Debating Debates: No ‘Big Mo’ : ‘GOOD’ VS. ‘BAD’ ABORTIONS: THE MATTER OF MOTIVES : Rights: Are there abortions that even supporters of legal abortion wouldn’t allow? Many concerned people are willing to make distinctions.

We are accustomed to arguing about whether abortion is good or bad, about whether women who have them are good or bad--but not about whether there are “good” and “bad” abortions.

Yet the question of such abortions has suddenly surfaced in the California gubernatorial race. Democratic candidate Dianne Feinstein, commenting on China’s birth-control policy, told a reporter that abortion for the purpose of gender selection was an “abuse” of the right, and if it were prevalent, “government could take a look at it,” even with an eye toward outlawing it. In last Sunday’s televised debate, Feinstein’s opponent, John K. Van de Kamp, tried to use her remarks to weaken her abortion-rights credibility, raising the specter of a government inquisitor along the way.

Since then, Feinstein has retreated somewhat. She now says she would veto any legislation that infringed “on a woman’s right to choose in the state of California.” But Feinstein doesn’t “personally believe that abortion should be used for the purpose of selecting the sex of a child.”

There are few, if any, abortions for the purpose of gender selection performed in the United States. In China, a single-child policy and a millennia-old preference for males have resulted in the abortions of female fetuses. Community pressure has also forced the abortion of any fetus once the mother has had her allotted child. The government interferes with a Chinese woman’s right to reproduce, rather than her right not to.

Obviously, this is not our problem. And our society claims that, at least ideally, there should be no difference in value between sons and daughters.

But the controversy of gender-selection abortions raises an interesting point. Suddenly, motive is injected into abortion. Are there abortions that even abortion-rights advocates would not allow? If the fetus is merely a clump of cells, it shouldn’t matter if the abortion is performed for reasons we consider invalid or even frivolous. A sex-selection abortion isn’t an abuse of the right unless you think there is a moral ambiguity in the right itself.

Alternatively, if the fetus is a life from conception, abortion foes who would allow an abortion in the case of rape, incest or danger to a mother’s life are sanctioning killing. If the fetus is a life, it shouldn’t matter how it came into being. The life would be equally sacred whatever the sins of its father.

What seems apparent is that despite the absolutist tone of the debate, many or even most concerned people are willing to make distinctions. Many anti-abortionists will allow reasons for abortions that are so compelling that they outweigh what is seen as the right to life itself. Many strong abortion advocates envision certain reasons for abortion that are less than legitimate. They may not wish to outlaw those kinds of abortions for fear of endangering the right itself. But it seems fair to say that even fervent abortion-rights supporters do not advocate or condone abortions for reasons like sex selection, either favoring boys or girls. There is no right without some form of restriction--no one has asked that the right of abortion be extended to the third trimester.

In light of that, the basic question is: Why do we consider certain motives improper?

The obvious answer is that we distinguish between not wanting a child at all and not wanting a particular child. Quite properly, we shrink from making arbitrary and superficial judgments on what a child should be like--what gender, what coloring, what height. We affirm the equality of all “types” and the value of diversity as the true aim and foundation of freedom of choice.

What makes “selective” abortions different is that they are not motivated by the inabilities or unwillingness of the mother, but by something lacking in the child. Reasons for abortions are usually grounded in the circumstances of the mother, which are concrete and relatively easy to place value judgments on. If the woman is poor or unwed or underage, it is especially easy. If she is married and wealthy, absolution seems slightly more difficult, yet we respect her desire to remain unembarrassed, or to avoid disruption of her family life, or to prevent the birth of a child who will go unloved.

If abortion-rights advocates accept that any inability or unwillingness on the part of the mother is justification enough for an abortion, are we willing to say the same for the child? We approve of, or at least are understanding of, abortions in which the fetus has a congenital disease or deformity. But what other reasons are valid? Is any shortcoming in the fetus enough?

If we answer “no,” the floodgates to all kinds of subversions of the right to choose will be opened. If we answer “yes,” it may become a case of might making right. We would be weighing a life not against another life and against that life’s real problems, but against merely aesthetic preferences simply because we have the power to do so.

Having realized that, what do we do about it? Do we outlaw “bad” abortions?

Abortion-rights advocates will be reluctant to allow any moral distinctions within the framework of choice itself, fearing that this will weaken freedom of choice. This is understandable, in light of the totalitarian nature of the abortion debate today, for which the despots on both sides may be blamed. But a fear of political consequences, while natural, can’t justify the refusal to make important moral distinctions if those distinctions do indeed exist.

In considering legislation to outlaw “bad” abortions, it is not enough to trumpet the evils of government inquiry into motives, as Van de Kamp has done. Motive is important--it makes an accident different from a crime. Nor is it enough to say that such a law is unenforceable. We have any number of difficult-to-enforce laws--against various sexual practices, for example--on the books.

Criminal courts determine motives all the time, in the face of silence or denial by the perpetrator. A woman who has had an abortion because she did not like the sex of the baby she carried may lie about her motives, but there may be letters she has written, a pattern of previous abortions, perhaps an ex-boyfriend or a doctor whose bills she hasn’t paid who is willing to testify against her. The evidence would be put to a jury. Since she’s innocent until proved guilty, her chances of being convicted may be extraordinarily slim. But some women will be convicted. Some may even confess.

For the time being, it is enough to say that “bad” abortions are not really a problem, in California or elsewhere. Such abortions, as has been noted, are extremely rare, if they exist. We don’t need to make legal distinctions because, so far, the motives are ones we can live with.

But what of the future? Genetic engineering has made the concept of customizing your child like a car no longer unthinkable. Those who can afford it will select for hair color or intelligence, and then the rich really will be different from you and me. There may come a day when the right to an abortion will be an affirmation of a great many things that the right to choose stands against. What will we do then?