New Continent Emerges Full of Old Uncertainties : Europe: The Iron Curtain lifts, satellite states begin expressing themselves. That may bring democracy; it may also revive past conflicts.

The Bush Administration has come under heavy criticism for its handling of recent political changes in Eastern Europe. Its somewhat timid response to reform in Hungary and Poland was coupled with a modest aid package to the two countries. When Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger sounded cautionary words about the dangers of regional instability, critics quickly accused the Administration of harboring nostalgia for the Cold War.

It is entirely natural for Americans to support democratization in Poland and Hungary. For almost 45 years, we have criticized the imposition of Soviet-propped communist governments on the peoples of Eastern Europe. Lifting the Iron Curtain and allowing a measure of freedom for imprisoned populations became a cherished objective of U.S. policy.

But U.S. policy had another important goal: political stabilization of the Continent. After two devastating world wars, U.S. and European statesmen agreed there was a need to erect a new European political structure, one less susceptible to conflict and war. The alliance system we built and the two superpowers’ massive military presence were central to the new structure. Both made a decisive contribution to an unprecedented 45 years of peace in Europe.

The Soviets used the Red Army in Eastern Europe to replace traditional authoritarian regimes with ineffective and unpopular communist governments. In solidifying their rule, the Soviets also managed to suppress chronic ethnic and national conflicts among East European countries. The Soviet threat strengthened the perception of common interests among West European nations--also between these nations and the United States. Subsidiary structures contributed to stability in Europe; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community owe their existence to Cold War realities. It may have been an unappealing trade-off, but the Soviet-imposed “fraternal” order in the East and the threat that posed to the West undergirded a stable, if not always tranquil, existence for a war-weary Continent.

The United States and the Soviet Union are now re-evaluating the nature of their respective commitments to Europe, a process that may lead to superpower disengagement. Such disengagement could well mean the renationalizing of Europe. Patterns of political, security and economic cooperation built under the auspices of superpower presence may not survive superpower absence.

The problem of new nationalism and instability is especially acute in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Among those agitating against Soviet domination are groups motivated by ideals we would not find so congenial. The assertion of popular will may well cause reappearance of confrontational and nationalistic resentments that plagued the region before World War II.

Reduced Soviet involvement in Eastern European affairs may have already allowed latent tensions to surface. Romania’s harsh treatment of Hungarians in Transylvania has forced many to flee to Hungary. Tensions mount between East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia over the issue of East German refugees. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria experience ethnic unrest. Soviet reluctance to act as regional policeman will bring more festering conflicts to a head.

Why should the United States worry? European instability and rabid nationalism caused two world wars and America participated in both of them. The global responsibilities assumed since 1945 are strong moralistic elements in U.S. foreign policy; political considerations would probably not allow America to sit out another European conflict. The re-emergence of instability has to be a major U.S. concern. Moreover, this time the distinction between good and bad guys will be harder to make--all with the menace of nuclear weapons in the background.

Another possibility may be just as unsettling: reappearance of old conflicts and superpower reluctance to adjudicate them. That could thrust Germany--especially a reunited Germany--to the fore as regional power by default. Does emergence of a hegemonic Germany in central Europe contribute to continental stability or detract from it? It is not at all clear.

Do these prospects mean the United States should oppose the process of democratization in Eastern Europe? Or that it should not push for deep cuts in Soviet conventional military forces in Europe, even though at least some of these forces are there as much to secure Soviet control as to intimidate the West? Certainly not.

The goals of political self-determination and reducing the oppressive presence of the Red Army are worthy in their own right and the American public expects its leaders to pursue them vigorously. In any event, the process of superpower disengagement and greater European self-assertion may be inevitable.

But no one should be deluded into believing the result would necessarily be a more stable and pacific Europe. The opposite may be the case: a Continent again awash in conflict, populated by mistrustful nations long on memories, short on forgetting and forgiving.

In the movie “Three Days of the Condor,” a CIA analyst discovers a plot within the agency. He takes his discovery to an old OSS hand bound to a desk job in Langley and, after revealing the details, asks the old man, “You saw some action once, too, didn’t you? Do you miss the action?” Slowly, the old man replies, emphasizing every word, “It is not the action I miss. It is the clarity.”

There is, after all, something to be said for feeling a little nostalgic about the Cold War. We surely will not miss the action: the Berlin crises, the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the brinkmanship and the threats. But we may miss the clarity. In a nuclear world, clarity, predictability and order should not be nonchalantly dismissed as unimportant. They make the world safer.

The Administration is right, therefore, to adopt what one congressman called “thoughtful ambivalence” toward developments in the Eastern Bloc. The Cold War arrangement was dangerous but had advantages. The emerging European order may offer new opportunities but it will pose new risks, too. In the face of uncertainty, informed prudence is a better guide to policy than enthusiastic and sentimental naivete.