There’s No Sure Path to Latino Power : Redistricting: Concentrated or dispersed, minority voting strength can be undercut. A better route is a larger Board of Supervisors.

The trial of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors over the method they used in 1981 to redistrict the five supervisorial districts raises two fundamental questions that go beyond this particular case: What is the best way to empower a group, and how can political effectiveness be maximized for everyone?

The supervisors have been charged with drawing their district lines so that the county’s Latino voters were spread over three districts rather than being concentrated more heavily in one or two. The plaintiffs contend that under the supervisors’ plan, Latinos were denied a reasonable opportunity to elect one of their own because their voting strength was diluted among three districts.

The first question is how best to empower a group, giving it a role in the decision-making process. Is a group better served if its members are lumped into a single district, thereby increasing substantially the possibility of electing a member of that group? Or is the group better represented if its people and voting strength are dispersed throughout the county, although not in sufficient numbers to constitute a majority of voters in any one district?

Both approaches to political empowerment rest on assumptions that are appealing but questionable. If a district is created for a particular group, that may be the quickest way for it to gain formal office and to begin to build an effective base for further electoral victories.

A single seat, however, may not ensure that the people can achieve their objectives. The board member may be politically isolated, or if all of a group’s power is concentrated in one district, other board members may pay even less attention to that group’s views.

The other approach to acquiring decision-making authority is dispersing a group’s voting strength throughout the county. It does not need a majority or even a plurality to influence the outcome of elections. In fact, in very close elections, it can considerably increase its voting power by being a swing bloc.

There is the potential, therefore, for a group to be influential in more than one district, but essential conditions must exist, and these are difficult to ensure. It must either be cohesive in close elections or large enough to make major candidates pay attention to the group.

The success of either empowerment approach, therefore, is dependent upon several variables. Selecting one strategy over the other cannot guarantee that true political power will be achieved automatically.

The second political question stemming from this controversy is, how can all people in the county attain greater political effectiveness? A large part of the answer lies in changing the board itself.

The number of supervisors should be increased to at least seven. Each of the supervisors today represents about 1.5 million people. By comparison, each of the 15 Los Angeles City Council members represents about 200,000 people. By adding two supervisors, the voting influence of everyone in the county is increased because the districts will be smaller. As a consequence, supervisors will be less geographically and politically removed from most of their constituents.

The 2 million Latinos in the county should benefit immediately in several districts because of their population distribution. Yet all people in the county will have greater opportunity to make their votes count more than they do now. This in turn should make supervisors more responsive and accountable.

Had the Board of Supervisors carried through with two reform proposals made in the 1970s, this current trial might have been avoided. It was suggested then that the board membership be increased and that a separate office of county executive, elected by the voters, be created.

The justification for the additional supervisors was the same as we read today: to get more diverse representation and to draw supervisors closer to the electorate. The rationale for the executive, a county mayor in effect, was that there should be separation of power and checks and balances in county government. Without an executive branch, the five supervisors act as both county legislature and executive.

The major argument against these proposals was the added cost to the taxpayer. Less publicly, some of the supervisors did not want their political power diluted by new supervisors or assumed by the county executive. Hence, there was little political support for the ideas and they faded.

No single reform or court decision can correct all the structural deficiencies of the board. Regardless of the ultimate disposition of this court case, some political changes should be made not just to provide representation for one group but to improve representation for everyone. Increasing the number of supervisors can be an important first step.

This trial and the public discussion of the issues can be the impetus for requiring Los Angeles County to change its 19th-Century structure to one more democratic to meet the increasing challenges facing government in the 1990s and beyond