Big U.S. Troop Presence Is Becoming a Liability : South Korea: The economy is burgeoning and politics are boiling. In the meantime, the American military force is becoming a whipping boy.

In their talks this week, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and President Bush have been silent about the issue of withdrawing any of the 44,000 American troops based in Roh’s country.

Despite the two presidents’ reluctance, recent violent demonstrations in Seoul only underscore the growing irritant that our troop presence has become in U.S.-Korean relations. The rationale for our $2.6-billion annual presence, which made sense in the days following the Korean War, has grown weaker each year as South Korea’s economy continues to boom.

Today, South Korea’s economy is eight times larger than North Korea’s and its population is twice as large. Clearly, South Korea has matured to the point where it can more fully shoulder the burden of defending against a smaller, poorer neighbor. But when asked when the United States can begin reducing its Korean troop presence, the White House and South Korea both respond, “not now.”

This is the same response that Americans have been hearing for years. Recently the South Korean defense minister was more explicit: “We can discuss the issue of withdrawing U.S. troops in South Korea only after the year 2000.” In his remarks, the official indicated he had the year 2004, or perhaps 2006, in mind.

Certainly, North Korea still poses a threat to South Korea. But no one is seriously talking about ending our ironclad security guarantees to the Seoul government. Military experts agree that North Korea could not sustain a war against the South without substantial Soviet or Chinese assistance. Yet the Soviet Union and China are looking inward to their own serious economic and political problems. Rather than being an impetus to North Korean ambitions, virtually all east Asian observers agree, the Soviets and Chinese help keep the brake on.

In this context, it makes sense now to reevaluate our Korean security policy with an eye to what’s best for our interests. Let us ask ourselves, if North Korea poses such a threat to South Korea, why have the South Koreans allowed the share of their gross national product allotted to defense to decline 22% in the last few years? In fact, South Korea spends a smaller share of its GNP for defense than we do. We have repeatedly urged South Korea to buy more military equipment, preferably from us, but Seoul has resisted.

It would certainly be unwise for the United States to sever its security commitment to South Korea totally. But it would be just as unwise to pretend that nothing has changed in 25 years. South Korea has a burgeoning economy and a $10-billion trade surplus against the United States. If the Koreans can’t shoulder more of the burden of their own defense now, do we really have to wait until the year 2006, when South Korea’s economy will be about 15 times larger than North Korea’s? Can we act only with South Korea’s acquiescence? If the answer is yes, then aren’t we being held hostage?

Apparently the Pentagon, despite the Administration’s rhetoric, agrees that it is time to rethink our policy. According to recent press reports, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are already preparing plans for the possibility of withdrawing all U.S. troops by 1995. They know what a recent Pentagon report states; that in South Korea, “the role of U.S. air and naval elements is likely to be more critical” than our ground troops.

Removing 10,000 Army troops by 1992, as I have proposed, would still leave two Air Force wings and all current Air Force personnel in place, as well as two-thirds of our current Army presence of about 31,000 soldiers. This remaining force would be a strong symbol of commitment to South Korea’s security. Only Germany and Japan would have more U.S. troops.

Our large troop presence in South Korea is a political liability for us in several ways. Our presence is inevitably a lightning rod for South Korean protest groups, as the most recent demonstrations show. We have become a whipping boy for every social and political ailment in South Korea, real or imagined.

We do not want to be a catalyst for every Korean dissident. Our policy must recognize that South Korea’s political center of gravity is to the left of Roh, who only narrowly won in 1987 against two left-wing opponents, who together received far more votes.

We now have the opportunity to take control of events, rather than let them control us. A 25% reduction in U.S. troops in South Korea could save us more than $500 million annually and reduce anti-U.S. sentiment while still preserving important military capabilities. Let’s not wait until 2006 to take this sensible step.