Sweet Revenge at Cam Ranh Bay? : Vietnam: A call by U.S. warships would end the tilt toward China and indicate a new role as regional stabilizer.

A delegation from the House Arms Services Committee has set out for Southeast Asia to look at the alternatives for the bases in the Philippines. Among their destinations is an unusual place--Hanoi.

Will the Americans return to Cam Ranh Bay, the naval base they built and left to be taken over by the Soviets? The question may not be as absurd as it sounds. As the United States begins looking for new facilities for its ships and planes to operate in Asia, there have been intriguing hints from Hanoi that the American ships would be welcome to call at Cam Ranh Bay. It does not appear to be just a bait to lure the Americans into normalizing relations with Vietnam. It is an expression of their geopolitical concerns.

The Vietnamese, for sure, are not about to hand over part of their sovereign territory to the Americans. But, like the port in Singapore, Cam Ranh Bay will be open for visits, resupply and perhaps repair. In the past several months the Vietnamese have hinted to U.S. visitors to Hanoi that Cam Ranh Bay will sooner or later be vacated by the Soviets and will be open to ships of friendly nations. In December, the Soviets quietly crated all the MiG-23 fighters and Tu-16 bombers stationed in Cam Ranh Bay and sent them home. According to Moscow, about 50 ships operating from Cam Ranh Bay have been withdrawn. A Vietnamese official told an American politician in February that Cam Ranh Bay was an open port and U.S. warships could visit after or just prior to normalization of relations. “I look forward to U.S. warships visiting Cam Ranh Bay,” the Hanoi official told the startled man.

Located on the edge of the South China Sea overlooking one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, Cam Ranh Bay had long attracted the attention of seafaring nations. In 1905, a Russian fleet on its way to attack Japan cast anchor at Cam Ranh Bay. Sixty years later Americans turned it into one of largest air-naval bases in the world and then left it to the victorious North Vietnamese. Shortly after the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam, Cam Ranh Bay was opened to yet another Russian fleet--now Hanoi’s ally.

For Hanoi, an American call at Cam Ranh Bay would both herald the restoration of ties between the two countries and signal a new geopolitical order. It would symbolically end the American tilt toward China and indicate Washington’s willingness to play the role of a stabilizer.

For Washington to send ships back to Cam Ranh Bay to use the additional piers the Soviets built would be more than sweet revenge. It would be an important step in redefining the American role in Asia in the post-Cold War era. It is a role in which diplomacy, trade and technology rather than firepower play the primary role. America’s limited military presence and cooperation with countries of Southeast Asia should serve as a symbol of its continued commitment to stability and peace in the region rather than a hair-trigger deterrent.

There is nervousness in Southeast Asia that the declining Soviet threat, bitter wrangles with the Philippines and the pressure of congressional budget cutters would bring about a precipitate American withdrawal from the region. But for many reasons--from nonaligned aspirations to suspicion of the neighbors--none of the countries except Singapore would like to host American forces. And even Singapore is reluctant to sign a “status of forces agreement” to give extra-territorial rights to American servicemen. Nationalistic Filipinos have been calling for a joint-use agreement that would remove the stigma of hosting foreign military bases.

If the United States is going to move in the direction of joint use of air fields and gunnery ranges and commercial use of the repair facilities, it would make sense to include Cam Ranh Bay in the list of such landing sites. Hard-working and skilled Vietnamese would provide as good a labor force as any and would be much cheaper.

With Cold War exigencies disappearing, nations in Southeast Asia will be increasingly competing for wealth and power, and traditional rivalries will resurface. Few expect the American forces, inevitably smaller in coming years, to be the region’s policeman. But as the only non-threatening outside power (on whose market, capital and technology a lot rides) the United States has the new role of referee and as a balancer. By dropping anchor at Cam Ranh Bay, the Americans will finally cast away an unhappy past.