COLUMN RIGHT : Fight Iraq by Sea and Air, Not by Land : Keeping our ground troops out will enhance our staying power.

Saddam Hussein has threatened to use foreign civilian hostages as a human shield to deter attack on his military forces and installations. With U.S. military personnel now heavily committed and exposed to dangers enormously greater, both in numbers and kind, the safety of civilian hostages cannot be permitted to drive U.S. military policy. To do so would be nothing less than to treat our soldiers as second-class citizens.

How war is waged depends on the purpose for which the war is fought--the objective--and the nature of the theater of warfare--the terrain, climate, and so on, and the forces and weapons used or expected to be used by the enemy. Thus, there are primarily naval wars, or land wars; if prevailing over the enemy, and not annexation and control of territory, is the casus belli, there can be air wars--and there can be naval-air and land-air wars.

The Middle East conflict in which we find ourselves is, or should be, classed as a naval-air war. And that is how we should wage it.

In these circumstances, the four U.S. Navy carrier task forces, with their complements of aircraft and attendant warships, are sufficient to achieve the objectives of the blockade against Iraq. Those forces alone also are capable of providing full defensive support for Saudi Arabia if augmented by strategic air power--FB-111s, B-52s and B-1Bs--from remote bases, perhaps in Greece or Turkey.

The Saudis’ three AWACS systems, plus the two provided by the United States, should be sufficient to provide military intelligence and surveillance, augmented as they are by our own satellite surveillance capability.

Iraqi land forces, were they to invade Saudi Arabia, could be attacked and repelled in the open desert terrain by carrier-based aircraft, backed by strategic bomber forces from remote U.S. bases. Also, there is the option of applying remotely based air power to devastate the enemy’s war-supporting structures.

The injection of F-15s and ground forces--Army and Marine Corps--was certainly premature and may have been unnecessary and unwise.

The deployment of U.S. F-15s in Saudi Arabia, in addition to the 60 F-15s operated by the Saudis, introduced the need for air bases and airfields, which must be defended by ground forces. These further necessitate ground-force bases that must be defended and supplied.

In a military operation where the modification of enemy behavior is the objective, and where naval blockade of the enemy economy is the instrument, time must be allowed to achieve the desired result.

The injection of additional forces in Saudi Arabia with the intent to strengthen a military presence can be a two-edged sword. Their vulnerability may render them a potential element of weakness and, at best, a distraction from the major purpose: naval blockade, with its economic constraints, extended over a protracted period of time.

If our total involved military personnel were based on the carrier task forces or at remote bases, we could reduce--if not eliminate--their vulnerability to attack. We also would relieve them of host-country problems raised by the billeting of large numbers of military personnel in a climate where custom resists such a presence. In this context, our naval carrier task forces provide bases that are virtually autonomous insofar as logistical support--food, medical service and water--are concerned. Our forces thus could avoid living under conditions strange to them and for which their training has been minimal.

In summary, our strategic posture in this conflict should be reexamined.

Awesome military power can still be brought to bear in defense of Saudi Arabia. It is a region made to order for naval-air action and naval blockade, without a single U.S. soldier having to set foot on Middle East territory. Such a course of action would avoid the casualties to be expected in a land war. More important, it is designed to maximize staying power--at home and abroad--in a protracted conflict, a consideration that could determine the outcome.

It is realized that these recommendations present a picture sharply at variance with the situation as it now exists. The purpose of this analysis is not to criticize action already taken; it is to offer constructively a line of reasoning for circumstances in which we must be sure of our course of action and of our staying ability.

It is never too late to review one’s posture in a critical military situation. Indeed, failure to do so solely because of the extent of our initial ground-force commitment in Saudi Arabia--however that came about--would not commend us favorably to the fortunes of war.