Excerpts: Told Aides to Act ‘Within Law,’ Reagan Says

Here are excerpts from former President Ronald Reagan’s testimony as a defense witness in the Iran-Contra trial of his former national security adviser, John M. Poindexter . Richard W. Beckler, Poindexter’s lead attorney, questioned Reagan about internal Administration meetings on the “Iran initiative”:

Question: Maybe you could tell the jury a little bit about what you recall about those meetings and the fact that there was disagreement and so on?

Answer: Yes. I do recall that word had come back from our people dealing with the Iranians that they wanted something, some evidence, that would make them confident that they were meeting with people who had access to the top levels of government in our country.

And the thing that the Iranian representative had suggested was a single shipment of TOW anti-tank missiles to be sold to them, not given . . . .

And my word back to our people was that we had a policy that we did not do business with a government that supported terrorism.

The answer that came back was that these individuals did not support terrorism, and there was some documentation to the effect that they had shown an opposition to terrorism wherever they had an opportunity . . . .

And I made the decision that there was one thing upon which we could base selling them this single order of TOW missiles that could be transported in a single--in one airplane, and that was that we had some nine hostages being held by the Hezbollah, which had a kind of philosophical relationship with Iran, and that, if they would use their efforts to get our hostages freed, yes, we would make this sale.

They agreed that they would do that. And so the shipment was sent. And I can’t place the timing, but very shortly thereafter, we had received two of the hostages, not together--one at a time--and were told that two more would be available within probably 48 hours.

And it was at about this time that the little weekly newspaper in Beirut printed an erroneous story that we were doing business directly with the Khomeini and trading arms for hostages.

If you want the disagreement that occurred between our people, some of the people said that this would--they didn’t say that it was trading (arms) for hostages ‘cause it wasn’t. My answer--they said it would be made to appear that way if it ever came to light. My answer to that was that, if I had a child kidnaped and held for ransom, and if I knew of someone who had perhaps the ability to get that child back, it wouldn’t be dealing with the kidnapers to ask that individual to do that. And it would be perfectly legitimate for me to reward that individual for doing this.

Q: Mr. President, perhaps you could explain to the members of the jury whether the Contra support, the freedom fighter support, was one of--was a very important issue that concerned you during your tenure as President?

A: Yes, it was very important. Here was one of the countries in the Americas that had evidently been picked for becoming a Soviet satellite. The Sandinistas, the revolution to overthrow the dictator, the Sandinistas were a part of the revolutionary group. The revolution was also made up of other people and citizens of Nicaragua.

And the Sandinistas and the revolution sent to the Organization of American States a request that they urge Somoza, the dictator, to step down and end the killing in that revolution. And the Organization of American States asked for a report as to what were the aims of the revolutionaries who were making this request. And they gave those aims, and it was multiple parties. It was freedom of choice. It was freedom of press. It was all the things we believe are pure democracy.

And so the organization asked Somoza, and he said: “If it will save killing more people, I will step down.” And he did.

Then the Sandinistas were the only organized group in the revolution. They seized power. They even exiled some of the leaders of the revolution, jailed some of them, and they took over the government. They announced that the revolution would not stop at their borders, that they were going to carry it on to other countries. They made it very plain that they were going to create what they had created, a communist government.

And the people of Nicaragua began trying to revolt, but they would wind up herded into jail. I was visited in Washington by two clergymen, neither one of whom had any ears. The Sandinistas had cut his ears off. And not a word of that had ever appeared in our public press, even though I introduced one man to a great group of the press in the East Room of the White House.

And they had a great disinformation campaign, which divided the people outside Nicaragua as to who should get support--the Sandinista government, or the group that had seized the government, or the Contras, who were freedom fighters, who wanted to have what we have in our own country and that the result of the revolution would be a democracy.

Q: Now, did there come a time, Mr. President, in 1984--early 1984--when it looked like funds that Congress had provided for Contra support were running out? Do you recall that time frame?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you recall what your instructions were to your top people at that time as to what ought to be done about this?

A: Yes. My instructions were that whatever we did in trying to maintain the existence of the Contras should be done within the law. I emphasized that at every time.

Q: Mr. President, you said before that getting funds for the Contras was an important item for your Administration. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And--

A: May I explain? Would this be helpful or would this be appropriate if I explained why I feel so strongly about this?

Q: Yes.

A: We know that there were guerrilla groups all over Latin America, all of them being supplied with their military power by Castro in Cuba, and which--and he in turn was supplied by the Soviet Union. We only had to heed the words of Lenin, which was guiding them, when Lenin said that the Soviet Union would take Eastern Europe. It would organize the hordes of Asia, and then it would move on to Latin America. And once having taken that, it wouldn’t have to take the last bastion of capitalism, the United States. The United States would fall into their outstretched hand like overripe fruit.

Well, history reveals that the Soviet Union followed that policy and almost up to the present head man there. And so, when this was taking place down there, when we knew that the Nicaraguan government--the Sandinista government--was determined that it was going to join the spreading of communism to other American countries, there was no way we could sit by in our position here and let that happen without giving those freedom fighters the opportunity to fight for their freedom. And I saw nothing wrong with that.

