So Many Questions Right Now

Removing Gen. Manuel Noriega from power is something everyone can applaud. And--let’s face it--if U.S. forces could have gone in and spirited him out to stand trial here on drug charges in one swift, deft and decisive stroke, the inevitable second-guessing about desirability and legality would be over with, in all probability, with comparative celerity. Noriega declared war on the United States first, after all, and he’s such a villainous figure that few will shed any tears over his being chased from power.

But the fact is that our forces are still in Panama, and Noriega is still at large. This means that even though most Americans support President Bush’s action, we are left wondering whether the conception and execution were as irreproachable as the intent. In his address to the nation Wednesday, President Bush said, “No president takes such action lightly.” Well, the American people regard this as a very serious matter, too. So do our friends in Latin America, where memories of past U.S. interventions are so vivid that many of them immediately condemned the invasion.

That’s why numerous and troubling questions about the U.S. action against Noriega’s hateful regime must be asked. Clearly it’s a good thing Noriega is out. Panamanians overwhelmingly voted in May for a presidential candidate, Guillermo Endara, who pledged to remove Noriega as commander of the Panama Defense Forces. The general used that powerful post to run Panama behind the scenes and to oversee his drug trafficking and other illicit activities. Noriega showed how much power he could wield, and how brutally, when he prevented Endara from taking office, letting his thugs publicly beat Endara and one of his vice presidents, Guillermo Ford.

But while it’s clear Noriega had to go, it’s less certain that force was the only way to remove him. And if it was the only option, why did the United States have to act on its own? And, if a Lone Ranger intervention was the only way, why was U.S. intelligence unable to pinpoint his whereabouts to facilitate early capture? President Bush says he had to protect 35,000 U.S. citizens living in Panama from “imminent danger.” But were things in Panama really more dangerous now than at any other time in the 2-year standoff with Noriega? Or did Bush find the series of recent violent incidents involving U.S. citizens in Panama--including the shooting death of a Marine Corps officer and the brutalizing of another officer and his wife--a useful pretext to take actions they had been planning for some time? And why was this action taken now, just when it appeared that the campaign of economic and diplomatic pressure against Noriega was beginning to have some effect?

Other questions that have yet to be adequately answered: How well did this operation go in strictly military and political terms? Elements of the PDF are still offering resistance, despite claims that U.S. troops are now mopping up. Conversely, if the PDF completely collapses, who will enforce the authority of Panama’s new civilian government? U.S. troops may wind up staying in Panama longer than Pentagon planners realize just to serve as policemen. How will the Panamanian people react to the invasion? Many undoubtedly feel relief that Noriega has been ousted. But how many will be angry or distraught over the blood it cost?

What will the effect of this action be on the future of democracy in Panama? Another goal of the invasion, according to Bush, was to “restore democracy,” and many members of Congress who rushed to the President’s support agreed with that goal. But, in truth, Panama has never been a real democracy; for almost 20 years it has been under the control of military dictators who ruled at least partly because they were on good terms with Washington. For a long time, one of them was Noriega, who got on very well with the Reagan Administration until his drug trafficking became too much for it to overlook. The United States helped create the monster it is now trying to destroy, and the invasion may set back genuine democracy in Panama for many more years. And Latins remember well the dozens of major and minor U.S. interventions in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean far better than most Americans do, which is why they were reluctant to encourage U.S. military action against Noriega, no matter how much they detested him.

And what will the impact of this action be on the future of the Panama Canal treaties? In his speech Bush pointedly emphasized that he is fully committed to implementing them, and turning the canal over to Panama in the year 2000, as they require. That is an important stance, and one the government must stand by even if some jingoists now start calling for continued U.S. control of the Canal Zone. The canal is a symbol to Panamanians, and other Latin Americans, of what many call “American imperialism.” While it was controversial in this country, President Carter’s decision to give up the canal was the wisest step ever taken by a U.S. President to show that the era of gunboat diplomacy was ending and that the United States is prepared to treat its neighbors with the respect and dignity they want.