Standoff in Panama: Contest of Two Wills : Surrender: A gentle but stubborn man of the cloth betters the man of the gun, the ‘maximum leader.’

For 11 days, dozens of officials and diplomats from the United States, the Vatican and Panama conferred around the clock while their advisers pored over constitutions, canon law, extradition treaties and legal precedents--all in an effort to end the agonizing standoff with deposed Panamanian strongman Manuel A. Noriega.

But the crisis in Panama City ultimately became a contest of wills between two men--a self-proclaimed “maximum leader” and a gentle but stubborn Spanish-born priest. And in the end, the man of the cloth bettered the man of the gun.

Senior officials credit Archbishop Jose Sebastian Laboa, the papal nuncio who once headed a Vatican tribunal that investigates miracles, with maneuvering Noriega through a series of turning points that persuaded him to leave the Vatican embassy and surrender to U.S. forces.

“I believe that Father Laboa was the most instrumental person in making this happen,” Maj. Gen. Marc Cisneros, the commander of the U.S. Army South and the lead American negotiator in Panama, told a news conference in Panama on Thursday.

A senior State Department official in Washington added: “Once the Vatican made clear it would not grant him asylum but would not turn him over to us, we knew it all depended on Laboa. He somehow had to convince Noriega to voluntarily give up.

“Getting Noriega to leave of his own free will was a horrendous obstacle,” the official said. “There were many (in the U.S. government) who said he wouldn’t be able to do it. They were convinced that Noriega would rather come out with guns blazing or even take people inside the nunciature hostage in exchange for his own freedom.

“But this time Laboa worked his own miracle.”

Laboa personally made the decision to grant Noriega refuge in the palm-fringed Vatican mission on Christmas Eve, mainly to neutralize Noriega’s threat to wage a prolonged guerrilla war from the northern Panamanian jungles.

But the 66-year-old priest from the rugged, mountainous Basque region of Spain also turned out to be more effective than American forces in getting Noriega out.

He did it by playing his own game of psychological warfare--a one-man version of the good-cop, bad-cop routine--according to a European envoy who was in the embassy daily.

During the first part of Noriega’s stay, Laboa applied crude pressure and veiled threats, according to the envoy and U.S. officials.

Noriega was denied the right to use the telephone, either to take incoming calls from his U.S. lawyers or to contact his family, which had taken refuge in the Cuban Embassy.

He was kept incommunicado, denied access to newspapers or radio. And the television set in the Spartan, white room on the second floor of the three-story mansion where he was lodged was broken.

Uzi Is Locked Up

He was denied the right to wear a uniform, and the Israeli-made Uzi submachine gun he brought with him was locked in a safe. He was dressed instead in plain T-shirts and trousers, and the sole adornment in his room was a crucifix.

As part of the strategy, Laboa, along with another priest from the embassy, stood outside Noriega’s room and discussed his dismal prospects in voices loud enough for him to hear, the European diplomat said.

The conversation included a reference to Anastasio Somoza, the deposed Nicaraguan dictator who was assassinated shortly after his forced exile in 1979, the diplomat said.

“The heat was applied literally,” a State Department official said. “Even his air conditioning was turned off. It had to be a humbling experience that demonstrated in stark terms how vulnerable he was.”

Noriega quickly became “downcast and moody,” according to Marcos G. McGrath, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Panama.

It was during this period that Laboa applied the first concrete pressure on Noriega, in the form of two letters.

The first was signed by Laboa and relayed to the U.S. Army, authorizing American forces to raid the embassy if the nuncio felt threatened by Noriega or his supporters who also had holed up inside the mission.

Laboa then orchestrated a campaign to convince Pope John Paul II--in a letter from Panama’s bishops--that the grounds for asylum should be refused.

That letter was sent shortly after Laboa told Noriega that the Vatican would probably not grant asylum to the former dictator as a political or diplomatic refugee, the official said.

Letter From Bishops

“The letter from Panama’s Catholic bishops, which urged the Vatican not to recognize Noriega as a political or diplomatic refugee because of the criminal charges against him, helped sway the Vatican,” McGrath said.

Noriega was indicted on drug charges by U.S. grand jurors in February, 1988.

After winning assurances from the Bush Administration that the 12-count indictment against Noriega would not call for the death penalty, the Vatican notified all parties that it would not allow the dictator to stay in the embassy for a prolonged period and that it hoped for swift resolution of the crisis.

