No Matter Who Wins, America Can Help : Nicaragua: Sunday’s vote will be historic, but the economic disaster won’t change. One real need is speedy normalization of U.S. relations with the victor.

Sunday’s election is of historic importance for the future of Nicaragua.

Whether opposition candidate Violeta Chamorro is elected or President Daniel Ortega reconfirmed, the new government will enjoy the legitimacy conferred by the vote and by international recognition.

The winner, however, will face two central problems: lingering civil conflict and economic chaos. Neither the Sandinistas nor the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) has exhibited the vision necessary to successfully resolve these problems.

Nicaragua’s economy has been reduced to subsistance levels. Exports have dropped to 20% of 1978 levels, unemployment has reached 30% of the working-age population and inflation is unmeasurable. These indicators are a formidable source of political dissatisfaction. But the opposition’s message has been lost in symbolism and it has not been able to to develop an appealing electoral platform. Its campaign has suffered from divisions and a lack of leadership and organizational capacity.

During the campaign, UNO has resembled the opposition in South Korea during its last election, in which divisions in the opposition facilitated the victory of the governing party. Persistent factionalism in the opposition is making it probable that Ortega will be reconfirmed, but not because Nicaraguans are better off after 10 years of revolution or because Sandinism is the most popular movement.

Nevertheless, dissatisfaction and the search for an alternative have turned out large crowds for opposition rallies, united in the chant “This time they go.” The spontaneous support of the people seems less the result of the appeal of UNO’s campaign and electoral program than a referendum against Sandinista rule. If economic issues and the urgency for change carry the election, Chamorro could win. If nationalism and party organization are the key, Ortega benefits.

Ortega’s primary goal is to remain in power. The Sandinista’s ideological project has stalled, and the foreign subsidies that financed their revolutionary experiments are no longer forthcoming. If he is defeated, invalidating the election is not a realistic option. Such an act could easily engender a crisis similar to those that ended the regimes of Eastern Europe.

Beginning the task of reconstruction will require a national accord. If UNO wins, its 14 constituent parties must form a coherent coalition without interference from the United States. If the Sandinista front wins, it cannot continue to treat the opposition as a means of legitimizing its power or presume that it has been handed a mandate to continue promoting Sandinista political projects.

My country is exhausted by conflict, and international expectations awakened by the revolution against Anastasio Somoza in 1979 have been frittered away. Nicaragua needs political openness, a climate of confidence, management skills and foreign assistance.

During the long campaign, the Bush Administration acts like an accountant, letting others take the risks while being content with recording profits and losses.

Its policy has been to hope for a UNO victory, which would be a cheap solution to the Nicaragua problem. Now, if the opposition does not win, what are the alternatives for U.S. policy? Continuation of the war is not a real possibility, despite the fact that several thousand resistance combatants are inside Nicaragua. No country in the region is willing to risk getting involved, given the unreliability of U.S. policy. And given the United States’ new relationship to the Soviet Union, there is simply no political will to re-start the conflict.

Regardless of who wins this election, the United States has the possibility of entering a new phase of relations with Nicaragua. Normalization is inevitable.

U.S. policy must be clearly defined to avoid polarization of domestic debate and enhance the democratic process in Nicaragua. Resolving the trade embargo would help economic recovery, and providing economic aid for the safe return and relocation of Nicaraguans would help national reconciliation.

The Bush Administration’s foreign policy has been one of impeccable pragmatism. In the case of Nicaragua, its reluctance to define its policy seems the result of internal political calculations. Until now, the silence of the Administration has been justified for reasons of political prudence. Tomorrow that silence may be a lost opportunity.