Iowa Skipper Faces ‘Cruel Business of Accountability’ : ‘Admiral’s Mast’ Proceedings to Determine Navy Careers of Captain, Executive Officer

It is a tradition as old as sailing ships and as uncompromising as the sea itself: Skippers are held accountable for what happens on their watch. And, whether they are sleeping in their staterooms or issuing orders on the bridge, everything that happens while they are at sea happens on their watch.

The U.S. Navy, its traditions tempered by 20th-Century concepts of justice, has devised gradations of punishment and provided the accused with legal counsel and avenues of appeal. But, when an inquiry ends, in the words of a 1952 editorial often quoted by naval historians, then “comes the cruel business of accountability.”

This is what awaits Capt. Fred Moosally, the skipper of the battleship Iowa. In the four-month inquiry after the disastrous April explosion of the Iowa’s No. 2 gun turret, investigators found a welter of management, training and personnel deficiencies in the operation of the Iowa’s 16-inch guns.

Not Blamed for Accident

Although investigators concluded that the deficiencies “did not cause the accident or contribute to the loss of life,” Moosally and the Iowa’s executive officer, Cmdr. John P. Morse, will be judged at an “admiral’s mast.”

The investigation determined that the blast in all likelihood was caused by the “intentional intervention” of 24-year-old Gunner’s Mate Clayton M. Hartwig, who is believed to have placed a detonating device between two sacks of gunpowder in the breech of the turret’s center gun.

Citing Moosally’s “otherwise outstanding performance,” the Navy’s top brass concluded that neither he nor his executive officer should be subject to court-martial or relieved of his command. But the mast proceedings could result in letters of admonition, or, in a more severe move, letters of censure that could dog both officers’ careers into retirement.

“In all probability, Capt. Moosally’s career is over,” said Eugene R. Fidell, a Navy-trained Washington attorney who regularly handles military justice cases. But Fidell and several former Navy skippers said the proceedings will be closely studied, as the Navy struggles to uphold the iron doctrine of accountability while bringing it in line with the realities of modern life.

Upholding Naval Tradition

“These investigations of the Navy’s more administrative or management failures offer a late 20th-Century paradigm for the Navy as a human institution, a form of human activity,” said Fidell. “What they tell us is that personal responsibility is still expected. It’s a lovely picture of the continuity and the meaningfulness of naval tradition, even in the space age.”

In a statement issued Thursday, Moosally acknowledged the burdens of his rank.

“I am responsible for everything that happens aboard my ship, and I have no excuses for the problem areas that were found aboard Iowa during the investigation,” Moosally said.

The Navy investigation disclosed that the Iowa’s center turret was an administrative shambles. Among the “systemic deficiencies” cited, no formal schedule of assignments was maintained, and sailors working in sensitive safety positions were not certified to carry out their jobs. Amid the remains of the 47 victims of the turret blast, investigators found forbidden spark-producing items, such as rings and cigarette lighters.

Moosally’s superiors faulted the skipper and his executive officer for relying too heavily on outside inspections and subordinates’ reports on the operation of the 16-inch guns.

“While delegation is expected and encouraged, proper execution of doctrine and directives is the responsibility of the commanding officer,” wrote Adm. P. F. Carter Jr., commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command. “Accountability is the core value in the measurement of performance.”

It is a tradition that has no parallel elsewhere in American society. Cabinet secretaries and business executives rarely resign in disgrace and are seldom fired over the mistakes of distant subordinates. But, for Navy skippers, who have unparalleled authority on the open seas, it comes with the territory that a promising career can be ruined in an instant by the missteps of a young and inexperienced crew.

“In our business,” said one senior Navy officer, “the commanding officer is always responsible.”

Capt. Glenn R. Brindel, skipper of the Navy frigate Stark, was drummed out of the Navy after an Iraqi Exocet missile slammed into the ship’s side in May, 1987, killing 37 sailors. Brindel was blamed for the ship’s failure to defend itself against the incoming missile, and it was no excuse that he was in his cabin at the time the missile hit.

Neither does death exonerate the skipper. The captain of the U.S. minesweeper Hobson, Lt. Cmdr. William J. Tierney, was held accountable by a Navy board of inquiry when his ship turned sharply into the path of an aircraft carrier during night maneuvers in 1952, even though Tierney was one of the 176 sailors who drowned.

‘Must Answer’ for Deeds

“The captain of a ship, like the captain of a state, is given honor and privileges and trust beyond any other men. But let him set the wrong course, let him touch ground, let him bring disaster to his ship or to his men, and he must answer for what he has done,” the Wall Street Journal said in a subsequent editorial.

At least Tierney was awake. In 1969, preparing for a dawn exercise, Cmdr. Albert S. McLemore of the destroyer Frank E. Evans went to bed and turned command over to a junior officer.

While McLemore slept, the Evans collided with an Australian aircraft carrier during night maneuvers, killing 53 of its crew. McLemore was nevertheless held accountable and was punished with a general court-martial, a letter of reprimand and the withdrawal of points needed for promotion.

But while the Navy’s tradition of accountability appears to have withstood the tides of ages, it has not been isolated from political currents. Many believe that, in recent years, especially, political factors and the changing nature of warfare have threatened to erode the old order.

As political leaders increasingly call on the Navy and Marines to conduct operations in the twilight between war and peace, some experts believe that the iron doctrine of a skipper’s accountability inevitably will lose its bite and its meaning.

After then-President Ronald Reagan pronounced himself accountable for the 1983 truck-bomb explosion at the U.S. Marine compound in Lebanon in which 241 U.S. Marines and sailors died, many Navy traditionalists grumbled that no commander had been made to walk the plank for military deficiencies in the operation.

Last year, in what many considered to be a notable exception to the rule of accountability, a Navy board of inquiry stopped short of recommending disciplinary action against Capt. Will C. Rogers III, the skipper of the Navy cruiser Vincennes. Rogers’ ship shot down a civilian Iran Air jetliner on July 3, killing all 290 people on board.

Instead, the board called for a letter of reprimand for the ship’s operations officer, who relayed inaccurate information that led Rogers to conclude that the approaching aircraft was an F-14 fighter, not an A-300 Airbus.

Actions Called Justifiable

Immediately after the downing of the Iranian airliner, Reagan and Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pronounced the captain’s actions justifiable. Then-Vice President George Bush traveled to the United Nations to defend the action. Navy officers widely believe that those early statements put substantial pressure on investigators to prove Reagan and Crowe right.

In the wake of the Iowa explosion, Navy officials were quick to defend the recommissioned World War II-vintage battleships as safe, modern warships--a factor that many believe may have led investigators to discount safety-related explanations in lieu of the theory that Hartwig intentionally caused the mid-Atlantic blast.

But the Iowa investigation carried none of the international political implications of the Vincennes incident or the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut.

As a result, experts maintained that the Navy was able to reimpose its values and reassert the hoary captain’s law.