Risk a Leap Toward Negotiations : South Africa: Both the government and the African National Congress seem to be making progress at laying out the conditions essential for talks.

The recent election in South Africa produced a mandate for negotiation. Eighty percent of President Frederik W. de Klerk’s inaugural speech covered negotiation questions.

The focus of international pressure on South Africa is that the negotiation process must be under way within nine months. If this happens, pressure from outside the country will probably decrease for awhile. Everything in our politics--internal and external--therefore boils down to negotiation. If it fails, South Africa will be in a cul-de-sac sooner than we think.

What are the chances for success?

The following are good signs:

* The government is developing a comprehensive negotiation strategy. It is making use of very knowledgeable people to ensure that the matter is attempted correctly.

* The government is prepared to comply with some of the prerequisites for negotiation, namely the release of political detainees, relaxation of discriminatory laws, a partial lifting of the state of emergency and the legalization of peaceful demonstrations. The government is also prepared to discuss the other demands during prenegotiations.

* The government has a very capable negotiating team.

* There is strong pressure on black groups to negotiate. The West, the Soviet Union and African leaders have demanded this.

But there are questions.

It is doubtful whether there can be legitimate negotiations without involvement by supporters of the African National Congress. These include the internal groups such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the United Democratic Front, the South African Council of Churches and numerous other black community organizations. The Mass Democratic Movement is the new umbrella group, and it is inspired and led by the ANC from its headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia.

The question is whether the ANC supporters want to participate in pre-negotiations. Another question is whether the government will compromise significantly and allow them to participate. From this point of the view, pre-negotiations will initially have to be held in secret.

What goes on in the mind of the South African government? My impression is that it first wants to concentrate on beginning negotiations with representatives of black municipalities, homeland leaders, tricameral members of Parliament and a number of church groups.

It appears that the government is also planning regional elections in black communities so that a wider base of elected black leaders can give credibility to the first round of negotiations.

In the meantime, it also seems possible that contact will be made with internal leaders of the ANC’s supporters and that even the ANC itself may be approached.

I am convinced that the entire negotiation plan will fail unless the ANC becomes directly involved in pre-negotiations. The government, however, appears to be extremely careful on this point. There is a tendency to underestimate the influence of the ANC or to try to outsmart its leaders.

What goes on in the mind of the ANC?

My in-depth contact on four occasions over the last two years with top ANC members in London has been publicized. In each case, my confidential and intensive discussions lasted for days. I and the small group of South Africans who participated in the talks were assured that we could make excellent contributions toward preparations for negotiation, the search for a compromise and the exchange of essential information.

My understanding of ANC leaders is that they accept the government’s will and intentions to reach a negotiated settlement. They also interpret the election results as a clear mandate of the white electorate for constitutional change. They believe that the whites are sincere in their search for a post-apartheid system. The ANC, too, says: “Give F.W. de Klerk a chance.”

They accept--and this is very important--that the ANC is not the only representative of the black people. They admit that the ANC is only one of the actors (albeit a very important actor) in the push for change.

They want to be involved in pre-negotiations. If the government proves its willingness to allow this, as well as its willingness to compromise, they are prepared to be flexible.

As for violence, their view is that the bloodshed they have caused has decreased considerably and that they will end it once the process of negotiation officially begins.

They will also try to get sanctions lifted once negotiations begin.

As far as they are concerned, South Africa plays a decisive role in Namibia and Angola. If South Africa cooperates, it will increase our credibility with the ANC.

The chances of successful negotiation will depend on the success of pre-negotiations on the aforementioned conditions. No one expects the government to comply with all of these these demands. But it is clear that a leap in the direction of these conditions must be risked.