On the fourth day of his refuge, Noriega became even more isolated. Most of the 30 supporters, who had been sleeping on cots provided by the U.S. Army in the embassy employees’ dining hall, walked out of the mission and were detained.

The only others left inside were Noriega’s former chief of intelligence, the head of his personal bodyguard unit, the director of immigration and his wife--and four Spanish Basque separatists and a Cuban who had also taken refuge in the Vatican embassy from the fighting.

“It apparently worked,” said the State Department official. “Noriega became despondent as he realized he was being abandoned.”

As the standoff continued, the European diplomat said, Laboa abandoned the initial strategy and carefully began “building an aura of trust” with the isolated strongman.

“In the last five days, he (found) that he could get to Noriega by treating him well,” the diplomat said.

But it was not enough to get Noriega to accept Laboa’s appeals to leave.

The second turning point was making Noriega realize that the option of seeking refuge in a third country was out, leaving only prosecution in either Panama or the United States as the only choices confronting him.

Laboa repeatedly told the deposed leader that no other country was prepared to take him. Spain and the Dominican Republic publicly announced that they would not grant him safe haven.

But, U.S. officials said, Noriega refused to believe that even Cuba would turn him away. Noriega’s wife and two children had been granted refuge in the Cuban mission.

Then, at some point during the final 48 hours, Laboa, who is also dean of Panama’s diplomatic corps, presented Noriega with a message from the Cuban Embassy.

The message made clear that Havana would not take him, even in the unlikely event that the United States would allow him free passage, according to Panamanian and U.S. sources.

U.S. officials believe that Laboa solicited the note, directly or indirectly, from his Cuban counterparts.

“My impression is that this message finally convinced Noriega of his total isolation,” another European diplomat said.

Added the State Department official, “At this point, he was even less welcome than the shah when he left Iran”--a reference to the wandering exile of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi through Morocco, the Bahamas, Mexico, the United States and Egypt until his death in 1980.

But just in case Noriega missed the point, the nuncio laid out one last option: that the Vatican embassy would haul down its flag and move to new quarters--leaving Noriega alone and exposed.

Throughout this period, Laboa, an extrovert who likes to joke, engaged Noriega in frequent daily conversations to build up his trust.

The deposed dictator apparently was not fully aware that Laboa, who never masked the church’s hostility toward him during his military rule and frequently gave asylum to Noriega’s opponents, had in fact become his principal opponent.

The final turning point came Wednesday, when Laboa bluntly informed Noriega that “his asylum would expire at noon Thursday,” according to a senior Administration source.

That threat opened up the possibility of either American troops or Panamanian officials taking him into custody.

“Noriega finally had to make a choice,” a Pentagon official said.

Laboa also knew that Grupo Direct, an organization of young Panamanian professionals, was set to demonstrate Wednesday outside the nunciature.

He encouraged the move as a tactic that would pressure Noriega more effectively than the barbed wire, blaring music and deployment of elite Delta force commandos around the nunciature.

“It was the final squeeze,” said the State Department official. “It was a brilliant touch. It was the most effective way of making prosecution in the United States look almost inviting. The chanting of thousands of angry people haunted him all day.”

Added the European diplomat: “The nuncio explained to Noriega that . . . if he had stayed in Panama (for trial), he would have been lynched by a mob.

“The only place he could have guaranteed safety was in the United States and he could always hope for a mistrial.”

The ordeal ended as suddenly--and secretly--as it had begun.

The papal nunciature relayed word to Gen. Cisneros, U.S. commander south, on Wednesday afternoon that the “end was near,” according to the State Department official.

While the Vatican slept, the persuasive Spaniard personally negotiated the final steps.

Noriega, the nunciature told the Americans, had some final requests. He wanted the right to wear a uniform and to be met by an officer of general rank, no advance publicity, and some time to make calls to his family. Cisneros agreed and a uniform was provided.

Laboa insisted that Noriega have a final meal before his long flight to captivity in Miami. In turn, the former dictator asked for a souvenir from the nunciature--a Bible--to take with him.

At 8:48 p.m., Noriega--accompanied by Laboa and two other priests--finally walked out of the gate. Three minutes later, he was detained by U.S. troops.

“There was a man of God, the nuncio, a priest, and a man of power, General Manuel Noriega,” Vatican spokesman Joaquin Navarro mused in obvious elation Thursday. “In the end, the man of God won.”

