U.S. to Shed Main Role in S. Korea Military Alliance

U.S. and South Korean officials announced Thursday that the United States will withdraw part of its armed force here and gradually relinquish its dominant role in the military alliance between the two countries, eventually turning over all major commands to South Korean officers.

The plan disclosed by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and South Korean Defense Minister Lee Sang Hoon would fundamentally alter the 37-year-old security arrangement between the two countries.

Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the joint U.S.-Korean military structure has been commanded by an American four-star general. That post and a number of other subordinate commands will soon be turned over to the Koreans.

The so-called “Koreanization” of the relationship marks a profound shift in one of the United States’ most important military pacts. It results from growing South Korean self-reliance and self-confidence as well as a global retrenchment of the American military forced by a shrinking U.S. defense budget.

At a press conference here after a 90-minute meeting between the two defense chiefs, Lee said that Seoul accepts the need for the United States to trim its current 43,500-man military force. He also said that his government has agreed to pay more--”within limits”--toward support of the remaining American soldiers.

The United States plans to withdraw as many as 7,000 noncombat troops from South Korea over the next three years, while asking the South Koreans to double their current $300-million annual contribution to the $2.4 billion-a-year cost of maintaining the large U.S. force here.

Cheney, noting that the United States intends gradually to reduce its military presence on the peninsula, reassured the Koreans: “We are not going to move precipitously. The commitment remains strong. The threat (from North Korea) is undiminished.”

But while insisting that the United States has no intention of abandoning its Asian ally, Cheney said: “The nature of our relationship has changed somewhat. The Republic of Korea can now do more to provide for its own security.”

The initial American troop-cut proposal was met with “horror” by South Korean officials, according to a senior U.S. aide traveling with Cheney.

“They have a fear . . . that any withdrawal means the beginning of the plug being pulled, that the American security blanket is gone,” the official said. But he said the U.S. position is unequivocal: “We want them to take over” responsibility for their own defense.

Cheney said the change in the U.S. posture in South Korea is part of an overall reassessment of the American military role throughout the Pacific Basin. He is currently on a two-week swing through Asia during which he will also present Japanese and Philippine officials with plans for U.S. troop withdrawals and demands for greater local contributions to the defense of those nations.

The Pentagon plans to cut U.S. troop strength in South Korea, Japan and the Philippines by 10% to 12% over the next three years, a reduction of 12,000 to 15,000 men from the current level of 120,500.

Cheney is trying to head off impatient critics in Congress who want much deeper cuts on grounds that the threat to the United States has abated and money now spent on military forces can be diverted to civilian programs.

South Korean Defense Minister Lee said that Seoul anticipates that the United States will soon shift “from a leading role to a supporting role” in the defense of the Korean Peninsula.

He also acceded to U.S. demands that South Korea pay a far greater share of U.S. military costs here.

“The Republic of Korea is willing to increase cost-sharing on a gradual basis within the limits of its ability and affordability,” Lee said at the press conference.

He noted that, like Cheney, he has to persuade a restive legislature that the increases in defense spending are worthwhile.

The cost-sharing talks are at an early stage, both officials noted. The most serious conflicts concern military construction and payment of Korean civilian employees of the U.S. military.

The South Koreans have consistently refused to pay for building any facilities that are not directly related to combat, such as the libraries, swimming pools, bowling alleys and theaters that the United States provides its soldiers to make duty in South Korea more appealing.

The South Koreans say that since they don’t provide such luxuries for their own troops, they will not pay to build them for the rich Americans.

A similar concern underlies the refusal to pay the salaries and benefits of 22,000 South Koreans who work for the U.S. military here. The “local hires” are much better paid than comparable Korean workers and the Koreans balk at subsidizing the gap.