Bush Aides Fear Major Fight on Arms Treaty : Summit: Senate wrangling over ratification could hurt further negotiations with Moscow.

Even as President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev initialed the broad outlines of a strategic arms reduction treaty on Friday, Bush Administration officials were growing uneasy about the prospects for a major wrangle in the Senate over the ratification of the final START agreement.

In Washington, conservatives have begun to muster their forces for a fight against what they see as U.S. concessions in earlier negotiations between Secretary of State James A. Baker III and his Soviet counterpart, Eduard A. Shevardnadze. A clutch of vocal Republicans have warned that they may oppose ratification.

What concerns the Administration is not that START might fail in the Senate but that a noisy fight could damage Administration efforts to negotiate further arms cuts with Moscow--including conventional forces in Europe.

No more than 20 senators--many fewer than the 34 no votes needed to block a treaty--would be likely to vote against START, according to the Administration’s early nose counts. But officials acknowledged that acrimony over the treaty will be a problem.

“It’s going to be a bloody battle,” said one Pentagon official, who added that the conservatives’ defection has stung the Bush Administration.

The possibility that trouble in the Senate could cast a cloud over other negotiations was underscored by developments Saturday on conventional forces in Europe.

Following Friday’s talks between Bush and Gorbachev, ebullient Soviet aides declared a breakthrough on the previously stalemated effort to negotiate European troop cuts. U.S. officials, while less bullish, were careful not to throw cold water on the Soviets’ assessment of the summit sessions.

In the even more delicate minuets that lie ahead, the last thing Administration negotiators want is congressional critics denouncing their handiwork. “It always weakens the President’s hand if he does not have the support of the legislative branch” on key national security issues, noted Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Potential opponents of the START accord have focused their ire on provisions agreed to by Baker and Shevardnadze. Saying he had “split the difference” with his Soviet counterpart on a number of outstanding details of the START agreement, Baker agreed to accept numerical limits on nuclear-tipped cruise missiles with ranges over 375 miles--a number the Soviets proposed--and appeared to consent to the exclusion of the Soviet Backfire bomber from negotiations.

Conservative arms experts also are troubled by Baker’s failure to persuade Moscow to accept limits on further testing of the Soviet SS-18 missiles. The two sides have agreed to ban “new types of heavy ICBMs,” but conservatives fear Moscow could get around that prohibition by “modernizing” the existing SS-18s.

Worst of all, conservatives feel, Baker appeared to accede to the Soviets’ reluctance to complete reductions in their conventional forces in Europe before a final START treaty is signed later this year. That puts the United States in the position of rewarding the Soviets with a favorable nuclear arms control agreement while it continues its military occupation of Eastern Europe, conservatives charge.

Of course this could change; the Administration seems to expect an agreement this year on conventional forces in Europe.

“The vaunted negotiator caved in to basic Gorbachev demands all the way down the line,” wrote conservative columnist William Safire in the New York Times. Baker’s “get-a-deal imprudence” allowed him to be taken “to the cleaners,” Safire said.

Bush Administration officials sought to assuage disgruntled Senate conservatives this week with promises that Baker’s actions would not bind negotiators as they complete work on the treaty.

“We’re being assured that when we see the text of what they’re initialing, we’ll see that they haven’t given away the store,” said one Republican staff member.

Still, there is widespread suspicion among conservatives that the final agreement will include several of the most troubling provisions.

That could pave the way for a querulous Senate debate.

Add to this a lack of enthusiasm for the treaty on the part of many Senate liberals and moderates. Congressional sources said last week that the START agreement’s failure to put limits on mobile missiles or naval weapons, in addition to what they see as its modest warhead reductions, have disappointed many senators whose firm support for the treaty could be key to quick ratification.

If such lawmakers believe that the benefits of the treaty are marginal, one Democratic aide noted, they are more likely to demand clarifications and may even send negotiators back to the table, as they did several times during the ratification process of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces agreement.

At a time when Bush may need the Senate’s goodwill for future arms treaties, that kind of protracted debate could pit the President against a Senate that is fiercely protective of its “advise and consent” prerogative.

Also, Democrats such as Sam Nunn of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, are expected to submit conditions for ratification that will seek to ensure Pentagon compliance with the ABM treaty in the “Star Wars” anti-missile program. The Soviets intend to issue a separate unilateral statement outside of the START treaty to the effect that any significant violation of ABM will be grounds for pulling out of START, and legislators like Nunn want to underline their intention to make sure the ABM treaty is observed in a relatively narrow way.

