cut 40 surface vessels in the last four years and have hinted to a senior Pentagon consultant that they will remove as many as 50 attack submarines in the hope of inducing cutbacks in the U.S. carrier fleet. At the same time their naval exercises in the Pacific have become much more defensive and less provocative than in recent years.

The United States response has been to schedule PACEX, the most provocative naval exercise in many years, which will link the Japanese navy even more closely into U.S. naval strategy. The exercise will feature a U.S. naval foray into the Sea of Okhotsk, which borders Soviet territory and is a sanctuary for Soviet missile-launching submarines.,

It is in the interest of the United States, although not necessarily the self-defined interests of the U.S. Navy, to reduce and not increase military tensions in the Pacific. Once again national-security priorities are inverted. Reducing the costs of the military is a prerequisite for a successful economic strategy. Gorbachev offers the possibility of naval disarmament that could produce major savings for both countries.

It is not in the interest of the United States for Japan to become more of a military power than it already is. This is particularly true if we are unable to address the increasingly serious economic conflicts that threaten to turn ever close military allies into bitter commercial rivals.