It’s There, So Recognize It : Lithuania: Nervous Americans worry about Gorbachev’s survival. But U.S. support for the government in Vilnius can help prevent chaos.

The Bush White House remains mute in the face of pleas from Vilnius that the United States recognize Lithuania’s newly reconstituted government. The silence is puzzling. Washington claims that the forceful incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union in 1940 is unlawful, yet it refuses to extend diplomatic recognition to the government of President Vytautus Landsbergis.

President Bush argues that U.S. recognition of Lithuania could possibly undermine Mikhail S. Gorbachev just as he, in the new role of Soviet president, faces serious economic problems, mounting popular discontent and ethnic strife at home. Bush contends it is in the vital interests of the United States to spare Gorbachev from a setback that his neo-Stalinist opponents could exploit to topple him.

The chief State Department spokesperson, Margaret Tutwiler, said after Lithuania’s March 11 declaration of independence that it has been the practice of the United States “to establish formal relations with the lawful government of any state once that government is in effective control of its territory and capable of entering into, and fulfilling, international obligations.” Since that time, President Bush has urged both sides to abstain from threats and to negotiate their differences.

Administration supporters argue that even if the Lithuanians were capable of controlling their country politically and achieving economic viability, the United States could not force Gorbachev to recognize the Landsbergis government. This factor, they would have us believe, probably best explains not only Washington’s failure to recognize Lithuania, but also why no other government has extended diplomatic recognition.

Others in the Bush Administration downplay the situation. Gorbachev’s modus operandi is to bluster and rage in the face of opposition even as he seeks reconciliation. They say he will use similar tactics in dealing with the Lithuanians. Thus, there is no need for Washington to press and risk losing his good will. In truth, these justifications are disingenuous, cynical and flawed.

Gorbachev has wrested many concessions from the West. He has done this by skillfully manipulating the idea that while law and morality are on the Lithuanians’ side, politics dictate he deny them their freedom. Otherwise, he says, hard-liners in the Kremlin will depose him.

American Kremlinologists agree that Gorbachev’s internal problems are mounting. But, simultaneously, they argue that he has consolidated his power. As George Kennan told Congress in January, Gorbachev’s opponents are afraid of toppling him because, even if they could, they are terrified of the chaos that would accompany his demise.

President Landsbergis is a resolute proponent of his nation’s independence, but he is also a pragmatist. He expects negotiations with Moscow to be detailed and protracted. He knows that Lithuania will continue to have intimate economic relations with the Soviet Union. It is in both sides’ interests that this continue. Landsbergis knows that his country will initially experience economic difficulties, but he also believes in Lithuania’s capacity to achieve a level of economic prosperity at least equal to the present.

Landsbergis favors negotiations with Gorbachev and is willing to make concessions. For example, he has said that the Red Army must leave Lithuania, while conceding that Moscow should be allowed to maintain naval bases on the Baltic in such strategic areas as Klaidpeda. It is Gorbachev who has been making threats and refusing to talk with Lithuanian authorities. Lithuania has the capacity to “control its territory” and fulfill “its international obligations” . . . if Moscow does not place barriers in its path.

The multitude of problems threatening the Soviet Union cannot be resolved without Western assistance and good relations with the United States. If resolute, President Bush could induce Gorbachev to halt his bullying tactics (such as the current military exercises in Lithuania) and intimidating rhetoric, which could easily lead to violent outbreaks that neither Gorbachev nor Landsbergis wants. Gorbachev is a political visionary. He knows that the Soviet empire is an anachronism and cannot long survive as presently constituted. The Lithuanians have provided him with a peaceful solution to the problem.

Soviet threats to use force to confiscate the personal firearms of Lithuanians (which Moscow knows would never be used against the awesome Red Army) and the arrest of young Lithuanians who have deserted the armed forces could lead to bloodshed. Once violence occurs, it would be very difficult to control its destructive course. Gorbachev could not possibly desire another Baku, and certainly President Bush does not, either.

The United States can wait no longer, nor act like a bystander, in a drama that could turn into great tragedy for the Lithuanian people and possibly destroy the constructive course of East-West relations. By recognizing Lithuania, President Bush could help avoid impending disaster.