A Stronger South Korea Can Now Stand On Its Own, So Bring U.S. Troops Home

As it surmounts each new political crisis, South Korea is demonstrating that democracy has firmly taken root. Indeed, the Republic of Korea is proving to be a dramatic success for U.S. policy. South Korea, a ravaged, helpless land at the end of the war 36 years ago, is today one of the strong men of East Asia. Yet as Seoul grows more assertive, strains are increasing between the United States and South Korea. Now, therefore, would be a good time to update the alliance for a changed world by withdrawing American troops from the Korean peninsula.

When the United States initiated the defense treaty that now binds Washington to Korea, the South lay in ruins. If Seoul was to be defended, America had to play the lead role. Today, however, the Korean balance has shifted dramatically. South Korea competes globally in the computer, auto and construction markets, and its economy is nearly five times the size of that of North Korea. South Korea has twice the population of the North, and Pyongyang is on its own militarily; in fact, North Korea’s erstwhile ally China is now pushing for a peaceful settlement of the peninsula’s conflicts. Thus, American troops are no longer needed to defend the South.

Of course, an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces would leave Seoul vulnerable. The North has been investing disproportionately in its armed forces for years, though South Korea currently has a number of compensating advantages--a qualitatively superior air force, newer weapons, a defensive posture in rugged terrain and better trained soldiers--and even now could probably thwart an invasion from the North. In any case, it will not be long before Seoul achieves clear parity with Pyongyang.

And it will be almost impossible for the North, which suffers from severe economic problems that have caused it to default on $800 million in foreign loans, to keep up in the future. A 1985 RAND Corp. study estimates that in the years ahead North Korea will have to devote 36% to 42% of its gross national product to defense, roughly twice the current share, just to match Seoul’s present expenditure of 6% to 7%.

The South is also gaining ground internationally. The presence of virtually every communist nation at the Olympics, an event boycotted by Pyongyang, shows the limits of the North’s influence even among its putative friends. In fact, South Korea is a bigger trading partner of Beijing than is the North, has been developing warmer relations with the Soviet Union, and recently established official diplomatic relations with Hungary. This contrasts sharply with the Korean War, when the Soviet Union equipped North Korea’s forces and China intervened directly.

Another important change in the East Asian military dynamic is the growing influence of Japan, which has surpassed the Soviet Union as the world’s second-ranking economic power. Japan is increasingly able to not only defend its own territory and surrounding seas, but also to directly support future South Korean defense efforts, with financial aid, if nothing else.

With a new Administration in Washington, this is an excellent time to to reassess America’s defense guarantee. The United States should provide South Korea with, say, five years in which to build up its own forces, after which the defense shield would be eliminated. Washington could sell South Korea, which is running a multibillion annual trade surplus, any conventional weapons that it wanted; the State Department could also work to smooth relations between Seoul and Tokyo, which are still tainted by Korean resentment over Japan’s colonial rule during the first half of this century.

One benefit of a troop pull-out would be to dismantle a trip-wire that threatens to involve this nation in a conflict unrelated to its basic security. Disengagement would also save money, so long as the troops were demobilized, reducing the disproportionate global military burden borne by the United States. Finally, removing American troops from Korea would help insulate Washington from Seoul’s fractious political struggles.

Of course, disengagement would not be risk-free. But no foreign policy is without cost. Today the United States pays a very high price to defend populous, prosperous nations around the globe as part of a containment strategy developed in a different era. Withdrawing troops from Korea would begin the much-needed process of updating U.S. foreign policy for the 1990s and beyond.