Buying Time and More Opportunity : Soviet Union: Gorbachev has taken his country another giant leap forward. But the transformation is not complete, and in no way assured.

Explaining the new Soviet policy of non-interference in Eastern Europe, Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze asserted this week that “it is easier to change our policies than to change their people.”

Mikhail S. Gorbachev might well have defended his domestic policies in similar terms. Shevardnadze’s statement stands on its head half a century of Communist Party beliefs and efforts. The Central Committee’s endorsement of the principle of a multiparty system marks a watershed in Soviet history, moving beyond perestroika to a more fundamental transformation of the Soviet system. Having earlier renounced the Communist Party’s monopoly on truth and endorsed a “socialist pluralism” of ideas, the Soviet leadership now renounces the other main tenet of Leninism: its claim to a monopoly of power.

By throwing his support to the advocates of radical political change, Gorbachev has departed from his effort to hold together a coalition bridging reformers and conservatives within his party. The step-by-step radicalization of his reform program effectively splintered the coalition that had brought him to power and increasingly alienated its conservative wing. At the same time, it generated mounting expectations and pressures for even more far-reaching political and economic change and growing frustration with Gorbachev’s vacillating response. The rapid unraveling of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe accelerated the pressures for change in the Soviet Union itself. Ever the master politician, Gorbachev has once again managed to convert a dangerous impasse and a widespread crisis of confidence into a signal victory for himself and his cause. At the very least, it gives him time--and an opportunity to forge other changes in Soviet life.

Clearly, the decision to force the party into political competition can be defended as a response to the de facto emergence of a multiplicity of political forces in the Soviet Union. What began as a reform from above unleashed a remarkable explosion of independent social and political activity generated from below. Tens of thousands of so-called “informal” groups and movements now cover the Soviet political landscape, from small single-issue lobbies to broad “popular fronts” in the non-Russian republics embracing millions of members and supporters. As politics returned and a new cast of actors emerged, a whole spectrum of political orientations has begun to crystallize, ranging from Communist fundamentalists and Slavophile nationalists to Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and environmentalists.

It will take some months before the new multi-party system is officially endorsed by the Communist Party Congress and given constitutional form by the Soviet legislature. It will take even longer before grass-roots organizations manage to establish networks, enlist members, acquire funds and know-how to compete at the polls and in the media, and overcome the chicanery and foot-dragging of local officials who will no doubt seek to obstruct their efforts. If the appeal of the Communist Party has plummeted, its organizational advantages over potential political rivals remain enormous.

Much of the new political activity is likely to take the form of nationalist parties confined in their organization and appeal to single republics, such as Estonia, Georgia or Moldavia. And the Communist Party is also likely to be transformed further as it attempts to cope with the new political environment.

Not only may the Communist Party fragment along republic lines--the Lithuanian party has already asserted its independence of Moscow--but it may also divide between right and left. The advocates of more rapid and more radical change are themselves divided between economic reformers committed to efficiency and marketization and populists concerned with social justice and opposed to private enterprise. The conservatives are divided not only between moderate defenders of the status quo and intolerant, anti-democratic extremists, but also between committed Communists and conservative Russian nationalists who share little in common beyond hostility to Gorbachev and to the West. Both groups are further divided over the nationality problem.

Popular support for all these groups and parties is extremely fluid, given the rapid pace of change and the novelty of the political scene. Their prospects will largely depend on situational factors beyond their control, but also on their political skill in exploiting unfolding opportunities and articulating broadly appealing themes. It is well to bear in mind, however, that many features of the Soviet scene--above all, the profound economic crisis, the growing threat of national conflicts and fragmentation, and the rise of Russian nationalism and xenophobia--make it likely that the process of transformation will be far more painful and protracted, and far less benign, than in Eastern Europe.

This week’s momentous developments in Moscow mark a giant step forward. But in themselves they do not help resolve, relieve or manage the formidable economic and ethnic problems that threaten to destabilize the Soviet system itself.