Freed reported from Panama City and Wright reported from Washington. Times staff writers Richard Boudreaux in Panama City, William D. Montalbano in Rome and Art Pine in Washington contributed to this report.

TRICKY LEGAL GROUND--U.S. attorneys were cautious in making arrest. A4

ANGER IN MIAMI--Panamanians outside courthouse hostile to Noriega. A4

THE RISE AND FALL OF MANUEL NORIEGA

Key events related to Gen. Manuel A. Noriega’s rule of Panama and his overthrow: 1981 Gen. Omar Torrijos, Noriega’s mentor and predecessor as Panama’s strongman, dies in plane crash. 1982 March--Three of Torrijos’ colonels, Ruben Dario Paredes, Roberto Diaz Herrera and Noriega, cut a deal to resolve power struggle. Paredes takes over as armed forces chief and agrees to retire in 1983, leaving Noriega to take over with Diaz Her-rara as second in command. Noriegapromises to deliver 1984 presidential election to Paredes. 1983 August--Noriega takes over as military chief. Panamanian legislature passes law creating Panama Defense Forces with control over National Guard, police, Panama Canal matters and other areas. Noriega reneges on Paredes deal and installs his own president in 1984 election. 1987 June--Diaz Herrera, retiring as second in command, accuses Noriega of drug-related activities, rigging 1984 election and murdering Dr. Hugo Spadafora, former vice minister of health who accused Noriega of drug trafficking. Protest movement demands investigation; street protests are brutally crushed. 1988 Feb. 4--Federal grand jury in Miami indicts Noriega on drug-running charges. Grand jury in Tampa returns similar indictments. Feb. 25--President Eric Delvalle, who was installed by Noriega, announces that he has fired his patron. Feb. 26--Noriega-dominated National Assembly ousts Delvalle, who goes into hiding. Washington continues to recognize him as head of state. Education Minister Manuel Solis Palma is named minister in charge of presidency. Noriega opponents call general strike. Government closes opposition news media. March 3--U.S. courts block withdrawal of Panama funds from U.S. banks. March 11--President Reagan imposes sanctions, including eliminating trade preferences for Panama and withholding Panama Canal fees. March 14--Public employees riot after government is unable to pay wages. March 16--Military coup against Noriega fails; demonstrations erupt in capital. March 28--Troops disperse thousands of anti-government marchers and storm Marriott Hotel, beating and arresting opposition activists and journalists. Several are injured, dozens arrested. April 9--United States tightens economic sanctions, prohibiting U.S. firms from making payments to Panamanian government. Some $56 million in Panamanian funds in American banks are frozen. United States tries to negotiate Noriega’s departure without success. May 9--Panamanian banks impose severe restrictions, including a freeze on savings accounts. Aug. 21--U.S. accuses Panama of 240 incidents of harassment of U.S. military personnel in 1988. 1989 May 7-9--Presidential election pits Noriega candidate against opposition candidate Guillermo Endara. Noriega’s victory claim is countered by rioters as well as international observers who say ballots were rigged. May 10--Government nullifies election before final results are released, citing fraud and international interference. Endara and his two running mates are beaten and a bodyguard killed by civilian thugs as soldiers look on. Police break up opposition demonstration with gunfire and tear gas. May 11--President Bush orders 2,000 U.S. troops to Panama, joining more than 10,000 already there. Sept. 1--Provisional President Francisco Rodriguez takes office, but Noriega remains de facto leader. Oct. 3--Attempted U.S.-backed military coup against Noriega fails; ringleader is reportedly summarily executed by Noriega himself. Dec. 15--Noriega says Panama is in a “state of war” with U.S. Dec. 16--Panamanian soldiers kill U.S. Marine lieutenant, saying he and three others fired at Noriega’s military headquarters, wounding three people. U.S. denies charge. Dec. 18--U.S. Army officer wounds Panamanian police corporal because he thought the man was about to draw a weapon, according to U.S. military. Dec. 19--Bush orders U.S. troops into combat in Panama City on mission to seize Noriega to face federal drug charges in the United States. White House says mission is also intended to protect American lives, restore democracy and preserve integrity of the Canal. Dec. 24--Noriega seeks refuge at Vatican embassy. Bush Administration demands that he be turned over to face drug charges; intense negotiations involving Vatican, U.S. and new Panamanian government ensue. 1990 Jan. 3--Noriega leaves Vatican embassy and surrenders to U.S. Jan. 4--Plane carrying Noriega arrives in Florida. Source: Associated Press