Abortion and ‘Neutral’ Law

Philip A. Lacovara’s claim that neutral principles of law support government regulation of abortion (“Freedom of Choice Isn’t Total,” Op-Ed Aug. 12) rests on a legal philosophy that was in vogue some years ago but is now discredited as an intellectual muddle.

An obvious problem is that, for every “neutral principle,” the law also provides opposite “neutral principles.”

Lacovara’s four principles are: 1.) Reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of life. 2.) In partnerships, parties have obligations to one another. 3.) Parental consent is required for surgery on minors. 4.) The government has no obligation to pay citizens to exercise their rights.

But contrary principles state : 1.) Reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of individual conscience. 2.) If the parties’ burdens are not mutual, their obligations are not mutual. 3.) Parental consent is not required when not in the best interest of the minor. 4.) The government may not condition its funds upon citizens’ forfeiture of their rights.

A more basic problem is that there is simply no such thing as a neutral principle applicable in all situations. Principles are statements of values that people hold in certain contexts. Change the context, and the values of the principle change. Beware of lawyers who claim that the objective majesty of the law will solve moral dilemmas.

ROBERT BENSON

Professor of Law

Loyola Law School

Los Angeles