Riptides of Reform

One would think that economic reform and populism were common causes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe these days. Yet in both the Soviet Union and Poland, there is a conflict brewing between these otherwise complementary forces, a conflict that could undermine their mutual desire for reform.

Both countries have a strong and overwhelming social consensus in support of change, especially change that dismantles repressive structures of production and political control. Yet within this consensus a division has emerged: One side favors economic restructuring at the expense of some social concerns, and the other side favors social and political goals over more radical economic measures. The first side can be considered technocratic, the second side populist.

In Poland, the government and Communist Party officials, after years of inefficiency and inertia, have embarked on an ambitious program to get Poland’s feeble economy back in shape. The first and most painful step was the price reform implemented last Monday. Prices of some consumer goods increased several times over, angering many Polish consumers who organized protests and held strikes. This came a few precious weeks after the the party and Solidarity forged an awkward coalition that elected General Wojciech Jaruzelski to the new post of president.

In part because of the reaction to the price reform along with a general public concern that Solidarity is in cahoots with the Communists, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa has begun to steer the labor union into closer alignment with its populist roots, opposing the price reform and aligning with the Peasant Party to shake the unpopular General Czeslaw Kiszczak out of his new perch as prime minister.

In the Soviet Union, the division has been visible for some time but was hardened last week with the formation of a formal opposition within the new Soviet Parliament, the so-called Inter-Regional Group. This clot of left-wing parliamentary delegates consider themselves more radical than Mikhail S. Gorbachev, yet they oppose major tenets of his program such as the introduction of private economic cooperatives. They are suspicious of any reforms that sacrifice social justice to economic efficiency.

The most prominent of them, maverick politician Boris N. Yeltsin, exemplifies the values that motivate the group’s members; he is a people’s politician, a deliverer of stirring speeches, whereas Gorbachev’s ministers are technocrats with little popular appeal. Last month’s strikes in Siberian and Ukrainian coal mines also illustrated this division; the strikers professed support for economic change, but insisted that the government hand out more consumer goods and protect them from rapacious private cooperatives as well.

In both countries this division between economic change and populist sentiment threatens to divert popular support from difficult but important economic restructuring. The leaders of both countries realize the potential danger. Without popular steam, the engines of reform may either wind down or be forced to consider harnessing the power of coercion to keep going. To avoid this, each country’s leaders will have to struggle to keep the forces of reform and the forces of populism working in concert.