Thailand Can Become the Key to Restraining Khmer Rouge : Cambodia: Power-sharing is impossible. There’s no choice but to back Hun Sen and help the Thais disengage from the forces of Pol Pot.

In the wake of the Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, civil war is moving from simmer to boil between the genocidal Khmer Rouge, still led by Pol Pot, and the government of Hun Sen, who has administered the country for 10 years.

But all that the outside powers can bring themselves to say is that the “best solution” would be negotiation and power-sharing. Especially after the failure of the Paris negotiations, this is a wholly irrelevant observation, akin to asking Mikhail S. Gorbachev to negotiate with Josef Stalin over the future of Russia and to work with him for free elections.

These two groups of Cambodians hate each other. From the point of view of Hun Sen and his colleagues, the Pol Pot-ists behaved like monsters while, from the point of view of Pol Pot, the Hun Sen group is a traitor to his movement.

There is proof that these former Khmer Rouge of Hun Sen do have a different ideology. No visitor to Cambodia today can mistake the present government of Hun Sen for the concentration-camp government of Pol Pot. It may be a one-party state, as are many others we deal with, but it is a normal government with money, music, religion, time off for relaxation, family life, and, indeed, a considerable amount of free enterprise. None of this could be said about Pol Pot’s government.

While the Hun Sen government was certainly established by the Vietnamese, the Cambodian population is clearly more concerned over the reappearance of the Khmer Rouge. And the willingness of Hun Sen to arm a popular militia is evidence of his confidence in the population’s attitude.

There is no other choice, today, except that between Hun Sen and Pol Pot. The two other aspirants, represented by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, are by all estimates too weak to determine the outcome, much less to prevail. At most, they can provide legitimacy to whoever wins.

In this regard, history may be repeating itself. Just as Prince Sihanouk is fronting for the Khmer Rouge today, as leader of their so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, so also was he their putative leader from 1970 to 1975.

Many young Khmer joined the Khmer Rouge in 1970 precisely because their prince, Sihanouk, issued a call for them to join with the Khmer Rouge to overthrow Lon Nol, with a view to putting Sihanouk back in power. Among these patriotic young Khmer who rallied to the prince’s call was an 18 year-old schoolboy named Hun Sen. According to credible reports, he defected from the Khmer Rouge seven years later to avoid an order from Pol Pot to destroy a Vietnamese village. Sihanouk’s and Son Sann’s factions are also filled with former Khmer Rouge who defected in either fear or revulsion.

What can be done? The key may lie with the Thais. Not long ago, Hun Sen’s defense minister said: “If the Thais gradually reduce their support to the Khmer Rouge, we can prevail easily. If they continue the support, it will be difficult for us though we still think we can win.”

This is a plausible assessment. It is no secret that the Thais have, for the last 10 years, helped the Khmer Rouge. They have provided them with sanctuaries on Thai territory, funneled weapons supplied by China, given the Khmer Rouge information and advice and permitted them to maintain unsupervised refugee camps.

In sum, in the Thai effort to persuade the Vietnamese to leave Cambodia, they have worked with the devil.

But new ideas are arising in Thailand. Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhawan now has friendly relations with Hun Sen, whom he has brought to Bangkok several times in his laudable effort to turn Indochina into a marketplace rather than a battlefield. He is trying to slow the pace of the civil war and to substitute commercial forces for military ones. He is trying, in the wake of Vietnam’s withdrawal, to move the Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations from policies opposing Vietnam’s invasion to policies opposing a Khmer Rouge return to power.

Prime Minister Chatchai needs and deserves help. In particular the Thais should not be required to confront alone the hard-line Chinese determination to keep supporting their proxy, Pol Pot. We should be standing with our ally, Thailand, and urging China to cease and desist.

For Americans who detest Pol Pot, the alternatives are few. If we are currently too mired in past policies to support Hun Sen and if we cannot help the Thais to restrain the Khmer Rouge, will we not be morally obliged, in the end, to encourage the Vietnamese to return?