Q: Now, Mr. President, in addition to this phone call, as I mentioned a little while ago, you also had a meeting on May 21 with President Suazo (then the president of Honduras) . . . . Once again, this meeting with President Suazo, do you recall where it took place?

A: Well, I have to recall. I see right here. Took place in the Cabinet room, which was usually the meeting place for such things.

Q: Can you tell the members of the jury what the purpose of this meeting was with President Suazo, as best as you can recall?

A: Well, I think the description down here of it is pretty accurate. It was to provide a public demonstration of the close relationship between our two countries and our commitment to their sovereignty and territorial integrity in the event that the Nicaraguan government should--should threaten them with any action. And that we were going to continue our support for the--for the freedom fighters.

Q: Mr. President, during some of these meetings, were you given something like a 3-by-5 card you would perhaps refer to from time to time to guide you in your meetings? I mean, you had so many meetings, I am sure that you would be given something.

A: Yes. And it was simply to outline the subjects of things that I was to see if they didn’t bring up that we brought up, that we should talk to together . . . .

Q: Looking at that first paragraph on that page, and I refer you to the statement where it says: “Without making the linkage too explicit, it would be useful to remind Suazo that in return for our help in the form of security assurances as well as aid, we do expect cooperation in pursuit of our mutual objectives.”

A: Uh-huh, uh-huh.

Q: Perhaps you could explain basically what that refers to?

A: Well, again, I think it is the same tone. That we don’t want to press them to go too far that they challenge the Sandinista government and wind up in open hostilities with them. And the--it would be useful however to remind them for our help in the form of security assurances as well as aid that we do expect cooperation. That we feel that there is an obligation on their part too.

Q: In 1985 and 1986, did you know--just tell the jury generally about what you knew about what Oliver North was doing with regard to helping the situation in Central America vis-a-vis the freedom fighters.

A: Well, you have to have people who can be available to make contact with the leaders of the Contras and so forth, sometimes closer than just writing a letter. And it was my feeling and my understanding--I did not meet individually with him to any extent at all. But it was my understanding, because his name would crop up in memos and so forth, that that’s what he was doing.

And I am trying to think what the other angle (was). I know that there was another area too in which he participated. Well, for example, in the meeting with the Iranians, he was involved in that, and I think was actually there in the meetings with them. Whether all of the time or not, I am not familiar.

Prosecutor Dan K. Webb, cross-examining Reagan about a letter Poindexter sent Congress on July 21, 1986, about National Security Council involvement in aiding the Contras.

Q: Let me ask you this question based on your role as chief executive of this nation. If the information that Robert McFarlane provided to you in 1985 is false, contained lies and deceived and obstructed Congress, would it still be your belief that John Poindexter should readopt those false statements in responding to Congress on July 21, 1986? . . .

A: Well, I simply--no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending those letters, McFarlane. And I have never . . . caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.

Q: I understand. But I am just asking you, as I understand it--am I correct, Mr. President, that the letter that you were looking at there from John Poindexter dated July 21, 1986, you, yourself, actually did not approve and authorize those letters at the time they were sent? Is that correct?

A: I have no recollection of doing so. But that could be my memory. I don’t remember.

Q: I take it as the chief executive and as President of the United States, you did not want or did you authorize your top officials of your Administration to provide false information to Congress? Is that a fair statement?

A: That is a fair statement.

Q: Let me call your attention to one specific thing that I think you testified to on direct.

As I understand, on direct examination, you related to some extent that your attorney general, Ed Meese, on or about Nov. 24, 1986, after making some type of evaluation and inquiry into the Iranian arms sale initiative advised you that he had discovered that there was some Swiss bank accounts involved, and that money out of the Iranian arms sales appeared to have gone in some way to assist the Contras. Do you recall that?

A: What I testified is that that’s what was being published and carried on by the press. But to this day, all I know is that some sum of money over and above the $12.2-million purchase price appeared in a Swiss bank account in which it was said that account had been used on other occasions to provide help to the Contras. And to this day, I still with all the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was--whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.

Q: . . . My question only to you, sir, is: To the extent that there was in fact a diversion of proceeds, did you in any way approve or authorize that while you were President of the United States?

A: For heaven’s sake, no. And when I was once asked about that extra money and said if it was an added sum to the purchase price, what would I do, I said I would have given it back.

Q: Mr. President, when your Tower Commission reported back to you in March of 1987, did the Tower Commission not tell you, Mr. President, Oliver North and your National Security Council were involved in 1985 and 1986 in assisting the Contras militarily and paramilitarily? Do you recall that being told to you by your Tower Commission?

A: I don’t recall that, and I can only tell you that my interest in that commission was to find out the thing that I still do not know, and that was how did there turn out to be more money than the 12 million two for the TOW anti-tank missiles, who delivered and who--obviously, it seemed to me that someone must have raised the price for those, but that was never found out. I still do not know.