With these and other forces forming, some analysts have already noted eerie parallels between the forthcoming START ratification debate and the acrimonious clash over ratification of SALT II, which was finally set aside when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December, 1979.

For instance, several veteran negotiators involved in drafting the START accord have either criticized the agreement or quit in protest over the Administration’s haste in completing the treaty. Edward L. Rowny, Paul H. Nitze and Richard N. Perle, all powerful conservative voices in sinking SALT II, have raised new criticisms of START and the haste with which it has been negotiated.

Finally, some have warned that a harsh Soviet response to the Baltic states’ demand for freedom could doom the START treaty as surely as Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan did the SALT II accord.

Even Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), while predicting “smooth sailing” for the treaty, warned that “if Lithuania got out of hand, (it) would be a different matter . . . like Afghanistan finally scuttled the Salt II treaty. If a Tian An Men Square-type operation occurred in the Soviet Union or with Lithuania,” Cranston added, “it could poison the atmosphere and maybe kill the treaty.”

Times staff writer Paul Houston contributed to this article.

THE SUPERPOWER ARSENALS

Although the START treaty is not complete, most major decisions have been made. The pact will limit each side to a total of 6,000 warheads. No more than 4,900 warheads can be on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and no more than 3,300 can be on ICBMs alone.

Listed below are major weapons systems and how they will be affected by START. Total destructive power is listed for missile systems and submarines, many of which carry multiple warheads.

For comparison purposes, the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima was 15 kilotons.

MISSILE SYSTEMS

U.S.

MX Missile Destructive power: 5,000 kilotons each Current number: 50 START proposal: 50

Minuteman II Destructive power: 1,200 kilotons each Current number: 450 START proposal: 100

Minuteman III Destructive power: 200 are 510 kilotons each; 300 are 1,005 kilotons each Current number: 500 START proposal: 500

Soviet

SS-18 Destructive power: 5,500-7,500 kilotons each. Current number: 296 START proposal: 154

SS-24 Destructive power: 5,500 kilotons each Current number: 18 START proposal: 75

SS-25 Destructive power: 550 kilotons each Current number: 170 START proposal: 400

SUBMARINES

U.S.

Poseidon class: 27 still commissioned Destructive power: 8,960 to 16,000 kilotons per sub. Under START: Not expected to carry strategic nuclear missiles.

Trident class: 9 launched, 4 being built, 16 more approved by Congress Destructive power: 19,200 to 50,400 kilotons per sub. Under START: 21 deployed

Soviet

Yankee class: 16 still fitted with nuclear missiles Destructive power: 16,000 to 32,000 kilotons per sub. Under START: Not expected to carry strategic nuclear missiles.

Delta class: 12 Can carry 16 missiles, each with 3 to 10 warheads. Under START: Each submarine will carry missiles assumed to have 4 warheads.

Typhoon: 6 Destructive power: 14,000 to 20,000 kilotons per sub. Under START: arsenal reduced to 12,600 to 18,000 kilotons per sub

BOMBERS

Because planes can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons, an arbitrary number of nuclear warheads was allocated to each bomber.

U.S.

Although many U.S. bombers can carry up to 20 nuclear warheads, existing U.S. heavy bombers are assumed to carry 10 warheads each.

B-52: 263 operational, of which 173 carry nuclear weapons Under START: 95 kept operational.

B-1B: 90 operational, each can carry 8 cruise missiles and 12-24 free-fall nuclear bombs. Under START: All expected to remain operational.

B-2 (Stealth): In development, 132 originally planned Can carry 16 cruise missiles and additional free-fall nuclear bombs Under START: Unknown.

FB-111A: 48, can carry up to six nuclear bombs Under START: will no longer carry nuclear weapons.

Soviet

Existing Soviet bombers are assumed to carry 8 warheads, although they are capable of carrying 12. Future Soviet bombers will count as 10 warheads despite a maximum capability of 20.

Bear: 145. Under START: 45 will be counted as carrying one warhead, while 90 will be considered to carry 8 warheads each

Backfire: About 350. Can carry nuclear devices, but are usually conventionally armed. Under START: Are not expected to carry nuclear missiles.

Blackjack: About 12. Each can carry up to 6 cruise missiles and additional gravity bombs. Under START: 32 are expected to be deployed

Sources: Jane’s Fighting Ships (1989-90), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft (1989-90), Jane’s Weapons Systems (1988-89), Natural Resources Defense Council.