U.S. Rushes to Revive Cocaine Battle in Peru : New Aid Package Being Considered for Joint Program

After gaining ground against coca growers last year, the joint U.S.-Peruvian narcotics program has been paralyzed for months by the combined threat from cocaine traffickers and leftist guerrillas, U.S. officials say.

To counter what it calls the “narco-guerrilla alliance,” the U.S. government is hurriedly considering a substantial new military and economic aid package for Peru to help the army and police operate in Peru’s coca-growing jungle and to finance development programs, according to American sources.

Similar aid is being considered for Colombia and Bolivia, the two other principal cocaine-trafficking countries in South America, whose security forces also are hard-pressed to cope, the officials here said. In Washington, a Bush Administration official said that the assistance could surge to as much as $500 million next year from the current $57 million.

Aid Would Not Include Troops

Aware of the potential political hazards both here and in the United States, U.S. Embassy sources in Peru emphasized that the aid would not include U.S. troops and would be designed as an anti-narcotics package rather than anti-guerrilla assistance--while recognizing that the line between the two has become blurred in recent years.

Helicopter-borne coca eradication missions ceased in Peru on Feb. 10 because intelligence pointed to a growing danger of ambushes in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the world’s largest single coca-producing region on the eastern slope of the Andes. The nine American-supplied helicopters repeatedly came under fire while ferrying Peruvian crews to coca fields, and one U.S. contract pilot was wounded.

Since then, virtually no coca bushes have been cut down because travel by road in the valley is too dangerous, according to Peruvian and U.S. officials. Thus, after more than 12,000 acres of coca were destroyed in late 1988 and early this year and with the increase of coca acreage possibly neutralized for the first time, coca production could increase once again by about 10%, the average in past years.

U.S. and Peruvian drug agents and scientists completed testing in March on aerial spraying of herbicides to kill coca fields. Peruvians are now analyzing the test results to determine whether the spraying is safe, but a decision on wide application is not expected for six months to two years. One U.S. official said that one herbicide, known as Spike, “performed magnificently,” killing the coca without destroying the undergrowth or nearby crops.

Much to Overcome

“Now we have to overcome the political factor, and of course the economic and social effects as well,” he said.

The State Department’s anti-narcotics office has emphasized the need for aerial spraying, given the dangers and slow pace of manual eradication even when the crews are flown in by helicopter. But aerial spraying, even if environmentally safe, could displace tens of thousands of peasants who survive by growing coca and possibly push them closer to the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) rebels who roam the valley.

The guerrillas already defend the growers’ interests and are said to protect traffickers who ship partially refined cocaine base to Colombia by small planes from clandestine airstrips.

Although both Peruvian and U.S. officials maintain that most coca growers are not from the area and arrived in recent years to earn quick profits, many local officials in the valley worry about the impact of all-out eradication. Therefore, the aid package would include plans for agricultural development along with stepped-up eradication efforts.

Several American officials insisted that U.S. aid would not and should not include combat troops, who would be vulnerable and of little use in the jungle. Peru has capable soldiers, the officials said, but they need equipment, ranging from arms, more helicopters and basic supplies “right down to boots.”

The goal is to find funds in the current budget to get the aid moving within months if the Peruvians prove amenable, a senior embassy official said in Lima. He declined to speculate on the amount. A decision depends on the National Security Council’s review of the military role in the drug war and the Bush Administration’s drug strategy, scheduled to be announced in September.

Peruvian President Alan Garcia said during a visit to Argentina last weekend that he is interested in more funding for the anti-narcotics effort but not in military aid. He said the U.S. government has not asked Peru whether it wanted or would accept such aid, and added, “At no time nor in any way have they discussed this with us. We don’t want military aid. We don’t believe in it.”

In the meantime, U.S. and Peruvian officials have been improving security in the valley, including the fortification of a police base deep in the jungle. They are now awaiting clearance from Washington to resume airborne coca-destroying missions.

Limited American Presence

American anti-narcotics aid is a relatively paltry $10 million, and the American presence is now limited to a couple of dozen agents from the Justice Department’s Drug Enforcement Administration. The Peruvian army so far has left narcotics work to the police and has concentrated on the guerrilla war.

Both Peruvian and U.S. authorities say that the alliance between the traffickers and the guerrillas in the valley requires a more unified response by Peruvian security forces.

In April, an apparent combined force of guerrillas and drug traffickers attacked the town of Uchiza, freeing nine jailed Colombian traffickers and killing several police officers. Persistent reports in Lima suggest that U.S. helicopters lifted off from Tingo Maria, at the southern end of the valley, to try to land police troop reinforcements close to the combat scene but had to turn back because of bad weather.

In Heart of Coca Region

The fortified base is at Santa Lucia, a village located a few miles from Uchiza in the center of the valley, in the heart of the coca-growing area.

The U.S. government now provides virtually no military assistance to any South American nation, apart from minimal training.

“I am talking about assistance to the Peruvian military, not action by the U.S. military--which will be over my dead body,” one senior U.S. diplomat said. “There are certain possibilities of training people in the use of our equipment, if we provide it. But the policy approach is based on fighting drugs, not fighting guerrillas.”

Smith, The Times’ Buenos Aires bureau chief, was recently on assignment in Peru. Times staff writer Douglas Jehl in Washington contributed to this story.